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This thesis examines the motivations of  women who joined the Islamic State af ter engaging with 
the terrorist organisation and their supporters on social media. Public social media posts made 
by Aqsa Mahmood and Hoda Muthana, two western women who joined the Islamic State in 2013 
and 2014, are analysed through the theoretical f ramework of  social identity theory to determine 
the factors that drove them to depart for Syria to become wives and mothers for the Islamic State. 
From here, these common trends are considered in terms of  contemporary countermeasures 
designed to counter terrorist recruitment on social media, to consider how ef fective these might 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
In February 2015, just eight months af ter the Islamic State declared a Caliphate, it was reported 
that 90,000 pro-Islamic State social media posts were produced on a daily basis.1 Not only were 
the Islamic State able to coordinate the dissemination of  their content across the internet, but they 
also seemed to be at least somewhat successful in ef forts to use social media to recruit members 
internationally. An ef fective social media presence formed a core component of  their 
communication and recruitment strategy and became a platform where the Islamic State were 
prof icient in the widespread distribution of  terrorist material and recruitment o f  local and foreign 
f ighters.2 Coupled with its embrace of  social media platforms was its unique approach to female 
recruits. While most Salafist Jihadi terror groups have used local women in a variety of  roles, the 
Islamic State have used social media to  target and recruit women f rom abroad.3 
 
There have been substantially fewer female terrorists than males, though precise f igures vary 
between organisations.4 The status of  female combatants in terrorist organisations with Islamist 
ideologies has been contentious, and women have most of ten occupied traditional, non-
combatant roles in the private space.5 These roles were predominantly f illed by local women and, 
as such, recruitment was not directed toward those outside of  the space in which a terrorist 
organisation physically operated. The Islamic State considered mothers and wives important to 
the survival of  the group and its ideology through raising the next generation of  jihadis and looked 
internationally to recruit suf f icient numbers, thus, ensuring the permanence of  the society the 
Islamic State endeavoured to construct.6 Women were, therefore, targeted by Islamic State 
recruiters online, both through their recruitment material and in direct conversations with them.  
 
As more western women travelled to Syria and Iraq, it became apparent the Islamic State were 
able to inf luence individuals, many of  whom were well-educated, to relocate to a warzone through 
purely online interactions and without in-person contact. The process of  radicalisation and 
recruitment online of ten took place in private, with families and f riends of  the recruit completely 
 
1 Lisa Blaker, “The Islamic State’s Use of  Online Social Media,” Military Cyber Affairs 1, no. 1 
(2015): 1, https://dx.doi.org/10.5038/2378-0789.1.1.1004. 
2 Imran Awan, “Cyber-Extremism: ISIS and the Power of  Social Media,” Social Science and Public 
Policy 54 (2017): 138-139, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12115-017-0114-0. 
3 Meredith Loken and Anna Zelenz, “Explaining Extremism: Western Women in Daesh,” European 
Journal of International Security 3, no. 1 (2018): 47, https://doi.org/10.1017/eis.2017.13. 
4 Cyndi Banks, “Introduction: Women, Gender, and Terrorism: Gendering Terrorism,” Women and 
Criminal Justice 29 (2019): 181-182, https://doi.org/10.1080/08974454.2019.1633612. 
5 Devorah Margolin, “The Changing Roles of  Women in Violence Islamist Groups,” in 
Perspectives on the Future of Women, Gender and Violent Extremism , ed. Audrey Alexander 
(Washington, DC: The George Washington University, 2019): 41. 
6 Anita Perešin, “Why Women f rom the West are Joining ISIS,” International Annals of Criminology 
56 (2018): 33. 
2 
 
unaware of  their intentions until they had already departed for Syria and Iraq.7 This environment 
appears to have become permissive for recruiters online to control the narrative vulnerable 
individuals were exposed to and reduce the opportunities for radicalisation to be disrupted. 
However, these interactions were not devoid of  agency on the part of  women recruited into the 
Islamic State, who were active online across social media, eventually contributing to the 
recruitment of  other women while being radicalised themselves.8  
 
This then raises the question of  what drove women to participate in the Islamic State online and 
to eventually relocate f rom the comfort of  their westernised lifestyles into a conf lict zone.  Their 
recruiters appear to have had a level of  inf luence on the women they engaged with, but this was 
contingent on continued responses in an environment where there are fewer consequences of  
disengaging with undesirable individuals than there are in face-to-face social interactions. 
Furthermore, the escalation f rom online participation to violence represents a radical shif t in 
behaviour that stems f rom a shif t in an individual’s psychological state, whereby they are prepared 
to engage in, or at the very least support, violence in the name of  their newfound belief  system.  
 
This thesis sets out to understand the motivations for western women who joined the Islamic State 
as a result of  their recruitment via social media. What is understood about this process is based 
on the experiences of  individuals and, therefore, it can be dif f icult to determine a formula for 
recruitment. That being said, there are commonalities in the motivations based on the shared  
viewpoints they develop and the experiences that are used to facilitate the radicalisation process. 
Based on the understanding gained of  the motivations that drove western women to join the 
Islamic State, this thesis will seek to identify countermeasures that may be ef fective in the 
mitigation of  these drivers.  
 
7 John Simpson, “ISIS Brides: Parents had no Idea of  Bethnal Green Girls’ Plan to Wage Jihad,” 
The Times, February 13, 2020, https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/isis -brides-parents-had-no-
idea-of-bethnal-green-girls-plan-to-wage-jihad-3m2362h6s. 
8 Lydia Khalil, “Behind the Veil: Women in Jihad af ter the Caliphate,” Lowy Institute, accessed 




Chapter II: Literature Review 
 
In spite of  an abundance of  research, no general theory of  terrorism exists to explain its causes 
or why individuals choose to undertake terrorist activities. In part, this is due to the lack of  an 
agreed def inition of  terrorism; however, it is also due to the heavily politicised discourse on the 
subject.9 Despite the fact that no general theory exists, there are a number of  theories that explore 
the topic f rom a variety of  perspectives and identify several partly overlapping causes and risk 
factors that contribute to terrorism. Broadly, terrorism can be understood at three levels: 
individual, organisational, and systemic. Understanding these levels is important for developing 
strategies to counter terrorism recruitment. This review will provide an overview of  the various 
factors at each level, with a focus on one of  the organisational level theories, social identity theory, 
which will be utilised as a f ramework for understanding the recruitment of  jihadi brides on social 
media. It will then examine literature on female terrorists, their motivations, and the role of  social 
media in terrorist recruitment.  
 
There are several theories that seek to explain elements of  terrorism, including its ef fectiveness, 
origins, operations, and outcomes.10 These theories can be categorised into three levels, based 
on the approach taken to the problem-set: individual, organisational, and structural or systemic. 
Theories focused on the individual of ten attempt to def ine the characteristics of  a terrorist, which 
creates a problematically broad def inition to capture a wide spectrum of  individuals. 11 Several 
theoretical f rameworks have been applied at the individual level, including psychological and 
sociological approaches used in an attempt to answer why people become terrorists. 12 Attempts 
to produce a psychological prof ile of  a terrorist have proven unsuccessful.13 Instead, terrorists 
have been found to be mostly clinically normal and with a broad range of  personality factors. 14 
Despite this, individual theories have, nonetheless, proven a popular approach within the 
literature, as a means to identify the motivations that drive terrorists to violence.  
 
At an organisational level, it is recognised that institutions impact on individual behaviour. This 
approach looks to the needs and aspirations of  the organisation to develop an understanding of  
 
9 Jacqueline S. Hodgson and Victor Tadros, “The Impossibility of  Def ining Terrorism,” New 
Criminal Law Review 16, no. 3 (2013): 495, https://doi.org/10.1525/nclr.2013.16.3.494. 
10 Bradley McAllister and Alex P. Schmid, The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Studies  
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 201. 
11 Walter Laqueur, “Interpretations of  Terrorism: Fact, Fiction and Political Science,” Journal of 
Contemporary History 12 (1977): 1, https://doi.org/10.1177/002200947701200101. 
12 McAllister and Schmid, Handbook of Terrorism Studies, 214. 
13 Randy Borum, The Psychology of Terrorism (Tampa: University of  South Florida, 2004), 36. 
14 Andrew Silke, “Cheshire-cat Logic: The Recurring Theme of  Terrorist Abnormality in 




the impact it will have on individual behaviours.15 Various theoretical f rameworks have been 
applied to understand the impact an organisation has on an individual, including organisational 
process, social identity, and communications theories.16 These theories are focused on the 
relationships between individuals and their organisations, as well as individuals within 
organisations. As such, they provide insight into the social dimensions of  terrorist activities, and 
how these social interactions motivate individuals in their beliefs, behaviours, and actions. These 
interactions can be observed under a number of  circumstances, and more recently, have been 
demonstrated across several social media platforms where users interact with and inf luence one 
another as part of  an organisational structure. Although theories at this level have limitations, they 
of fer considerable potential for understanding behaviour that individual or systematic theories do 
not.  
 
At an even broader level, there have been attempts across the literature to characterise the 
systemic drivers of  terrorism.17 Examples of  these include structural inequalities that marginalise 
particular groups, perceived or actual injustices, and political systems created f rom opposing 
beliefs. In spite of  expectations that terrorism is rooted in adverse structural conditions, this is 
once again too general, with terrorist organisations emerging and thriving in a variety of  
environments.18 Systemic level approaches to terrorism studies are best placed to answer 
questions about the ideological position of  an organisation and the way in which a broad issue 
impacts upon its members motivations. However, as a broader theoretical f ramework, it of ten 
lacks the depth to understand the dif ferent ways these drivers have an impact upon individuals 
and organisations.  
 
At all levels of  analysis, it has been determined that a single, general theory to explain terrorism 
does not work, as terrorist organisations (and the individuals within them) are diverse in their 
makeup.19 An increased emphasis on individualistic experience, but within the context of  broader 
social relationships, as a driver for participation in a terrorist group gives strength to the use of  
social psychology as a lens for such studies. Social psychology is the study of so cial interactions, 
particularly how psychological variables are inf luenced by the actual, imagined , or implied 
presence of  others.20 Though self -radicalisation cannot be discounted as a viable means of  
participation, including where individuals are inspired to undertake an act of  terror based on 
material they have consumed online, the majority of  interactions on social media appear to be 
 
15 McAllister and Schmid, Handbook of Terrorism Studies, 226. 
16 McAllister and Schmid, Handbook of Terrorism Studies, 226. 
17 McAllister and Schmid, Handbook of Terrorism Studies, 248.  
18 McAllister and Schmid, Handbook of Terrorism Studies, 248-249. 
19 McAllister and Schmid, Handbook of Terrorism Studies, 228.  
20 “Understanding Social Psychology,” American Psychological Association, accessed January 
15, 2020, https://www.apa.org/action/science/social/  
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social in nature. To answer the research question at hand, being the factors that motivate women 
on social media to join the Islamic State, this study will draw upon social identity theory, which 
was initially proposed by Henri Tajfel and John Turner in 1979.21 
 
Social identity theory posits that the groups to which people belong determine their identity. 22 
Existential motives can drive a person to seek out a group, including, but not limited to, meaning, 
connectedness, empowerment, and morality.23 Group membership is important for a person’s 
concept of  self , seen to be derived partly f rom their participation. 24 As such, where the group 
changes, the part of  one’s self  emotionally attached to or derived f rom the group is seen to change 
in line with group expectations. Social identity theory is seen, therefore, as a f ramework through 
which individual changes can be understood and predicted dependent on the social behaviours 
of  the group.  
 
Groups can be used to divide one’s world into “us” and “them”, otherwise known as ingroups and 
outgroups. Social identity theory proposes that members of  the ingroup will discriminate against 
members of  the outgroup to improve their own social image by seeking out negative aspects of  
an outgroup.25 Said otherwise, there is a tendency to view one’s ingroup as more successful or 
superior when compared to an outgroup. This further entrenches the sense of  belonging within a 
group. Antagonism toward an outgroup can have adverse consequences. For example, racism 
may be the product of  tensions between ingroups and outgroups, and in its most radical format, 
can lead to genocide.26 Individuals can develop a sense of  empowerment through their 
participation in a group where they feel a sense of  superiority over outgroup members.  
 
Tajfel and Turner proposed three mental processes are involved in the evaluation of  ingroups and 
outgroups. The f irst of  these is social categorisation. One categorises people, including oneself, 
 
21 Henri Tajfel and John Turner, “An Integrative Theory of  Intergroup Conf lict,” in The Social 
Psychology of Intergroup Relations, ed. W. G. Austin and S. Worchel (Montery, CA: Brooks-Cole, 
1979).  
22 Henri Tajfel, “Individuals and Groups in Social Psychology,” British Journal of Social and Clinical 
Psychology 18 (1979): 183-185. 
23 Blake E. Ashforth and Fred Mael, “Social Identity Theory and Organisation,” The Academy of 
Management Review 14, No. 1 (January 1989): 22. 
24 John C. Turner and Penelope J. Oakes, “The Signif icance of  the Social Identity Concept for 
Social Psychology with Reference to Individualism, Interactionism and Social Inf luence,” British 
Journal of Social Psychology 25 (1986): 240-241. 
25 Michael A. Hogg, “Social Identity Theory,” in Understanding Peace and Conflict through Social 
Identity Theory, ed. Shelley McKeown, Reeshma Haji and Neil Ferguson (Switzerland: Spring 
International Publishing, 2016): 5. 
26 Omar Shahabudin McDoom, “The Psychology of  Threat in Intergroup Conf lict: Emotions, 




to understand the social environment.27 Social categories may include ethnicity, nationality, 
religion, occupation, and gender among other things, all of  which are useful to how one makes 
sense of  their environment and the functions of  the people who exist within it. 28 In the process of  
categorisation, one detects inherent similarities or imposes a structure on their social world. 29 It  
is also possible both approaches to categorisation will be used simultaneously, whereby one uses 
these inherent similarities as the basis for this structure. This process promotes ingroup 
favouritism as well as perceptions that outgroups are homogenous and , therefore, its members 
are broadly considered to constitute similar types of  people.  
 
The second process proposed is social identif ication. This is the mental process where the 
individual adopts the identity of  the group they have categorised themselves to belong to.30 This 
is the point where individuals begin to behave as they believe is expected of  them to conform with 
the group’s norms and are more committed to the group.31 There is also an emotional signif icance 
to this identif ication, which is intrinsically linked to one’s self -esteem.32 The f inal mental process 
proposed by Tajfel and Turner is social comparison. This occurs as one compares their group to 
others around them.33 To ensure groups are able to maintain self -esteem, they need to compare 
favourably to other groups around them.34 This is not to say that all members will agree entirely  
with the decisions and expectations of  groups in which they are members. Individuals may 
disagree with overarching elements of  the organisation, such as its values, strategy, and system 
of  authority. However, overall, they are expected to conform with the group’s overarching 
expectations to maintain membership. 
 
As the processes of  social identity unfold, there is an opportunity for inf luence to be exercised to 
shape the behaviours and actions of  members. The nature of  this power evolves with the group. 
There are several ways in which this power can be exercised as the power relationships between 
the inf luencer and their subject are dynamic, and power may be used interchangeably dependent 
 
27 J. Krueger, “Social Categorization,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioural 
Sciences, ed. Neil J. Smelser and Paul B. Baltes (The Netherlands: Elsevier Limited, 2001):  
14219-14223. 
28 Krueger, “Social Categorization,” 14219-14223. 
29 Krueger, “Social Categorization,” 14219-14223. 
30 Nick Hopkins, “Identity and Identif ication,” in International Encyclopedia of the Social and 
Behavioural Sciences (Second Edition), ed. James D. Wright (The Netherlands: Elsevier Limited, 
2015): 526-531. 
31 Jan E. Stets and Peter J. Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory,” Social Psychology 
Quarterly 63, no. 3 (2000): 226. 
32 James E. Cameron, “A Three-Factor Model of  Social Identity,” Self and Identity 3 (2004): 242, 
https://doi.org/10/1080/13576500444000047 
33 Dominic Abrams and Michael A. Hogg, “Social Identif ication, Self -Categorization and Social 
Inf luence,” European Review of Social Psychology 1, no. 1 (1990): 198, https://doi.org/10.1080/ 
14792779108401862. 
34 Cameron, “A Three-Factor Model of  Social Identity,” 242. 
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on the required context.35 In a group context, such power can be exerted to inf luence individuals 
to join a group, to maintain control, and to use members to undertake activities in furtherance of  
the group, such as terrorist activities.  
 
Social identity theory can be used to understand how terrorists like the Islamic State recruit  
members to further the objectives of  the group. This is achieved through understanding and 
inf luencing how people categorise themselves, creating an ingroup and outgroup, and increasing  
the marginalisation of  both sides. This increased perception of  “us” and “them” exacerbates 
tensions and justif ies the use of  violence. The ingroup’s membership can then be inf luenced as 
their identity and sense of  self  remains intrinsically linked to the group itself , and therefore, they 
are personally invested in and personally experience the successes and failures of  such an 
organisation.  
 
The question of  what makes a terrorist has been considered across several disciplines within the 
social sciences and humanities. Broadly, the literature is in consensus that there is no one 
motivation for an individual to become a terrorist but, rather, that the specif ic environmental factors 
that may drive someone to terrorism are individualistic and contex tual.36 More common factors 
have been identif ied across several studies, which include the social, economic, cultural and 
psychological circumstances and experiences prior to and throughout their participation in a 
terrorist organisation.37 However, these are not universal in and of  themselves. For instance, 
some economic approaches to the subject have attempted to f rame one’s socioeconomic position 
as predictive of  the risk they will join a terrorist organisation, with the expectation that poverty is 
a motivator for terrorist activity.38 Nevertheless, the majority of  impoverished people never 
become terrorists, and wealthier individuals may join for other reasons than their socioeconomic 
position. That is not to say that poverty cannot be a driver, but rather, that the literature has not 
determined a singular reason as to what motivates a terrorist in any f ield of  study.  
 
The strategic model of  terrorism posits that terrorists are rational actors. 39 Said otherwise, this 
means that these individuals are not impaired in such a way that their capacity to make 
 
35 John R. P. French, Jr., and Bertram Raven, The Bases of Social Power (Ann Arbor: University 
of  Michigan Press, 1959): 151. 
36 Kim Cragin, Understanding Terrorist Motivations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 
2009), 3. 
37 Thomas Hegghammer, “The Recruiter’s Dilemma: Signalling and Rebel Recruitment Tactics,” 
Journal of Peace Research 50, no. 1 (2012): 4, https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343312452287. 
38 Loken and Zelenz, “Explaining Extremism,” 48; Eric Mietz, What About the Women? 
Understanding the Addressing the Problem of ISIS Female Recruitment in the Western Balkans 
(Belgrade: Belgrade Centre for Security Policy, 2016), 6.  
39 Max Abrahms, “What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy,” 
International Security 32, no. 4 (2008): 78. 
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reasonable decisions is diminished. Though the act of  joining a terrorist organisation is considered 
a rational choice, organisational process theory stipulates that groups need to provide incentives 
for individuals to join.40 These are tailored to appeal to a variety of  individual needs, including 
belonging to a group, status, and reputation.41 However, the receptiveness of  an individual to 
such an approach depends on several contextual factors that can increase the likelihood of  
recruitment by either lowering the costs or raising the benef its of  participation, while the personal 
preferences of  an individual determine the extent to which each of  these factors inf luence their 
cost-benef it analysis.42 
 
Terrorist recruiters of ten appeal to particular shared experiences that may make an individual 
more vulnerable to recruitment. Terrorist organisations are of ten constructed around a shared  
political grievance the organisation seeks to rectify through violent means. 43 The impact of  this 
common grievance on an individual can be used to develop a sense of  solidarity for the objectives 
of  a terrorist organisation and overcome the risks associated with their participation.44 Even where 
a shared identity is constructed and collective goal is identif ied, the impact the grievance itself  
has, either directly or indirectly, is once again individualistic. Other contextual factors, therefore, 
determine the depth to which an individual is vulnerable to rhetoric derived f rom a particular issue, 
which also indicates a multitude of  factors, as opposed to just one, of ten motivates terrorist 
membership. It ought to be said that as terrorism is rooted in personal experiences, there will 
always be exceptions to broader generalisations and theories about their characteristics.  
 
One of  the problems with the identif ication of  particular mental or personality traits is rooted in the 
def initional issue of  terrorism itself . Where an individual undertakes an attack in the name of  a 
particular ideological position, but are found to suf fer f rom a psychological condition, their 
terroristic motives are of ten discounted as fanatical and insincere. For instance, Mert Ney killed a 
woman and proceeded to attempt to attack members of  the public in central Sydney in 2019. 45 In 
spite of  ideological views maintained by Ney, his mental health history meant that he was not 
considered to be a terrorist.46 The determination of  who is a terrorist—as well as the factors that 
 
40 Martha Crenshaw, “Theories of  Terrorism: Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” 
Journal of Strategic Studies 10 (1987): 19-20, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402398708437313. 
41 Crenshaw, “Instrumental and Organizational Approaches,” 19.  
42 Edgar Jones, “The Reception of  Broadcast Terrorism: Recruitment and Radicalisation,” 
International Review of Psychiatry 29, no. 4 (2017): 320-324, https://doi.org/10.1080/09540261 
.2017.1343529. 
43 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of  Terrorism,” Comparative Politics 13, no. 4 (1981): 383. 
44 Paul Collier and Anke Hoef f ler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War,” Oxford Economic Papers  
56, no. 4 (2004): 563-595. 
45 Tim Elf rink, “’Signif icantly Brave’ Bystanders Use Chairs and a Milk Crate to Trap Man on 
Stabbing Rampage in Sydney,” The Washington Post, August 13, 2019, https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/08/13/sydney-stabbing-video-bystanders-chair-milk-crate/ 
46 Elf rink, “Man on Stabbing Rampage in Sydney.” 
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mitigate such a label f rom being applied—can, therefore, impact upon the capacity to collect and 
analyse data that contributes to the individual picture of  who a terrorist is.  
 
From an organisational perspective, the recruitment of  terrorists can be divided into two phases. 
First, a terrorist organisation seeks to recruit mass numbers.47 Recruits need not be qualif ied, as 
they make up the lower ranks of  the group, where quantity is considered more important than 
quality in this phase.48 Violence which takes place may be unsophisticated or require a smaller 
number of  skilled members to coordinate. The second phase focuses on the recruitment of  
expertise to sustain and grow the group.49 This can be drawn f rom both within and outside of  the 
organisation. The Islamic State are known to have created recruitment campaigns which targeted 
specialised skillsets, such as doctors and educators.50 Social media has been identif ied as a tool 
that made it easier to identify people with the appropriate skills, and subsequently target them for 
recruitment.51 This has simplif ied the role of  the recruiter and simultaneously provided them with 
a substantially larger pool of  individuals with whom they can engage.52  
 
With the rise of  social media, the question of  what makes a terrorist in the internet era has 
increasingly preoccupied recent literature on terrorist recruitment. Social media is viewed not as 
a driver but an enabler in the recruitment process.53 It has the capacity to connect recruiters to 
vulnerable individuals and, in some instances, it has been found that the makeup of  social media 
platforms actively promotes interaction between recruiters and disaf fected individuals, such as 
the ‘suggested f riends’ feature on Facebook.54 Terrorists have seen social media as an 
opportunity to engage with those outside of  their physical spaces with greater ease. 55 Several 
organisations have also been fairly competent in their use of  social media. For example, in 2013, 
al-Shabaab provided live updates on a terrorist attack they orchestrated via Twitter. 56 The Islamic 
 
47 Mia Bloom, “Constructing Expertise: Terrorist Recruitment and “Talent Spotting” in the PIRA, 
Al Qaeda and ISIS,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40, no. 7 (2017): 605. https://doi.org/10.1020/ 
1057610X.2016.127219. 
48 Bloom, “Constructing Expertise,” 605. 
49 Bloom, “Constructing Expertise,” 605-606. 
50 Bloom, “Constructing Expertise,” 616. 
51 Bloom, “Constructing Expertise,” 606. 
52 Gregory Water and Robert Postings, Spiders of the Caliphate: Mapping the Islamic State’s 
Global Support Network on Facebook (Counter Extremism Project, 2018), 78. 
53 Elga Sikkens, Marion van San, Stijn Sieckelinck, Hennie Boeije and Micha de Winter,  
“Participant Recruitment through Social Media: Lessons Learned f rom a Qualitative 
Radicalization Study Using Facebook,” Field Methods 29, no. 2 (2017): 131, https://doi.org/10. 
1177/1525822X16663146. 
54 Water and Postings, Spiders of the Caliphate, 8. 
55 Marie-Helen Maras, “Social Media Platforms: Targeting the ‘Found Space’ of  Terrorists,” 
Journal of Internet Law 21, no. 2 (2017): 3. 
56 David Mair, “#Westgate: A Case Study: How al-Shabaab used Twitter during an Ongoing 




State became infamous for their calculated recruitment campaign across social media, 
disseminating information broadly which saw interested people, motivated by any number of  
personal factors, become members of  the group f rom across the world.57 
 
Al-Qa’ida have traditionally been cautious in their recruitment of  foreign fighters, something which 
has been ref lected in their use of  online spaces for recruitment purposes.58 Forums were 
established by al-Qa’ida, but never saw the same reach of  the mainstream social media accounts 
operated by the Islamic State and their supporters.59 The Islamic State needed to recruit a greater 
volume of  people to sustain their territory and replenish their losses. As such, their threshold for 
entry was relatively low. In spite of  expectations that members would adhere to a radical 
interpretation of  Islam, several recruits were found to have newfound and rudimentary knowledge 
of  the religion.60 This indicates that even in an ideological sense, the Islamic State were initially 
more interested in numbers than devout followers, which aligns with the phases of  recruitment  
outlined by Bloom.61 Several members also converted to Islam as part of  the recruitment process, 
which indicates their initial attraction to the group may not have been solely based on its religious 
appeal. 
 
The understanding of  terrorist motivations across the literature predominantly centres on the male 
experience, with most studies focussed on male terrorist recruits. This is not unjustif ied, as men 
represent the majority of  terrorists, although women have participated in various roles across 
various terrorist organisations.62 One example is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of  Colombia 
(FARC), where women have participated as fully as their male counterparts in militant roles. 63 
Women have also come to play a greater role in radical Islamist terrorist organisations since the 
early 2000s, including as suicide bombers for al-Qa’ida and Hamas.64 While the roles women 
have played in Islamist terrorism have become more active, their primary responsibilities have 
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predominantly been in support of  men in their participation in jihad and to raise the next generation 
of  jihadis.65 As such, women are typically seen to occupy non-combatant roles within a Salaf i 
Jihadist terrorist organisation, and as such, are relegated to private support positions.66  
 
Traditional gender roles are an important component of  this ideology, as it ensures family, support 
and education roles are fulf illed, particularly to ensure the organisation’s intergenerational 
survival.67 This characterisation of  women within Salaf ist Jihadi terrorist organisations means their 
activities are of ten obscured, as is ref lected in the limited literature available on the role women 
played as supporters of  such terrorist organisations. As the majority of  the women who f illed these 
roles were local to the terror groups themselves, there was little need for terrorist organisations 
to publicise or recruit for such position which, once again, minimised the role that women played 
as supporters in the public domain. 
 
The role of  women within the Islamic State was, however, elevated to a substantially more public 
space through their activities across social media platforms. The recruitment of  foreign women 
was prioritised, even though the role was similar to other Salaf ist Jihadi organisations.68 One 
notable new dimension of  a woman’s role within the Islamic State was as recruiters, operating 
online to target and recruit other women on social media.69 This attracted interest across news 
media and academia as a trend that was distinct f rom other Salaf ist Jihadi organisations. Also of  
interest was the attraction western women had to such an organisation, which seemed to be a 
more novel idea than male foreign f ighters. 
 
Women were also able to occupy more active and violent roles within the Islamic State, distinct 
f rom their female counterparts in other Salaf ist Jihadi organisations. Some women participated in 
a female police unit within Syria, known as al-Khanssaa Brigade, where they would act as 
enforcers of  a strict moral code for other women.70 This provided a sense of  autonomy and 
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independence for many women who were otherwise relegated to the home. 71 When the Islamic  
State began to lose territory, their messaging evolved to encourage women to participate in acts 
of  violence.72 This represented a radical shif t for a terrorist organisation that had become 
renowned for their deeply conservative views of  women. The role of  women with respect to the 
Islamic State has been explored in greater depth in academia, in particular, due to several high-
prof ile cases of  western women who have travelled to the Islamic State to become jihadi brides 
and the nature of  atrocities committed toward women in Syria and Iraq. This has contributed to a 
greater coverage of  female terrorist recruits in an attempt to understand their motivations.  
 
Since 2013, thousands of  women have travelled f rom their home countries to join the Islamic 
State. The cases of  several young western women were captured by news media outlets and 
garnered international attention.73 One example of  this was the media that surrounded the Bethnal 
Green Trio, three British teens who travelled to Syria via Turkey in 2015.74 Their journeys, known 
as a hijrah (migration), were of ten documented on social media in an ef fort to inspire other women 
to undertake the same act.75 From 2014 to 2017, the main source of  literature on these women 
and their social media use was in the form of  news media articles. Several journalists were able 
to establish relationships with women inside of  the Islamic State.76 Though their relationships 
were of ten volatile, as the women would of ten threaten the journalists and be critical of  their 
publications, they also provided valuable f irst-hand access to life inside the Islamic State. 
 
The reliability of  news media depends on the publication itself . Several media outlets, such as 
The Daily Mail and The Sun, f ramed stories of  jihadi brides in a salacious tone.77 Many articles 
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provided little analysis and made generalisations that undermined their credibility. In response to 
the public interest, news media produced greater volumes of  content on women recruited into the 
group to improve their readership. For example, the term ‘Bethnal Green Girls’ returns nearly 
700,000 search results in Google, as of  October 2019. These articles were also of ten short and 
do not contribute the same nuance and perspective as academia. However, academia of ten drew 
on these articles for case studies due to the lack of  alternative primary source material. 
Constraints around the contact of  women who had journeyed to Syria and Iraq meant that 
journalists of ten had direct access to these individuals that was unmatched in the academic 
space. This means that a substantial volume of  the literature is derived f rom sources that do not 
have the same credibility and rigour as academia.  
 
In the early days of  the Islamic State, many women who travelled f rom the west to Syria and Iraq 
were f ramed as victims, as opposed to perpetrators or terrorists. 78 Instances where women 
published threats directed toward the west would be the exception but, even then, their 
recruitment was of ten seen to have been a product of  coercion and manipulation. 79 Media outlets 
have of ten reiterated the ideological foundations for Islamist terrorist organisations to encompass 
values which dictate the societal roles and behaviours of  its members, especially those who are 
female.80 As such, women are expected to abide by strict codes of  conduct, which were seen to 
limit their operational capacity in the coordination of  violence.81 This has subsequently inf luenced 
how violent females are of ten characterised as anomalies by the media, even where there are a 
multitude of  examples. 
 
Since early 2019, the approach the media has taken toward women who became jihadi brides 
has shif ted to a noticeably more hostile tone. As the f inal territorial footholds of the Islamic State 
fell, several western women who had joined the Islamic State were located by journalists in al-
Hol refugee camp in Syria.82 Shamima Begum, one of  the Bethnal Green Girls, recaptured 
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international media attention in her appeal to return to the United Kingdom. 83 Prospective 
returnees have prompted policy makers to question how, and if , they will manage their 
reintegration to western society, and whether they continue to pose a security risk. 84 Critics have 
questioned the sincerity of  remorse by women who claimed the victimhood narrative that had 
previously been driven by the media. At the very least , women are now seen to have been 
complicit in atrocities which took place.85 Their overall intent, including the possibility they will act 
as perpetrators of  violence at a later date, has been questioned extensively by news media.  
 
The dichotomy of  how f emale recruits are portrayed persists across academic literature, with 
women viewed as either victims or brutal participants in the organisation. When f ramed as victims, 
the recruitment of  women is seen as a deliberate method by the Islamic State for the sole purpose 
of  exploitation by male combatants.86 This narrative was f requently adopted by media outlets, 
who of ten explain recruitment as either the abuse of  women by a patriarchal organisation or as a 
naïve decision to pursue an ideal of  femininity sold by Islamic State recruiters.87 As one of  the 
primary sources for academia, the way women were perceived and their information captured in 
news media may have also been inf luential in their portrayal in the academic space. This body of 
literature is of ten simplistic in its treatment of  female recruits and holds onto propaganda material 
produced by the Islamic State which supports this narrative. For example, the use of  kittens in 
posts by recruiters has been highlighted as a mechanism which attracted women t o the 
organisation, without further analysis of  additional messaging, subsequently over-simplifying the 
issue.88 
 
This view is contradicted by Kneip, who examined how women who joined the Islamic State felt 
empowered by their decision.89 Indeed, more recent literature on the topic of  female recruitment  
has considered the diverse roles women have played within the Islamic State, including those 
who were core members of  al-Khanssaa Brigade, an all-female police unit infamous for their 
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cruelty toward other women.90 Women have also been used as a ‘last resort’ tactic where cities 
have been retaken f rom the Islamic State, with women found with suicide vests in the f inal days 
of  the Battle of  Mosul.91 With more recent Islamic State propaganda encouraging women to 
prepare for battle, women may play a considerable role in the future of  the Islamic State. The 
participation of  women until the end of  the conf lict, where they had no other option but 
imprisonment, is seen by some as indicative of  their commitment to the o rganisation as well as 
the agency they had in their own decisions.92 
 
The majority of  literature which focuses on the recruitment of  women does so specif ically with the 
adoption of  a feminist perspective. As part of  this perspective, it is assumed that there must be 
something that appeals to women in addition to or distinct from the qualities which appeal to men. 
Buril justif ies this approach by citing previous studies on the gender gap in risk taking, which 
indicate women are less likely to take risks than men.93 Kneip notes that recent literature has 
identif ied numerous ‘extra’ factors which entice women to join the Islamic State, such as religious 
obligation, empowerment, emancipation, self -discovery and identity.94 These factors are 
considered to be in conjunction with other values promoted by recruiters to both men and women, 
including the promises of  excitement and f reedom.95 The identif ication of  the ‘extra’ factors that 
make women want to travel to Iraq and Syria has been the objective of  much literature on female 
recruitment, with the view that the targeted recruitment of  women is a relatively new phenomena 
for an Islamist terrorist organisation. 
 
Literature on the recruitment of  female terrorists tends to examine the role of  gender in greater 
depth than literature which focuses on male recruits. Based on the standard membership of  a 
terrorist organisation, it can be inferred that a woman would be an atypical recruit and , therefore, 
there must be some motivation tied to a gender-based appeal. Studies of  Islamic State 
propaganda targeted at women observe the use of  material that answers concerns they may have 
about their participation, such as child welfare and healthcare. 96 Amidst this material,  
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expectations for women are more explicitly stated. In a simplistic form, this is characterised as 
men as martyrs and women as wives and mothers.97 It was observed that women were told 
explicitly prior to their travel to Syria that they were not there to f ight, but rather to marry and 
procreate.98 It is apparent that there are gendered elements to the recruitment process, which 
consequently have inf luenced the way in which it has been studied.  
 
Western women feature predominantly in case studies within academia. This is a result of  the 
coverage within news media and availability of  information on these case studies. The interest in 
these cases of ten appears to stem f rom the above question of  what ‘extra’ element attracts 
women to travel f rom the West to join a terrorist organisation noted as particularly oppressive 
toward women.99 Women who travel f rom nations where radical Islam is more prominent, and 
where the political system is more conservative in its treatment of  women, such as the Middle 
East, North Africa and South Asia, are underrepresented in the literature o n recruitment, despite 
representing the majority of  women recruited.100 The assumption within the literature is that as 
these women were f rom societies where radical Islam is more readily spread and adopted, travel 
to the Islamic State to participate in the self -proclaimed Caliphate was a less peculiar 
phenomenon.  
 
The literature which has most broadly captured the international scale of  female recruitment are 
reports produced by governmental and non-governmental agencies on the topic.101 The objective 
of  such reports was to establish the extent of  the issue in an informative format for a strategic 
audience, including policy makers and counterterrorism practitioners. As such, a substantial 
portion of  this literature was dedicated to assessments and recommendations for the future of  
female terrorist recruitment by the likes of  the Islamic State. The basis of  these analyses was 
rooted in empirical data, namely statistics, coupled with the historic context captured on the 
Islamic State. Such statistics add value for their factual nature, but given the f luidity of  the 
situation, it is of ten dif f icult to evaluate their accuracy. Assessments where precise numbers are 
unknown are always undermined by their own inevitable uncertainty, though where this is 
acknowledged, these sources still provide one of  the most valuable strategic overviews of  the 
situation internationally in terms of  recruitment but of fer limited utility in understanding why women 
decide to join terrorist organisations. 
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One issue within the existing literature is the tendency to group women and minors together. 
There were several instances where women travelled with their children. For example, Sally 
Jones travelled to Syria with her son in late 2013 to join the Islamic State. 102 Women were also 
of ten believed to have been deceived by their husbands into travelling as a family to join the 
Islamic State.103 However, there was a lack of  distinction between women who joined alone and  
those who joined with young children. The grouping of  women and children to gether also 
undermined the agency many women had in their decision to join the Islamic State. The collection 
of  statistics internationally was dependent upon the reporting country, with variations in the quality 
of  data noted by Cook and Vale.104 The focus of  this literature was less so on recruitment via 
social media, and more on general recruitment itself . Statistics for those who were recruited online 
can be more dif f icult to obtain, particularly as social media sites have increased their vigilance 
around privacy, and content is of ten deleted by social media platforms where terrorist activity is 
f lagged. 
 
There is consensus within the literature that social media af forded the Islamic State the 
opportunity to interact directly with their supporters in a way that had only been seen before in 
face-to-face interactions. Social media provides a platform for public and private communications 
that transcends geographic boundaries. Behaviours online can be less constrained than in face-
to-face social interactions and in spite of  the vastness of  the internet, users can become 
entrenched in echo chambers that represent a radical subset of  a particular perspective. Overall, 
the Islamic State were seen as transformative in the way they approached terrorist recruitment,  
with consensus that this is likely to be inf luential on future terrorist recruitment ef forts by both the 
Islamic State and other groups. Their use of  the social media space exploited the very nature of  
social media itself , in that it connected recruiters with persons who could be easily identif ied as 
sympathetic to Islamic State ideological positions, allowed privacy in interactions, and provided a 
level of  operational security for recruiters and recruits to conceal their identities and avoid 
suspicion f rom authorities.  
 
Even as content was removed by social media companies, the Islamic State were able to recruit 
foreign f ighters internationally, thousands of  whom travelled to the self -proclaimed Caliphate in 
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Iraq and Syria.105 As social media platforms evicted the Islamic State, they found homes on more 
private social media sites, including Telegram. Several western individuals became notorious for 
their roles within the Islamic State. This was not just restricted to men, but women too, who 
became prevalent online recruiters and fulf illed several roles within the organisation, beyond what  
had previously been seen in other radical Islamic terrorist organisations. 106 Women who had  
joined the Islamic State became a curiosity within western media, as they seldom f it the model for 
a traditional terrorist. Many seemed to have been raised in moderate families, with access to 
advanced education.107 Social media use was seen as a common trend amongst western recruits,  
with women being active supporters online, both before and af ter they travelled to Iraq and 
Syria.108  
 
Social media is a tool for interconnectivity, irrespective of  the physical spaces that might exist 
between its users. However, social media is not a motivator for terrorist activity in itself . This  
fundamental concept served to connect recruiters with prospective recruits, even with substantial 
distances between them.109 The Islamic State were able to use social media on a scale that had  
never been demonstrated by a terrorist organisation.110 These platforms, with the correct search 
terms, were used to disseminate propaganda in an ef fort to recruit members and inspire ‘lone 
wolf ’ style terror attacks.111 In conjunction with this phenomena, the majority of  literature on the 
subject of  terrorist recruitment on social media followed the rise of  the Islamic State and used 
them as a case study. This builds upon a small body of  literature that examined terrorist 
recruitment in the early 2000s, which started to explore the role online forums played in al-Qa’ida 
recruitment.112  
 
The Islamic State not only used social media to their advantage, in a manner that could be seen 
as pioneering for other terrorist organisations recruiting online, but also targeted female recruits  
for roles traditionally occupied by local women in radical Islamist terrorist organisations. These 
women formed an important online community that assisted in further recruitment campaigns and 
propaganda for the Islamic State, using the female voice to counter allegations of  extreme 
brutality and violence. This research, therefore, seeks to use the theoretical f ramework of  social 
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identity theory to understand the ways in which social media is used to inf luence and recruit  
female members of  the Islamic State online, looking at the women involved as actors in the 
conf lict, and not victims of  coercion.  
20 
 
Chapter III: Methodology and Method 
 
There has come to be a greater body of  literature on the recruitment of  women in light of  the 
activities of  the Islamic State, as well as the implications social media has for social interactions 
and psychology. These issues are most commonly approached f rom within the social sciences 
as subjective and deeply contextual interactions between individuals and their environment, both 
real and virtual. The objective of  this research is to understand the factors that drove women to 
travel to Iraq and Syria in order to participate in the Islamic State. As such, this chapter will draw 
upon existing literature to outline the methodology and method used in the conduct of  this thesis 
to answer the research question. 
 
It has become apparent f rom the literature that interactions between a recruiter and a recruit—
both men and women—are dependent on factors at the individual, organisational and structural 
level.113 The responses of  prospective recruits are, therefore, their own unique experiences but 
linked to their relationships with recruiters and likeminded peers. As such, the qualitative approach 
was determined to be most appropriate approach to answer the research question at hand. 
Qualitative research allows for a level of  nuance and interpretation about experiences  that can be 
highly individualistic and subjective. Given terrorist recruitment is a personal experience, the more 
ref ined scope necessitated by qualitative research allows for greater depth in the research.  
 
This depth does, however, come at the expense of  the breadth of  the data that can be collected 
and analysed. The adverse ef fect of such a narrow focus is that the research will not necessarily 
capture universal trends, but a more selective sample of  such themes. Qualitative research is 
of ten perceived as being less generalisable than quantitative research, as empirical data captures 
a broader dataset, and therefore, can be used to identify overall trends and themes. However,  
quantitative data points do not reveal motivations and individual experiences. Observation of  
qualitative data can also provide insight and establish a basis for further research. On this basis, 
as a study of  experiential motivations, with an eye to critical theory, a qualitative approach was 
determined to be best suited to answer the research question. 
 
Case studies were selected as the methodology for this research, to best cover the individualised 
aspects of  the radicalisation and recruitment process online. A benef it of  case studies was that 
they provided the opportunity for an in-depth examination of  issues at an individual level. This  
allowed greater scope to explore the context of  each case and examine the environment in which 
their radicalisation and recruitment took place. There were multiple case studies which became 
well documented with the rise of  the Islamic State. In particular, selected posts made on social 
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media accounts were attributed, archived, and made readily available online. The availability  of  
attributed and verif ied data also eliminated the need for interaction with the cases, several of  
whom were found to be either deceased or detained. This best enabled access to the kind of  data 
needed to understand the individual motivations of  women recruited across social media.  
 
Social identity theory will be used as the theoretical f ramework through which the interactions 
between case studies and the organisation will be examined. This will be used to contextualise 
the psychological drivers experienced by the case studies in terms of  the social rewards they 
achieved for their participation and activity online. Social identity theory is rooted in the social 
constructivist tradition. Social constructionism is an epistemological position that ex amines how 
understandings of  the world are constructed collectively to form the foundation of  common 
assumptions about reality.114 It is based on the belief  that meanings are not developed in an 
individual and separate fashion, but rather in coordination with one another.115 As such, these 
social constructs are intrinsically linked to the society in which they are developed, and therefore, 
can dif fer broadly between societies. 
 
Social interactions are considered by Berger and Luckmann as the basis for all kno wledge.116 
Radicalisation does not take place in a vacuum, even self -radicalisation requires vulnerable 
people to consume material and ideas created and disseminated by others, be they individuals 
or groups. It can, therefore, be assumed that social interactions are an important element in how 
recruitment takes place to inf luence the identity of  prospective recruits as it pertains to the beliefs 
they maintain. This inf luence is a result of  individual, organisational and systematic pressures and 
interactions that motivate an individual to participate in a terrorist organisation. These social 
interactions can be analysed in terms of  the stages of  social identity theory, social identif ication, 
categorisation, and comparison, to understand the psychological impact these have had on an 
individual and how this is transformative for behaviours in accordance with group expectations 
and ideals. 
 
Prior to the data collection phase, two case studies were selected. To ensure comparative 
analysis could be undertaken at a later stage to identify common trends, these case studies 
needed to satisfy three criteria. First, they needed to be born in a western country; second, they 
needed to be female; and f inally, they needed to have had a social media presence prior to their 
departure to Syria or Iraq which could be captured in data collection. Research across news 
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media sites identif ied several individuals who matched these criteria and the subsequent selection 
of  Aqsa Mahmood and Hoda Muthana as case studies was based on the vo lume of  credible 
information on their social media presence and access to original posts.  The researcher also 
identif ied that the women did not appear to know one another, having come f rom separate 
geographic locations, and therefore, it was expected there would be suf f icient dif ferences to 
capture overarching themes more broadly. 
 
All the data collected for this thesis was obtained f rom open sources and was readily accessible 
to the public, either via news media or archives of  public social media accounts. First, social media 
accounts were identif ied for both case studies, based on details made available and captured 
across news media. Social media handles were cross-referenced across sources and public 
details available on these accounts, such as the geographic location, age, and photos, were used 
to attribute the user as either Aqsa Mahmood or Hoda Muthana. Some of  the posts made f rom 
these accounts were captured and reported in news media, while others were located via the 
Internet Archive. The Internet Archive is a site which captures public webpages across various 
dates.117 This was particularly useful for the social media site Tumblr, which hosts each user’s 
content on its own webpage. The majority of  social media posts dated to between 2013 and 2015,  
the time in which both Mahmood and Muthana were recruited into the Islamic State.  
 
Though both women are reported to have used other forms of  social media, this data was not 
obtained unless it had been made available for public consumption on a news media site. Though 
this content would have been made available to those connected to the social media sites of  both 
women, it was not intended for public consumption. As such, it would be a breach of  privacy to 
collect and use this data for research. However, content made available across publicly 
accessible social media platforms, particularly Tumblr and Twitter, or that which was captured by 
journalists and published more broadly, was considered public domain. Further, the researcher 
did not use social media accounts to gain access to this content, meaning that no attempts were 
made to obtain data that may have been available only to users of  the social media platform. This 
was also considered a limitation of  this research, in that only the motivations conveyed across 
public social media accounts would be captured throughout this research.      
 
News interviews were also accessed as primary source material. The families of  both Muthana 
and Mahmood provided interviews to the media in the immediate period af ter their respective 
departures for Syria.118 These interviews were used to provide context to the lifestyles both 
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women lived in the West, as well as any indicators they were being radicalised online and their 
social media activities, as perceived by those closest to them. Additionally, since Muthana was 
located in al-Hol camp in 2019, she has been the subject of  more extensive coverage and 
interviews which explore her motivations and time inside the Islamic State. Mahmood is believed 
to have been killed in the conf lict and it does not appear an interview took place at any point af ter 
she departed for Syria.  
 
Reports produced by governmental and non-governmental agencies represented one of  the most 
informative and reliable reference points to contextualise and understand the social media posts 
for this project. While government reports are of ten produced in support of a political position, the 
breadth of  material covered and trends identif ied provided direction on the themes for analysis of  
the case studies. Non-governmental reports, including those produced by the Counter Extremism 
Project in 2017 and the International Centre for the Study of  Radicalisation in 2018, provided a 
critical balance to the philosophies which underpin governmental literature. These reports also 
used empirical data to substantiate their claims, which provided a reliable foundation on which 
the case studies were analysed. Where accessible, information related to the recruitment process 
produced by the Islamic State was used to understand the mechanisms developed by the g roup 
themselves. Of  particular use was the manifesto on women by the Al-Khanssaa Brigade, the all-
female police group within the Islamic State, translated by the Quilliam Foundation. These primary 
sources were intended to support the development of  a balanced and critical perspective on the 
recruitment of  women by the Islamic State. 
 
A variety of  secondary sources were also accessed, which were primarily collected f rom news 
media and journal articles. News media provided extensive coverage of  both women when they 
initially travelled to Syria, as well as when Muthana was located in displaced persons camps in 
2019. Such news articles were collected f rom a variety of  outlets, with preference given for 
reputable news outlets such as BBC and SBS News. The interest in female jihadis who travelled 
to Syria meant such cases of ten received the tabloid treatment to attract readership and , as such, 
it was important to source news articles f rom reliable sources. Even where reliable sources were 
located, they acknowledged their own limitations, as there were instances where the identities of  
sources could not be verif ied due to the nature of  the conf lict and proliferation of  internet -based 
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Where possible, information collected f rom these sources was cross-referenced to conf irm its 
reliability and validity. While primary and secondary source resources of fered valuable insight into 
the recruitment process and sociocultural context f rom which Mahmood and Muthana come, they 
are also steeped in the political agendas of  their authors – be they the government or the Islamic 
State. As such, information can be distorted, and in some instances fabricated, to support these 
narratives. Likewise, the dependence on the internet for the collection means it is a possibility 
misinformation will be collected. While the use of  reputable sources seeks to mitigate such issues, 
cross-referencing to ensure the credibility of  information helped to ensure the research 
undertaken was an accurate representation of  reality. 
 
Data collected for the case studies was processed with thematic analysis to determine common 
trends in each case study. The purpose of  thematic analysis was to extrapolate common themes 
that came up repeatedly across the data. Due to the limited volume of  public social media posts 
recovered for each case study, deduction was used to determine these themes. The intention 
behind this analysis was to f irst identify the motivations of  women who joined the Islamic State 
af ter a period of  engagement on social media, and to then compare them to identify common 
trends across both case studies. From there, the discussion focused on the application of  






Chapter IV: Aqsa Mahmood 
 
One of  the f irst western women to join the Islamic State was 19-year-old Aqsa Mahmood, who 
departed Scotland for Syria in November 2013. Once there, she would become a propagandist 
concentrated on the recruitment of  women for the Islamic State.119 Mahmood was infamously 
credited as the recruiter of  the Bethnal Green Girls – Amira Abase, Shamima Begum, and Kadiza 
Sultana.120 The Bethnal Green Girls brought attention to Islamic State social media recruitment,  
and how inf luential young women could become in this space. Through her Tumblr and Twitter 
accounts, Mahmood publicly diarised her journey to, and life in, the Islamic State. This chapter 
will examine the motivations that drove Mahmood to the Islamic State, as well as how her social 
media presence evolved to capture the motivations of  other recruits. In particular, three themes 
were observed as the main contributors toward Mahmood’s eventual decision to join the Islamic 
State: the online echo chamber she developed, sisterhood, and a sense of  religious obligation. 
 
The Echo Chamber Effect 
 
Born and raised in Glasgow, Mahmood appeared well integrated within her community. 121 She 
was well educated, having attended a private school before she enrolled as a radiography student 
at the Glasgow Caledonian University.122 Mahmood was noted to have enjoyed western literature,  
such as the Hunger Games and Harry Potter, as well as western music.123 Mahmood’s family 
lawyer, Aamer Anwar, described the household as moderate and liberal, and that Aqsa was a 
“bedroom radical” unbeknownst to her family.124 Her parents were quick to publicly denounce the 
Islamic State, and reported they privately told their daughter the group is not a true representation 
of  Islam.125 The characterisation of  Mahmood that emerged in the media shortly af ter her 
departure for Syria did not f it the traditional prof ile of  a terrorist recruit. Publicly, Mahmood seemed 
to be a well-educated and integrated member of  Scottish society. However, her social media 
posts told a dif ferent story about Mahmood’s motivations over the year before she departed 
Scotland. 
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In 2011, Mahmood became deeply concerned with the outbreak of  civil war in Syria. 126 Her 
parents observed that she became more religious, but not in a fashion they interpreted as 
indicative of  radicalisation.127 Around the same time as Mahmood abandoned western music and 
literature in pursuit of  deeper religiosity, she would of ten share content on her Tumblr account 
that was illustrative of  her f ixation on the war.128 For example, she reposted images of  combatants, 
information on the number of  casualties and quotes about injustice in relation to the conf lict. 129 
Social media has recently been criticised as a tool for radicalisation as a consequence of  the echo 
chamber ef fect that can occur for users.130 The topic of  the Syrian Civil War appears to have been 
an entry point for Mahmood to become embroiled in an echo chamber that amplif ied radical views 
and introduced her to others who would encourage her eventual travel to Syria.  
 
In the social media space, an echo chamber occurs when the content a user is exposed to on the 
platform agrees with their political leaning and, thus, allows for their opinions to be echoed back 
to them.131 The social media user is, therefore, not exposed to an accurate or balanced portrayal 
of  real-world political views. Through the repetition of  core issues and a lack of  exposure to 
alternative views, individuals within an echo chamber can develop the perception their worldview 
is more popular or socially acceptable than it truly is.132 Social media platforms of ten encourage 
users to customise their feeds by following accounts and themes of  interest. With the exception 
of  paid advertisements, users have been able to isolate the content to which they are exposed to 
specif ic viewpoints by exclusively following content they agree with, and subsequently developing 
their own echo chamber. 
 
This behaviour is consistent with selective exposure theory, whereby people avoid contradictory 
content in favour of  information that reinforces their views.133 Selections are made based on the 
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individual’s perspective, beliefs, attitudes , and decisions.134 When exposed to information, people 
are able to select the favourable elements and ignore the unfavourable. Also known as 
conf irmation bias, selective exposure theory is rooted in cognitive dissonance theory.135 Cognitive 
dissonance is the psychological stress experienced where an individual’s belief  clashes with 
received information.136 To avoid such discomfort, certain defence mechanisms will work to 
balance a person’s representation of  the world and their environment.137 In such instances, 
selective exposure theory would see contradictory information overlooked in favour of that which 
supports preconceived viewpoints. This theory is linked to the emergence of  echo chambers 
online, where people have greater control over the information they are exposed to and can 
subsequently minimise their interactions with other views. 
 
Based on the assumption the content Mahmood posted was similar to that which she was 
exposed, it appears her interest in the Syrian Civil War was f ramed largely within a religious 
context. Mahmood did not appear to have ties to the country itself , though she did have ties to its 
people through their shared faith. This was representative of  the f irst and  second mental process 
identif ied by Tajfel and Turner as part of  social identity theory: social categorisation and social 
identif ication.138 As a means of  interpreting events, Mahmood categorised its actors on the basis 
of  their religious views, as was presented to her in the research she undertook across social 
media. From here, she interacted with content that reinforced these mental processes, and further 
entrenched a sense of  social identif ication with the subjects of  the content she consumed. Such 
content was predominantly on the Syrian Civil War but extended into other conf licts in the Middle 
East. This material was f ramed in religious terms, indicative of  the perspective with which she 
approached the selection of  information online, and with which she identif ied.  
 
Social media algorithms also dictate the content a user is exposed to. These algorithms serve to 
deliver relevant content to the user.139 Algorithms introduce content that matches the preferences 
and interests of  social media users and corresponds with their interactions.140 It was common for 
suggested content to feed the echo chamber ef fect and has the potential to introduce its user to 
more radical content. This strengthens the selective exposure individuals inside echo chambers 
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experience by reinforcing the same views and reduces the psychological burden of  sorting 
through material that disagrees with their worldview. Overall, where users within radical echo 
chambers are continually introduced to new streams of  the same or similar information, it amplif ies 
their expectation of  how popular their viewpoint is, and therefore, contributes to the normalisation 
of  otherwise radical ideas. 
 
Echo chambers can be used as tools of  social inf luence. As users feel increasingly validated in 
the views they hold, they become susceptible to further radicalisation within their echo chamber. 
The introduction of  more radical views within such environments of ten takes place without the 
same level of  criticism that would be typical elsewhere, and thus, the adoption of  such views 
becomes commonplace.141 Inf luencers within such environments are able to manipulate their 
followers to adopt the same views they espouse through the repetition of  themes and 
encouragement that certain views are acceptable and widely held. Such echo chambers can, 
therefore, encourage a sense of  inclusion and identif ication with a group. In accordance with 
social identity theory, this can, therefore, be manipulated online into a sense of  “us” and “them”.  
This is most of ten exemplif ied in lef t- or ring-wing echo chambers, where unif ication is encouraged 
in its most absolute form to counter the other side of  the political debate. 142 The consequence of  
such divisions is a discouragement toward seeking out alternative information f rom the other side 
of  the political spectrum, and a subsequent deeper entrenchment of  personal political views in 
accordance with the echo chamber’s membership.  
 
More broadly, inf luencers placed within social media echo chambers have the capacity to appeal 
to the deepest level of  social inf luence def ined by Kelman: internalisation. This is the process 
whereby people accept a belief , both publicly and privately.143 A private commitment to adhere to 
a radical set of  beliefs is critical to the assurance that acts of  terrorism are undertaken on behalf  
of  a terrorist organisation, particularly where a level of  autonomy is exercised in their execution. 
The targeting of  non-combatants is viewed as immoral, as is ref lected in various laws of  war, and 
as such, campaigns undertaken by many terrorist organisations who seek to target civilians 
require a deep private commitment to the group’s ideals that overcomes any sense of  moral and 
legal apprehension. It is at this point that the third phase of  social identity theory is actualised, 
and individuals undertake comparisons between the group they have identif ied with and others.  
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Social media of ten allows the user a feeling of  anonymity, which can make them feel protected 
f rom of fline consequences for their online behaviours, as per the social disinhibition ef fect, where 
people online relax social restrictions that would occur in face-to-face interactions.144 Though 
Mahmood has been attributed to her social media personas, the use of  a Nom de Guerre online 
helped her to be open in her thoughts and intentions—as is evidenced by the diarised and 
controversial style of  her posts—that did not seem to imitate her day-to-day of f line personality. 
Mahmood made several statements on her accounts that aligned with the beliefs of  the Islamic 
State in a public display of  her acceptance of  such beliefs.145 However, coupled with her actions, 
travelling to the Islamic State to become a jihadi bride, this indicates the level of  social inf luence 
that Mahmood experienced and the depth of  the private convictions she felt, as well as how she 
perceived her group as comparing favourably to others. These actions are the best evidence that 
Mahmood was inf luenced at the deepest level to internalise the beliefs to which she was exposed 
online. 
 
Mahmood was inf luenced to conform with a radical set of  beliefs, though this was not without a 
sense of  reward, principally in the form of  ingroup membership  and favourable intergroup 
comparisons that elevated her self -esteem. What this group of fered for Mahmood at a personal 
level is unclear to the researcher. However, based on her social media posts, it can be assumed 
the group of fered her a sense of  purpose greater than herself  in the form of  religious actualisation. 
This will be explored later in the chapter but of fers insight into the psychological dynamics at play 
within the online echo chamber. Through f requent interactions with ingroup members, Mahmood 
may have developed a preference for the ingroup (radical Islamists) over the outgroup (the West). 
Mahmood’s desire to be a part of  and participate in online ingroup communities made her more 
susceptible to inf luence in the form of  recruiters who approached  her privately. 
 
Though the topic of  the Syrian Civil War served to introduce Mahmood to this inf luential 
environment, it was not used to retain her interest. Comparisons between the content posted to 
her account in April 2013 and November 2013 show a reduction in content linked to the Syrian 
Civil War, with no posts observed by the researcher made in the latter month. While there are 
limited captures of  her account between April and November 2013, it is apparent that Mahmood 
had become deeply involved with radical content that she seems to have f irst come into contact 
with as a result of  her interest in the Syrian War. Behavioural changes observed by her family in 
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relation to her increased religiosity reinforce that the material she was exposed to extended 
beyond the war to personal conduct.146 This ref lects on the depth of  the social inf luence she 
experienced online. Even without the watchful eye of  her online peer group, Mahmood adhered  
to conduct they would approve of , such as conservative dress, additional prayer, and the 
withdrawing f rom tertiary education.147  
 
Most of  the accounts Mahmood interacted with publicly were observed to follow similar patterns 
in their posts. When Mahmood posted original content on Tumblr in March and April 2013, she 
would typically receive around 10 interactions in the form of  reposts of  likes, indicative of  the 
approximate size of  her following on the platform. She appeared to follow a variety of  accounts, 
several of  whom seemed to have reciprocated these interactions and formed public online 
relationships with Mahmood. Posts made on these accounts were typically similar to those made 
by Mahmood, with the central theme of  the Syrian Civil War and the occasional reference to 
radical Islam. However, there were also users who continued to propagate more radical positions. 
One such account, using the alias Prisoner of Faith, appeared to post almost entirely on subjects 
related to radical Islam. In one instance in early 2013, this account posted content by then Islamic 
State of  Iraq’s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, indicative of  a broader awareness of  the group’s 
senior leadership prior to their of f icial declaration of  a Caliphate in mid-2014.148 
 
It is unclear whether the accounts Mahmood interacted with were operated by recruiters on behalf  
of  what would become the Islamic State. It is possible that within the echo chamber she 
developed, she was subjected to inf luence f rom non-aligned and aligned radicals who intended 
to inf luence whoever they could in order to become active in radical Islam. The online ingroup 
was not strictly comprised of people who would go on to be a part of  the Islamic State, but rather 
a looser collection of  individuals with a similar outlook on issues of  signif icance to the Islamic 
State. As group polarisation theory suggests, users encouraged one another in their discussions 
to develop more radical views without necessarily attaching a substantive objective to such views. 
This environment was ideal for recruiters to exert inf luence with individuals already suscep tible to 
the same ideologies.  
 
In comparison with the accounts she followed, Mahmood was not the most radical voice within 
her echo chamber. However, her ideas of  what was acceptable, particularly in relation to violence, 
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had begun to develop to align with the ideologies of  the Islamic State. Mahmood posted anti-
Israeli content, such as an image of  a burning Israeli f lag.149 She also developed an intense 
reverence for Jihad and viewed it as the “apex of  Islam.” 150 Her posts at this time appear to have 
ref lected a general development and adoption of  radical views, as opposed to an overt 
endorsement of  what would soon become the Islamic State. Though Mahmood was invariably 
exposed to the Islamic State through her social media circle at this time, she appears t o have 
developed radical persuasions before she was recruited specif ically into the group as a 
consequence of  the echo chamber ef fect. Once inside the Islamic State, the tone of  Mahmood’s 
posts shif ted signif icantly toward the radical end of  the spectrum, particularly in advocating for 
violence. 
 
The echo chamber ef fect appears to have pushed Mahmood toward content of  a radical nature.  
Other members also contained within this echo chamber were able to articulate their concepts of  
“us” and “them” implicitly and explicitly within the content they posted online. These posts ref lected 
an in-group dynamic that had formed as a result of  the interactions between members of  the 
online community. In accordance with social identity theory, Mahmood was individually inf luenced 
as a consequence of  her participation in the group. Ideals of  behaviour iterated within this group 
were ref lected in her day-to-day life. While her parents observed she had become more religious, 
it became clear Mahmood had adopted views more radical than those with which she had been 
raised.151 For example, her withdrawal f rom university, linked with her eventual departure to Syria, 
appears linked to belief s around the role of  Muslim women.152 This also went against beliefs 
espoused by her parents, who had aspired for their daughter to have a med ical career.153 These 
beliefs were fostered online, and conformity to them was essential to maintain participation in the 
group.  
 
Mahmood indicated her views made her feel isolated f rom her of fline peers. She reposted text 
which outlined the consequences o f  “speaking the truth” as hatred f rom Muslims and non-
Muslims, being branded a terrorist, extremist or radical, and the risk of  imprisonment. 154 Posts on 
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the subject in March and April 2013 indicate Mahmood considered herself  an outsider in the West 
and identif ied with the experiences of  Muslim individuals who had been persecuted for their 
beliefs.155 This outsider status was reinforced within the echo chamber, where it was not only 
reiterated but translated into anti-Western sentiments and the justif ication of  violence in the name 
of  Islam directed toward perceived persecutors. Without the opportunity  for moderation, such 
views became normalised. Outsider status was not only a means to pursue a radical agenda, but 
also to create an in-group built on a common sense of  exclusion. As a result of  the echo chamber 
ef fect, there was a level of  control within the group around the content that members were 
exposed to, which minimised exposure to views f rom the out -group and allowed them to be 
characterised in such a way that would encourage members, including Mahmood, to eventually  
participate in violence against them.     
 
The Virtual Sisterhood 
 
Mahmood became a part of  this radical ingroup through exposure to their content in the echo 
chambers on her social media accounts. The accounts Mahmood interacted with appeared to 
belong to other women, as opposed to a mix of  men and women. This was identif ied as 
commonplace within radical spheres associated to the Islamic State. Men and women were 
especially discouraged f rom private interactions, in a way that imitated the relationships between 
the sexes inside territory claimed by the Islamic State. The other women Mahmood interacted 
with were westerners and claimed to be in cities f rom London to Brisbane. While it is not possible 
to ascertain how many followers Mahmood had and how many individuals she followed, 
Mahmood developed a close social circle online. Interactions within this circle would manifest in 
the form of  public interactions with one another. A post f rom one woman to Mahmood indicated 
the pair had never met, as the woman hoped to meet on Earth but prayed to meet in Jannah 
(heaven).156 This indicates that Mahmood had formed close f riendships online, and that such 
f riendships were built around a shared worldview.  
 
Mahmood seemed to bond with her online f riends over a shared interest in radical Islam 
encouraged within the echo chamber. It is not clear whether the other women in this social circle 
were recruiters for the Islamic State; however, they formed an integral part in one another’s  
radicalisation, which was exacerbated by the echo chamber ef fects they were all subject to as 
part of  their online activities. While her parents blamed Islamic State recruiter Adeel Ulhaq for 
their daughter’s eventual travel to Syria, the inf luence of  her network online can also not be 
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underestimated as normalising and justifying her decisions. 157  The majority of  her interactions 
with her online network, in addition to any Islamic State recruiters, would have been private and 
are not able to be studied for this reason. However, her public interactions are demonstrative of  
the wider network she managed to create for herself  to reinforce and validate her views.  
 
Within this social circle, one of  the most common themes which emerged was that of  sisterhood. 
While Mahmood reportedly had a strong relationship with her biological sisters, there is no 
indication of  what her female f riendships in Scotland were like.158 Online, however, Mahmood 
developed bonds with other women she described as ‘sisters’. Brotherhood and sisterhood are 
important concepts in Islam, which emphasises a spiritual equality of  Muslims before Allah.159 
However, only those who adhere to radical interpretations of  Islam are considered to be Muslim 
by groups like the Islamic State and, therefore, those considered part of  the sisterhood or 
brotherhood are exclusive. This reinforced the sense of  identif ication with the group and 
comparison to other groups. This radical attitude toward others – both Muslim and non-Muslim – 
strengthened the resolve of  the in-group as opponents to the out-groups and improved their 
perception of  how they compare to the out-group. In the case of  the Islamic State, their doctrine 
prescribes violent punishments, known to have included death and sexual slavery, for those who 
do not conform to their interpretation of  Islam.160  
 
The concept of  sisterhood in the context of  the Islamic State encouraged deeper relationships 
intended to emulate familial connections, and to act as an alternative support network. This  
became particularly important when a woman departed for Syria. For Mahmood, in particular, she 
indicated one of  the most dif ficult aspects of her travel to Syria was to leave her family behind. 161 
This was a concern she expected other women would also feel and provided guidance via her 
Tumblr account on how to cope with the initial phone call home when a woman f irst entered  
Islamic State territory.162 However, Mahmood had a well-established online network that would 
translate into real world connections who continued to act as her sisters once in Syria. This also 
allowed for women to directly compare their virtual f amily with their real one, entrenching their 
social identity with the former. This led to psychological reward in the form of  self -esteem and 
drove women to view their own families as hostile or antagonistic, subsequently undermining what  
were likely to be some of  the strongest relationships they had of f line. This virtual sisterhood would 
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eventually translate to real-world connections once inside the Islamic State, with Mahmood 
demonstrated in posts about separation f rom her hijrah buddy in September 2014.163  
 
Mahmood interacted f requently and publicly with others online she called sisters, with a central 
focus on their religion. These online sisters operated accounts which posted content similar to 
Mahmood. An account by the alias ‘Prisoner of  Faith’ f requently communicated with Mahmood 
publicly and f rom as early as 2012 would post commentary on radical Islamic philosophies and, 
more particularly, on the Islamic State of  Iraq and al-Sham. Other accounts posted content which 
ref lected similar viewpoints and reinforced one another where they shared and interacted with 
each other. Though public, their f requent references to sisterhood and engagement with one 
another as sisters created a sense of  exclusivity. This sisterhood became Mahmood’s echo 
chamber, where the repetition of  viewpoints was viewed as validation, and without challenge, the 
views evolved to become more radical in nature. This process is known as group polarisation, 
whereby a group makes decisions that are more extreme than the initial predisposit ion of the 
group’s members. 
 
The concept of  sisterhood is also conducive of  groupthink, a phenomenon where a collective 
desire for unity leads to irrational or dysfunctional decisions. 164 In such an environment, 
disagreement is seen to contribute to disharmony and is subsequently avoided. Where decisions 
are already extreme as a result of  group polarisation and members are reluctant to act in a 
disharmonious fashion, individuals can be motivated to participate in otherwise uncharacteristic 
activities. Accounts f rom her family indicate Mahmood was not at all inclined toward radical views, 
and that they were unaware of  her intent to travel to Syria.165 This would be consistent with group 
polarisation and groupthink, whereby Mahmood did not typically adhere to or opt for radical views 
until she was placed into a group environment where she identif ied with the cause and came to 
be convinced toward their proposed course of  action. In early 2013, it appears Mahmood attracted 
little readership on her social media account based on the low level of  interaction, and therefore, 
is unlikely to have attracted counterarguments that may have disrupted or challenged the 
development of  radical views. 
 
Irrespective of  whether the women Mahmood interacted with online were actual recruiters or 
fellow believers, they contributed to her radicalisation, as she no doubt did to theirs, through the 
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sisterhood they developed and subsequent episodes of  groupthink and group polarisation. It is 
notable that there were no observed instances where views raised were challenged, as groupthink 
encourages conformity and that members do not raise alternative or controversial views. 
However, posts which conformed to the ideo logy were commonplace within the social circle. In 
one instance in April 2013, Mahmood published text originally written by former al -Qa’ida Chief  
of  Intelligence, Abu Ubaydah Abdullah al- ‘Adam, which was on the subject of  how to prevent 
apostate awakenings.166 While this was not original content, Mahmood made the ef fort to 
contribute to the body of content within the echo chamber with equally radical views. Given these 
sisterhoods emerged within online echo chambers, there was already an absence of  criticism and 
counterviews; therefore, sisterhood becomes a powerful mechanism to control the behaviours 
and attitudes of  women as they are recruited into the Islamic State, with the sisterhood acting as 
an ingroup in its own right.  
 
The diarised style of  Mahmood’s post is also indicative of  the close relationship she shared with 
her followers and a desire to express her innermost thoughts, and sometimes vulnerabilities, with 
them. In the midst of  ideologically themed posts, Mahmood of ten wrote personal items that would 
receive reaction f rom her online associates. Examples of  such posts included an instance where 
she purchased an abaya (a type of  Islamic dress) that was too large and drew laughter f rom her 
f riends, and concern that her mother would be unhappy with the amount she had spent online 
shopping.167 Such posts became interactive places for her sisters to share in her experiences, 
particularly in light of  the geographical space between them all. These posts were also a salient 
reminder that the women who made posts and instructed one another of  radical religious views 
were particularly young and had problems similar to their western peers. The solution to these 
seemingly mundane problems, however, dif fered in that the ultimate reso lution was to become a 
member of  a terrorist organisation.  
 
Islamic State recruitment material was tailored to a younger audience. Viral videos targeted 
toward men included references to common youth interests, such as video games. 168 For young 
women, the sense of  community and belonging that comes f rom participation in a sisterhood was 
used to attract them to the Islamic State. In the case of  Mahmood, this was most clearly evidenced 
when she was a recruiter herself . In one post, Mahmood appeals directly to  her ‘brothers and 
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sisters’ to hasten their trips to Islamic State territory.169 This post appealed to f irst, a sense of  
common identity in the form of  a sibling type relationship and, second, a sense of  urgency that 
encouraged people to abandon their western lives without a second thought. She also added 
advice to encourage other sisters to join her and relayed the experiences of  other women 
Mahmood interacted with in her daily life in an ef fort to convince women to join. 170 
 
While it was these sentiments and ideals that initially attracted women to the sisterhood online, it 
was the favourable comparisons to other groups, both similar and dissimilar, and the 
psychological benef its of these comparisons that kept them loyal. For Mahmood, the positive self -
identity she derived f rom her participation led her to develop a conf idence that was conveyed to 
her followers through her social media posts, particularly those which antagonised out -groups. 
This conf idence manifested in a belief  that the Islamic State was cap able of  achieving its military 
objective of  world domination, and that to be a member of  any other sect of  society would result 
in defeat. These comparisons—which proved deeply inaccurate with the hindsight of  seeing the 
Islamic State fall—were rooted in the narratives she consumed as a sister within the Islamic 
State’s digital family. This belief , however, coupled with the reinforcement and encouragement 
she received f rom her sisterhood online, would eventually be a key driver behind her decision to 
relocate to Syria and act on the ideologies she had come to believe.   
 
Though Mahmood did share violent and graphic content on her account, it is clear that the themes 
used in Islamic State propaganda to target men did not necessarily appeal to her and her f riends. 
Even where violence was condoned, it was less graphic than it might be depicted in other 
publications. For example, Mahmood posted a photo of the Boston Bomber, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, 
with the caption ‘innocent’.171 She would also post photos of  men killed  in the Syrian Civil War, 
though these images were intended to share and inspire sadness more so than to serve as a 
recruitment tool.172 Likewise, the content on other accounts she interacted with was of  a similar 
nature and did not ref lect the content that would become viral as Islamic State marketing tools, 
such as videos of  beheadings and those modelled af ter video games. 173                                                                                                                                  
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The use of  sisterhood to attract women also acts on motivations traditionally understood to drive 
individuals to terrorist organisations, namely a sense of  isolation. 174 Individuals consider 
themselves to be on an outgroup within their home countries, and therefore, feel alone. Such 
feelings were expressed by Mahmood and encouraged by her network. The perception they were 
outsiders was considered a consequence of  their views.175 This was not seen as a negative 
consequence, however, as this became a point of  commonality within the online ingroup 
Mahmood found in the Islamic State sisterhood. Posts which highlighted how Muslims were 
persecuted for their beliefs in western societies were used to f ind a place of  common 
understanding and stoke sentiments of  resentment toward the west. These sentiments were used 
as the basis for a radicalisation and became the platform upon which Mahmood was radicalised 
in her views as a Muslim. Shared experiences encouraged the entrenchment of  sisterhood online 
and deepened the divide between Mahmood’s newfound online ingroup and the outgroup in which 
she lived her day-to-day life.  
 
Sisterhood opened avenues for the women to share close personal events and develop their 
f riendships. In one instance, Mahmood shared a post f rom an online associate that requested 
prayers for her grandfather.176 This is demonstrative of  the vulnerabilities shown by other women 
within her social circle in search of  support. Requests for duas (prayers) were commonplace 
within Islamic State inner circles online, as a way to connect with one another spiritually.177 The 
opportunity to show such support in a public forum, which likely continued privately, further 
entrenched interpersonal connections within the sisterhood. This would also make it harder for 
women to betray the trust and conf idence of  their sisters, either in a personal capacity or to law 
enforcement. These acts of  vulnerability would act to further solidify the in-group dynamics, and 
developed a unif ied f ront, at the very least, in their social media presence.  
 
In many instances, the women in Mahmood’s social media circle were more preoccupied with 
their relationships with one another than with their husbands. While there was discussion of  their 
marriages, these posts seldom came with the same level o f  vulnerability the women displayed 
with one another on other issues. This created a deeper sense of  f riendship, which meant that 
those with whom Mahmood interacted online had a greater level of  inf luence over her. Their 
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advice to her, including encouragement to eventually travel to Syria, came f rom a place of  trust 
and conf idence given the vulnerabilities they had shared with one another. The primary content 
examined in this research related to posts made by Mahmood in the period between March and 
November 2013; however, a large dataset exists in the period af ter she travelled to the Islamic 
State. The content and tone changes as she evolves f rom recruit to recruiter, and it is likely that 
during this time she received instruction on what to post f rom within the Islamic State as part of  
their broader recruitment strategy. The limitations of  such posts may have also been to protect 
the identif ication and targeting of  her husband by military actors in the region.  
 
That being said, men were of ten sent to participate in combat away f rom their wives. It appears 
women would of ten have one another to depend on as opposed to their husbands. Accounts f rom 
other wives described how western women lived in close proximity to one another and would 
spend time together. Mahmood was reportedly a part of  this arrangement and was likely to have 
had similar experiences to other women who have described their experiences since the collapse 
of  the Islamic State. This would include instances where women had multiple husbands, af ter 
their husbands were killed, and would spend extended periods alone. Likewise, women were 
considered subordinate to men and, therefore, f riendship did not appear to be an important quality 
in a marriage. It appears the majority of  relationships women had within the Islamic State were 
with other women and, therefore, sisterhood played an important part in their time inside Syria, 
just as it did online before Mahmood was recruited.  
 
A sense of  sisterhood provided a means to keep women content under such circumstances. Overt 
recruitment material produced by the Islamic State to target female recruits was tailored to appeal 
to traditionally feminine pursuits, such as wifedom, home life and children. In social media 
channels, the concept of  sisterhood was used to also remind women of  the network they would 
become a part of  and that their married life would not be lonely, even where their husbands were 
seldom present. This acted as much as an enabler as it did a motivation. Women were 
encouraged to participate in the Islamic State for the sisterhood it provided, but also because of  
the pressure f rom the sisterhood developed in the process of  radicalisation.  
 
Sisterhood became a direct line of  appeal when Mahmood became a recruiter herself . By June 
2014, Mahmood appeared to have at least three times the level of  interaction by followers on her 
Tumblr account. In a post series titled Diary of a Mujahirah, Mahmood included specif ic appeals 
to sisters with advice on instructions for travel to the Islamic State.178 These appeals also were 
intended to isolate women f rom any factors that might inhibit their motivation to join the Islamic 
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State, such as family and f riends. While, again, it is likely Mahmood received instruction o n the 
content she posted on her Tumblr, there is a level of  consistency with the posts she made prior 
to November 2013, particularly as it relates to the concept of  sisterhood. Perhaps the most 
signif icant change is that Mahmood writes with more authority.  This could be attributed to the high 
prof ile she gained af ter the media picked up on her disappearance, as she became an idol for 
likeminded women. 
 
One notable trend is that Mahmood seemed to interact primarily with other western women online, 
as opposed to women based in Syria or the wider Middle East area. In particular, her associates 
appeared to be the children or grandchildren of  immigrants who resided in English speaking 
countries. There were no instances observed by the researcher where Mahmood pub licly 
interacted with non-western women. Although, based on expressions of  solidarity with persons 
af fected by the conf lict in Syria, it is expected these were women Mahmood also viewed as 
sisters. However, this also allowed Mahmood to buy into a fantasy of  life in the Islamic State 
without the risk she may contact someone who provided a contrary view on the reality of  life on 
the ground.  
 
Such conversations would be unlikely to take place publicly as individual and private appeals to 
would be more likely to yield a positive result. It is unclear whether Mahmood received such 
correspondence. However, she reportedly contacted her parents while inside the Islamic State to 
advise them of  the ill conditions she lived in, of ten having to sleep on the f loor and becoming sick 
with pneumonia.179 Such details were never broadcast on her social media prof iles and are 
unlikely to have been iterated to prospective recruits Mahmood may have had contact with online. 
The lack of  interaction between Mahmood and non-western female members of  the Islamic State 
allowed her to accept a distorted picture of  life within the Islamic State.  
 
In Syria, it appears Mahmood mostly interacted with other western women, and seldom wrote of  
experiences with local women. Mahmood did use intermittent Arabic on her Tumblr account, but 
this of ten seemed to be with reference to religion. It is not clear to the researcher whether 
Mahmood was a f luent speaker, and what impact this had on her relationships with non-western 
women in Syria. It was reported that Mahmood was a member of  the all -female police brigade, 
al-Khanssaa, known for their brutal punishment of  women who disobeyed laws imposed by the 
Islamic State. Al-Khanssaa Brigade represented an in-group in itself  similarly built on the ideal of  
female f riendship. Women who participated in the morality police force had additional privileges, 
such as the ability to drive and walk about without the company of  a male escort. 180 They also 
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had power in their enforcement of  the moral code of  the Islamic State, which elevated them above 
their female peers.  
 
Al-Khanssaa was believed to comprise two elements which segregated western and non-western 
women.181 Power was a driving force for local women to join al-Khanssaa, as it af forded them 
independence that was more familiar to them from a pre-Islamic State period. However, western 
women who joined this brigade, including Mahmood, received substantially dif ferent treatment. 182 
They were paid more, and had even less restrictions in their day-to-day lives.183 It was also 
mandated that western and non-western women within al-Khanssaa would not associate with one 
another, likely to avoid comparisons about the benef its they received.184 This also represented an 
even more exclusive ingroup within the ingroup, whereby its members were elevated above those 
over whom they exercised power. This af forded them a sense of  superiority that enabled them to 
enact violent punishment over those seen to have transgressed Islamic State law. This may also 
explain why Mahmood seemed to only have close relationships with other westerners whils t in 
Syria, as well as why westerners dominated the social media space.  
 
Sisterhood, therefore, became weaponised to convince otherwise non-violent women to 
participate in the persecution of  other women. Much of  the recruitment process became a 
mechanism to ensure conformity within the Islamic State, and dissuade women f rom voicing 
alternative perspectives, even in the situations that were so counterintuitive and violent when 
compared to their western lives. Mahmood did not seem to demonstrate violent tend encies in 
accounts of  her life in Scotland, nor did she post an intention to participate in violence personally 
on her social media accounts. The precise reasons she was motivated to join al -Khanssaa 
Brigade are unclear, but it is expected this process would have been a natural progression of  her 
recruitment. Sisterhood, and the strength of  female bonds, allowed Mahmood to be part of  a 
situation where she was so deeply entrenched in the organisation’s values  that she was able to 




Mahmood was raised in a moderate family and appears to have been predominantly exposed to 
radical content online. However, her faith – though moderate – became critical in how she would 
view and process information online. The Islamic State required its followers to adhere to a strict 
interpretation of  Islam, one which was espoused within the online ingroup Mahmood became a 
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part of . This interpretation instilled in Mahmood a sense of  religious obligation, whereby she 
believed the life she would live inside the Islamic State was a way to Jannah. This sense of  
religious duty was shared amongst her online sisterhood, who encouraged one another to fulfil 
what they believed to be their calling. Several of  Mahmood’s posts ref lected on a deep religious 
development that took place before she eventually departed for Syria.  
 
Mahmood would of ten post content that was religious but, in many instances, was not overtly 
radical. Such content was intertwined with material on western ‘occupations’ in the Middle East 
and outrage in particular at the situation in Syria. Her personal background, as a f irst-generation 
Muslim in a western nation, was the way in which she came to interpret the information she viewed 
online and led her to content that aligned with the Islamic State. As an echo chamber amplif ies 
the views it contains, these are of ten perceived to be more popular and widely held than they 
really are. Mahmood, therefore, became entrenched in a community that capitalised on her 
previously held beliefs and continued to push her to embrace more radical ones, particularly as 
they related to the Syrian Civil War. This also led her to maintain the view that the ingroup she 
was a part of  were more successful in the implementation of  their ideology. With time, Mahmood 
moved her social media content f rom a focus on injustice and conf licts  in the Middle East to 
material focused almost exclusively on Islam.  
 
Religious identity was a commonality shared within the ingroup of  the Islamic State and, by 
extension, within Mahmood’s online echo chamber. Many of  the accounts Mahmood interacted 
with appeared to write almost exclusively on religious issues, again, with little that was overtly 
radical. The role religion played in her personal life appeared to transform her behaviour. 
Mahmood’s parents observed that she seemed to have deepened her piety , while her posts online 
discussed how she sought to dress conservatively, in line with her newfound beliefs. 185 Her place 
in the virtual sisterhood invariably helped, as the women all faced similar experiences in western 
nations. Within Mahmood’s social media activity, there does not appear to have been 
representation f rom women who lived within the conf lict zone they aspired to travel to. This,  
perhaps, allowed Mahmood to overlook the dangers of  travel to an active conf lict zone. This was 
also a means by which individuals could categorise groups—on the basis of  their religious 
identity—and identify with the Islamic State in that they purported to share a ‘true’ interpretation 
of  Islamic with its loyal members.  
 
Her online sisters emphasised what was expected of  women, the roles they could play in the 
future of  an emergent Caliphate, and how this was the obligation of  all true Muslims. Mahmood 
was subjected to social pressures to fulf il the duties expected of  her to maintain her membership 
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within her online sisterhood and was expected to lead a lifestyle supportive of  the aspirations of  
what would later become the Islamic State. Her role as an online supporter was part of  this, but a 
sense of  obligation to participate in the conf lict – albeit as a jihadi bride and not a combatant – 
was a common theme online.186 The sisterhood and recruiters encouraged the view that this was 
the path to Jannah, to prove one’s faithfulness to Allah. As an exclusive sect, it was critical that 
Mahmood support what she came to believe was the true interpretation of  Islam, to ensure their 
prosperity and longevity. This meant that Mahmood identif ied with the group and saw their values 
as a ref lection of  her own personal views. From here, Mahmood’s views became increasingly 
radical to align with the Islamic State’s, in an ef fort to ensure her own position within the group so 
that she would be seen as a member by outgroups who were perceived as inferior.  
 
This sense of  duty developed as a result of  the interactions she had within her echo chamber, 
with her online sisters, and probably through private interactions with recruiters that are not 
captured in this study. However, it was one of  the most critical motivators in her decision to join 
the Islamic State. The fundamental reason Mahmood travelled to Syria was to become a wife and 
mother, something she believed was her duty as a follower of  the Islamic State’s ideologies. This 
was not an aspiration she initially held when she became embroiled in the online echo chamber. 
In March and April 2013, no posts were found by the researcher that suggested she intended to 
become a wife and mother for a jihadi, nor that she felt it was her duty to do so. She did post on 
religious matters, including a desire to live in a Muslim country, and appeared t o have 
encountered radical content in this time, but none that overtly contributed to a sense of  religious 
duty. 
 
However, by November, she would post more f requently on the topic and alluded to a desire to 
become a wife. It can be inferred that between April and November, the idea that she had a 
religious obligation to assist in the furtherance of  the Islamic State became a deeply held belief. 
This is demonstrated not only in the content she posted and behavioural changes she exhibited 
in her day-to-day life, but also in her ultimate decision to depart for Syria. Though the pressure 
did come f rom within her online sisterhood to conform to their expectations, many of  those with 
whom she interacted appear to have never lef t their home countries, and instead remained online 
supporters in the years that would follow. It can be expected that private conversations between 
Mahmood and other women online might have contained fantasies about the prospect of  life 
inside what would become the Islamic State, in a more casual exertion of  social inf luence and 
pressure, but that not all women chose to act on this sense of  duty.  
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In November, Mahmood posted a series of  images depicting a jihadi and his wife in the moments 
before he leaves. These images are indicative of  some of  the aspirations Mahmood had for her 
new life in Syria. Unlike other women who would join the Islamic State at a later stage, Mahmood 
was one of  the f irst western women to make this journey, and so did not have the reassurance of  
other women to describe life in Syria and answer any questions she may have had. It is widely 
believed Mahmood was in contact with recruiters during this time. Women had sense of  obligation 
imposed on them by these recruiters made them believe this was the only right choice, and that 
they have a religious duty to fulf il inside Syria.187 It can be expected that similar pressures were 
applied to Mahmood, who had been conditioned through conformity with group expectations and 
views to participate fully in radicalised behaviours. These pressures were also derived f rom 
intergroup competition, where Mahmood needed to act in furtherance of  maintaining a positive 
self -identity by acting in an increasingly hostile manner toward outgroup counterparts, to bolster 
her own self -esteem through comparing favourably and advancing her group agenda.  
 
In an Arabic manifesto produced and circulated within the Islamic State – though not through its 
western channels – they considered the greatest responsibility for a woman was that of  being a 
wife and a mother.188 This manifesto was in accordance with the radical Islamic f ramework that 
dictated conduct within the Islamic State. Even though it was not designed for western 
consumption, based on there being no translation provided, the ideals outlined are ref lective of  
the content found on Mahmood and her associate’s online accounts. The content of  this doctrine 
is ref lected in the material circulated within echo chambers and used in the recruitment of  women, 
as their role within the Islamic State was f ramed as a righteous obligation. Much as men were 
called to jihad with the promise of  martyrdom, a similar sense of  duty was imposed on women to 
ensure they could satisfy the roles required of  them. The role of  women within Islamic State 
society provided Mahmood with a sense of  purpose as a consequence of  the radicalisation she 
had experienced and led her to travel to Syria to fulf il this purpose.  
 
Women were important state builders within the Islamic State. The intention that they would raise 
the next generation of  f ighters indicated there was a level of  future planning within the senior 
leadership that f iltered down to recruitment directives.189 In the short term, the presence of  female 
recruits was used to attract more men. Material that suggested male f ighters may have multiple 
wives, in addition to sexual slaves, depended on the presence of  female recruits who expressed 
enthusiasm to become a bride. The re-marriages of  women when their husbands were killed is 
indicative that the Islamic State was not necessarily able to meet this demand. As part of  their 
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viability in the longer term, the replacement of  individuals killed in action was important to the 
longevity of  the insurgency. This primarily came in the form of  recruits but was easier where an 
individual had already been radicalised, such as in instances where they were raised in such an 
environment. Given the Islamic State did not appear averse to the use of  child soldiers, termed 
cubs in recruitment material, a replenished population did not necessarily need to reach adulthood 
to become a combatant. 
 
Mahmood would later acknowledge the dif ficulties of life in a warzone to her social media followers 
but articulated that the cause was worthwhile. In her transition f rom a contributor and consumer 
of  the online echo chamber to a muhajirat, Mahmood’s purpose in the state became two -fold: she 
was both a wife and a success story. Muhajirat was the term used for a woman who had 
successfully completed hijrah to the Islamic State. They were used as examples to recruit other 
women, while they also contributed as wives and mothers. For Mahmood, this was also an 
important function of  her religious duty. It cannot be conf irmed that she was in control of  her social 
media once she entered Islamic State territory, but it is believed by the researcher that she was 
active as a recruiter. The recruitment of  other women further developed the capacity for the 
Islamic State to grow, both due to the capacity to provide brides for foreign f ighters who had been 
promised wives and to develop a supportive population. 
 
Of  particular importance to her radicalisation was the development of  an admiration for jihad within 
the terms set by the Islamic State. The concept itself  is contested within Islamic scholarship, and 
of ten interpretations of fered by terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State are 
refuted as self -serving and non-Islamic. Jihad was interpreted in such a way that justif ied the 
activities of  the Islamic State, not limited to  but including beheadings, public corporal punishment 
and the use of  sexual slavery to oppress minorities.190 The belief  that this was a just war was an 
idea that came to proliferate the echo chamber Mahmood occupied, particularly in reference to 
what was of ten seen as an unjust occupation by the West in the Middle East. The acceptance 
that such actions were justif iable allowed individuals to overcome personal reservations to 
conform with the expectations of  the wider group, as is of ten exhibited in instances of  groupthink.  
 
While women were not recruited as combatants, they were a part of  the conf lict in their role as 
wives. Men would of ten be killed in combat, subsequently to be considered martyrs, and their 
wives remarried to other f ighters. Women were of ten treated as commodities, with little time 
between marriages. This meant that women also needed to understand that jihad meant their 
husbands would of ten not come home f rom combat, but that their sacrif ice was for a necessary 
and important cause. Likewise, women were of ten exposed to displays of  violence in their day -
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to-day lives within the Islamic State, and so, to ensure cohesion in the face of  such overt violence, 
jihad was used to unify the group through the justif ication of  actions with the expectation group 
members would act supportively.  
 
Jihad is a core ideological pillar for the Islamic State and is used to justify the actions they 
undertake and create impetus for their followers to participate in such actions, even where they 
may otherwise have been viewed as morally reprehensible. It was imp ortant, therefore, that 
recruits would adhere to this interpretation of  jihad, and rate it highly, to overrule any moral 
objections they may have had to these actions. This was also important for women, as day -to-
day life within the Islamic State meant they were of ten privy to evidence of  violence that targeted 
civilians. Likewise, as per the doctrine produced by the Islamic State on the role of  women, it was 
important they recognised the signif icance of  jihad so that they would react accordingly if  they 
were called to partake in the combat. 
 
Islamic State doctrine, not broadcast in itself  but certainly inf luential in the creation of  material to 
recruit women, stipulated that women were to take up arms in the instance there were insuf f icient 
male combatants to defend f rom adversaries.191 This meant women needed to be conditioned to 
conform to such expectations even if  they never expected to take up arms. Such instances 
became common with the fall of  the Islamic State, where several women were found equipped 
with suicide vests, including German national, Linda Wenzel.192 Mahmood expressed intense 
admiration for jihad as the pinnacle of  Islam.193 However, her relationship with jihad – at least in 
public forums – was somewhat complex. There were instances that almost appeared to indicate 
an infatuation with conventional iterations of  jihad that extended to her calls for violence against 
the west while inside Syria, while she also recognised that her role was as a wife, and not a 
combatant in other circumstances.194 
 
It appears that emotions that bonded the virtual sisterhood – such as a sense of  injustice about 
conf licts in the Middle East and an intense admiration of  jihad – inf luenced the women to be 
supportive of  violence, though much of  their content only alluded to, and did not outright feature 
this. This violence was of ten raised with anti-western sentiments when Mahmood was inside the 
Islamic State, and though the researcher did not observe threats made by Mahmood against the 
west online before she was inside Syria, she was likely to have been exposed to this material 
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within her virtual echo chamber, based on the anti-western sentiments that were of ten posted to 
her own account.195 Jihad was def ined as part of  the religious obligations women had within the 
sisterhood, and their contributions as wives and mothers was seen as an essential component of  
the conf lict.  
 
Mahmood may have experienced some level of  discrimination in Scotland on the basis that she 
was a Muslim. At the very least, she identif ied with these experiences online and of ten shared  
content on the issue in March and April 2013. In one instance, she reposted a response to an 
accusation that Muslims (as a whole group, and not individuals) had undertaken the Boston 
Bombing.196 In this response, there is ref lection on how it feels to be persecuted on the basis of  
one’s identify, and how this contributes to a sense of  isolation. Mahmood also reposted a 
comment that essentially stated that Muslims should not need to prove to white people that they 
are not terrorists.197 Such isolation is of ten cited as a motivation for individuals to become 
members of  terrorist groups and undertake violence against the societies in which they were 
raised.  
 
Though Mahmood recognised her beliefs isolated her f rom her peers, it also appears Mahmood 
related to, and possibly experienced, a sense of  isolation that came f rom the treatment of  Muslims 
in western nations, particularly af ter terrorist attacks. This is also indicative that as of  April 2013, 
Mahmood did not consider herself  to be a Muslim extremist, in spite of  the views she expressed 
online. Her view that she was oppressed, a view which may have been rooted in some truth, was 
used to justify the violence she aspired to achieve. Negative experiences at the hands of  the 
western outgroup, such as those Muthana identif ied with on her social media, were used to 
deepen the divide between “us” and “them” in a way that worked to the advantage of  the recruiters.  
This meant that women like Muthana came to see themselves not as violent extremist s, but as 
individuals emboldened to defend their ingroup in the face of  an existential threat.  
 
However, early posts lacked the direction that would later come f rom Islamic State doctrine, 
particularly in terms of  calls for attacks on the West. Once again,  it appears that in early 2013, 
Mahmood was not inclined toward violence, but rather, attracted to an ideology that espoused 
violence. Women came to have a substantially more active role in the activities of  the Islamic 
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State when compared with other Islamist terror groups, such as al-Qa’ida and the Taliban. In early  
2013, Mahmood had not established overt ties with the Islamic State or its earlier manifestations. 
Instead, in this period, it is clear she was in the process of  self -radicalisation, which later made 
her either seek out or be sought out by recruiters who would lead her to Syria. A sense of  religious 




Mahmood was not a traditional target for radicalisation. Based on the information available about 
her life in Scotland, she did not have ties to extremists, was well-educated and seemed to have 
enjoyed at least some parts of  western culture. Of f line, there would have been few opportunities 
for a recruiter to radicalise someone who f its this prof ile. However, examination of  social media 
accounts operated by Mahmood demonstrate that her online behaviours and interests came to 
be increasingly radical as she went deeper into the echo chamber that would def ine her views on 
the world. Mahmood was not a radical before she ventured online, but the concepts she was 
introduced to were things she could related to, namely a sense of  sisterhood and a religious 
obligation bigger than herself .  
 
Both of  these concepts capitalised on the upbringing Mahmood had experienced: a young Muslim 
woman in a post-9/11 West. To explore such concepts online does not necessarily lead to 
radicalisation, but rather, the content on these issues that Mahmood found most appealing was 
viewed through the lens of  radical Islam. Once inside this echo chamber, Mahmood became 
involved with an ingroup that used sisterhood and religious obligations to entrench a divide 
between Mahmood and her western roots. Her social media posts indicate how she was 
conditioned to believe that these views justif ied her actions, and the actions of  the Islamic State. 
The exact process of  her recruitment remains unclear to the researcher, in terms of  whether 
Mahmood sought out avenues to travel to Syria or was approached by an online recruiter, but it 
is clear that her participation in the radical online community she encountered was a critical step 
in her journey as a Jihadi Bride.  
 
Mahmood became deeply embroiled in an ingroup within an ingroup, being the online sisterhood 
of  the Islamic State. This sisterhood used the echo chamber ef fect to strengthen the divide 
between themselves and their antagonists: any and all adversaries of  the Islamic State, but 
particularly, the West. In this situation, religion was used to create a sense of  duty or obligation 
that drove Mahmood to make hijrah to Syria, which ultimately served to advance the agenda of  
the ingroup and rewarded Mahmood with a sense of  personal satisfaction portrayed through her 
social media accounts af ter she arrived in Syria.   
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Chapter V: Hoda Muthana 
 
In November 2014, one year af ter Aqsa Mahmood departed for Syria, a 20-year-old American 
woman by the name of  Hoda Muthana departed her home in Alabama to make the same journey 
to Syria to join the Islamic State. Like many other women her age, Muthana was active across 
several social media sites, including Twitter and Tumblr.198 The posts she made on these sites, 
both before and af ter she travelled to Syria, documented her radicalisation, recruitment, and 
eventually, encouragement of  other women. These posts were captured and made publicly 
available by Ellie Hall, a journalist who maintained contact with Muthana throughout her time in 
Syria.199  This meant even as her accounts were removed, the contents remained available online 
for use in this study. Muthana is also one of  several western jihadi brides discovered inside al Hol 
camp since the fall of  the Islamic State.200 From here, she has provided interviews as part of  her 
ef forts to return to the United States.201  
 
Muthana was born in the United States to Yemeni parents, with her father having been a 
diplomat.202 She maintains that she had a conservative upbringing and was restricted in what she 
was able to do with her peers.203 She attributed this as the reason she had such a limited social 
circle of  f riends, but would not be able to spend time with them outside of  school or the mosque. 204 
Muthana resented that her brothers had f reedoms she did not, and feared a future where her 
mother chose her husband f rom the family in Yemen, meaning she would need to move there. 205 
Muthana also had a troubled relationship with her mother, feeling there was no relationship 
between the two of  them.206 These personal circumstances would culminate to inf luence her 
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decisions when Muthana was gif ted her f irst cell phone and entered into a social media space 
that would ultimately change her life.207 
 
Muthana was online in an environment where the Islamic State had announced their Caliphate.  
This meant two things for their online recruitment process: material was more overt and explicit 
in what was expected of  members, and ef forts to counter their online presence were stronger. 
Muthana would have subsequently been subjected to a more overt clash of  ideas in the social 
media space, including exposure to the kind of  treatment women were subjected to within the 
Islamic State, as well as the atrocities committed against others within the region. This means 
that, potentially unlike Mahmood, Muthana was likely to have experienced the ef fects of  some 
countermeasures, and still travelled to Syria, irrespective of  this knowledge. Notwithstanding this, 
three similar themes emerged f rom an analysis of  Muthana’s social media activity: her presence 
in an echo chamber found on Islamic State ideals, female f riendships, and a sense of  religious 
obligation.  
 
An Islamic State Echo Chamber 
 
Like many of  her peers in the United States, Muthana was active across several s ocial media 
platforms. However, her virtual network came to consist primarily of  Islamic State af f iliates and 
members, as opposed to others f rom her real-world social circles. It was these platforms, coupled 
with an increased interest in Islam, that appeared to introduce Muthana to these social networks 
in the f irst instance. In a 2019 interview, Muthana stated that she desired greater independence 
f rom her conservative family, and that her engagement with radical Islam was rooted in a desire 
to escape this conservatism.208 It is unclear whether this is the factor that drove Muthana to seek 
out such information across social media, or whether she encountered them via other means.  
Regardless of  the precise driver, it is apparent f rom social media posts f rom late 2013 and early 
2014 that Muthana had immersed herself  in an echo chamber centred on Islamic State ideals.  
 
Islam was one of  the common bonds within this echo chamber. It was on this basis that Muthana 
was able to participate in this community and form meaningful relationships with its members. 
These individuals rallied around their place as Muslims in the western world, which some 
perceived as threatening to their very identity. Muthana f ramed those she interacted with as 
‘normal’ Muslims, indicative that Muthana viewed their experiences and outlooks, at the very least, 
to be ref lective of  her own interpretation of  the world.209 Social media posts made in the year 
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before Muthana departed for Syria, between November 2013 and November 2014, indicate she 
was deeply involved with a virtual ‘family’ of  likeminded individuals. However, the nature of  the 
content Muthana posted, and invariably consumed, was of  a substantial ly more radical nature,  
idolising prominent jihadi f igures, such as Osama bin Laden, and adhering to a strict moral code 
of  online interactions that extended f rom its Islamic State linked facilitators. 210 
 
Muthana had been raised Muslim, and as such, it was an intrinsic part of  her identity and how she 
categorised the world around her. With this being a central characteristic of  members of  the 
Islamic State echo chamber, it was simple for Muthana to identify who belonged to this group 
alongside her. This category was not so broad as to include all members of  the Islamic faith, but 
rather, an exclusive and radical subsect of  it. It was at the social identif ication phase that Muthana 
was likely to have changed her behaviours to match those around her, as she ad opted this group 
identity to match what she had categorised herself  as belonging to. This paved the way for 
Muthana to undertake social comparisons between the Islamic State and all those perceived as 
antagonistic to their causes, including the United States,   
 
Muthana identif ied she participated in a group comprised of  some 3,000 members on Twitter, who 
used the platform to disseminate radical content, inform the increasingly radicalised views of  one 
another and encourage users to conform with behaviours and ideals set by the Islamic State.211 
All of  these qualities are characteristics of  an echo chamber. Membership of  this echo chamber 
comprised some of  the most devout supporters of  the Islamic State, known as the baqiyah 
family.212 The Arabic word baqiyah was commandeered by Islamic State supporters online, 
derived f rom their motto: baqiyah wa tatamaddad (endures and expands).213 These supporters 
aligned themselves with Islamic State doctrine in the digital space, sharing content of  a radical 
persuasion in accordance with Islamic State views. 
 
From as early as January 2014, Muthana’s username on twitter included the word baqiyah,  
indicative of  her membership in this online community, and a clear marker of  her social 
identif ication with the group. Muthana operated in accordance with trends seen within this online 
community. In January 2014, she posted a quote f rom Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyyah, a theologian 
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popular within Salaf i and Wahabi traditions, on the path to enlightenment, guidance, and 
victory.214 In her post, Muthana demonstrated her knowledge of  Islam in accordance with that 
practiced by the Islamic State. This also reveals the type of  content Muthana consumed as she 
was radicalised online, and how she used her own presence on social media to share this within 
the baqiyah family echo chamber. Her username was also a clear connection to the earliest  
manifestations of  this online family, as individuals would of ten self -identify and go to extreme 
lengths to protect one another.215 
 
This family was an ingroup founded on a strong ideological bond that translated to an emotional 
one. Online f riendships and interactions inf luenced members to modify their social identities to 
conform with expectations that aligned to the ideological found ations of  the group. The 
relationships within this ‘family’ were especially important, as individuals who travelled to Iraq and 
Syria to join the Islamic State would of ten sever ties to support networks in their home country. 216 
They were, therefore, able to maintain a support network that encouraged them to participate 
both online and of f line in activities that would advance the cause of  the Islamic State. The use of  
the term ‘family’, as well as f requent references to ‘brothers and sisters’, were tools to reinforce 
how important the bonds were that they shared with one another and maintaining the depth of  
these relationships was amongst the greatest one could experience.  
 
Membership into the baqiyah family represented an elevated status in the online space of  the 
Islamic State. The behaviours necessitated by this group led to the second and third stages 
proposed by Tajfel and Turner: social identif ication and social comparison. Social identif ication 
occurs when one adopts the identity of  the group they categorise themselves as belonging to.217 
Once one has identif ied with a group, there is a tendency to compare their group to others, with 
self -esteem being derived f rom favourable comparisons to other groups. 218 For the baqiyah 
family, this comparison was with ‘fans’ of  the Islamic State, over whom they exercised superior 
religious knowledge and piety, as well as with the adversaries of  the Islamic State. Membership 
into the family was attractive because they perceived themselves favourably when compared to 
both groups. As a result, ‘fans’ were known to aspire to have their accounts suspended – referred 
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to as ‘martyrdom’ – in hopes of  becoming baqiyah members.219 Muthana herself  was proud of  her 
position in this family, posting a tweet with a rabbit with a sign that read ‘baqiyah’.220  
 
A sense of  exclusivity and solidarity served to attract and maintain membership, which in turn, 
kept the family-style echo chambers functional in spite of  ef forts by western counterterrorism 
practitioners and social media companies to shut down terrorist recruitment on social media. The 
structure of  this online family was designed to maximise operational ef fectiveness. Members were 
instructed to protect one another’s identities f rom counterterrorism ef forts and would continually 
work to endorse the actions of  the Islamic State on social media to amplify the echo chamber 
ef fect for prospective recruits. To maintain their position in the group, members would disseminate 
material, share insight into a more advanced knowledge of  Salaf ist J ihadism, and encourage 
others to participate in terrorist attacks or travel to Syria. Members derived a sense of  identity 
f rom these activities and, as such, when the expectations changed, so too did their behaviours to 
maintain group membership. For Mahmood, this meant participation in an increasingly radicalised 
online space that she contributed to creating through her social media content. These behaviours 
were gradual, with a trend toward more violent and overt content closer to her decision to relocate 
to Syria.  
 
The Islamic State and their supporters were well versed social media operators. The use of  
hashtags, a feature for which Twitter has become known, meant that interested persons were 
able to rapidly discover relevant content and build an echo chamber on search terms. Some of  
these terms were specif ically targeted toward women, which shows the emphasis that the Islamic 
State placed on their recruitment.221 For example, #teamhijabi was used to circulate material 
specif ically targeted toward women.222 This once again reinforced this idea of  community and 
sisterhood, or in this instance, of  being a team. Gender played an important role in online 
discussions, and many users within echo chambers would identify themselves with account 
names of ten starting with umm (mother) or abu (father) to denote their gender.223 Muthana also 
adhered to this convention, and f rom at least August 2014, she used the name Umm Jihad 
(mother of  jihad) on Twitter.224 This distinction was an important feature of  online interactions that 
contributed to a sense of  sisterhood and a shared bond online.  
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The cohesion of  the group was primarily determined by their shared ideology, as they adhered to 
a common belief  system. Ingroup and outgroup dynamics were an important feature within these 
virtual echo chambers and encouraged members to withdraw f rom their day -to-day lives and 
relationships, thus isolating themselves f rom opportunities for external intervention. These 
behaviours also further entrenched social identif ication with group, which drives members to 
further adopt the group identity to garner favour with the group at the expense of  their participation 
in other groups. Group polarisation within the group meant that radical ideals would be easily 
accepted, where they may have been individually unpalatable. The Islamic State were revered  
for their extreme violence. Brutal and indiscriminate mass executions were not only a modus 
operandi for the group but also a key propaganda piece.225 The capacity for their supporters to 
not only accept but endorse such activities was largely the product of  group polarisation.  
 
Muthana’s membership within this family was indicative of  her status and commitment to this 
group and spoke also to the pressures she experienced prior to her departure for the Islamic 
State. Not only was Muthana part of  an echo chamber facilitated by the Islamic State, but its most 
radical online components. Social media posts made in January 2014 indicate she consumed a 
range of  media types, including videos, pictures, and literature.226 Some of  this she fed back into 
her virtual family, posting screenshots of  videos with notes of  admiration below. Her contributions, 
in turn, earned her respect and ensured her position within the family. Though the posts viewed 
by the researcher do not indicate Muthana had a signif icant social media following, interviews 
with her suggest she had connected with many others online in the private space. 227 Likewise, 
her posts were contributions to the sheer volume of  material available to those who looked online 
for content related to the Islamic State, creating a narrative of  success that made the ingroup 
appear, at least in the social media space, as favourable and popular in comparison to those who 
sought to have them removed f rom the online space. 
 
An examination of  accounts Muthana also followed provided insight into the material available 
within her echo chamber. Scepticism of  media outlets was strongly encouraged. For example, 
Tumblr user Bird of Jannah, an account followed by Muthana, encouraged followers to check their 
sources and share Islamic State statements that ‘debunk any sort of  lies and slander’. 228 She 
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would make posts that rebutted allegations made by the media, shared  material produced by the 
Islamic State and described her life inside the Islamic State in romantic and cheerful terms. 229 
This undermined the narratives that counterterrorism practitioners and western media wanted  
prospective recruits to consume, about how life under the Islamic State truly was. Attempts to 
characterise such conditions had little to no impact within the echo chamber, as such content was 
seldom widely circulated, and if  it were, it was only so that it could be refuted.  
 
This is characteristic of  echo chambers, whereby outside perspectives seldom reach those within 
them unless they deliberately seek out alternative information or sources. The discomfort caused 
by cognitive dissonance makes members less likely to explore this information, and even where 
they do, they reject it in favour of  that which is available to them in the echo chamber. This means 
that even though counternarratives became prominent in western media with the rise of  the 
Islamic State, Muthana may have had limited exposure to  these, and particularly to critical 
discourse that would have challenged the ideology she came to identify with as a matter of  her 
participation in such an echo chamber. It was this echo chamber that accelerated the process of  
social identif ication and comparison while also imposing behavioural changes that led Muthana 
to disengage f rom other support networks and sources of  information that may have prevented 
her radicalisation. 
 
Bird of Jannah answered questions about the truthfulness and sincerity of  her posts. In one case, 
she was asked whether she was rewarded for the recruitment of  wives and if  it was possible to 
leave and return to one’s home country. In response, she claimed that she was rewarded by Allah 
for spreading the truth and that people were f ree to leave but would of ten be persecuted by their 
governments if  they returned home.230 These posts are demonstrative of  a broader approach 
used by the Islamic State within their echo chambers, and ref lect the dynamics of  ingroup 
characterisations of  outgroups as hostile toward ingroup members, even those who sought to 
leave its ranks. Seemingly contradicting the narrative of  the Islamic State as an oppressive 
organisation, they were f ramed by their supporters as a f ree and fair society in contrast to their 
ideological opponents. For a woman who resided in the West, exposure to this kind of  material 
may have impacted the way Muthana viewed her peers and broader society, acting to push her 
away f rom western ideals and pushing her toward the Islamic State.  
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The Islamic State were not only denounced by the West, but also by religious leaders throughout 
the Muslim world.231 The expectation was that such declarations may undermine the legitimacy 
of  the Islamic State and encourage Muslims who were interested in membership to reconsider 
whether they were actually representative of  the values of  Islam. Rhetoric was produced to direct 
criticisms toward Muslims who were not part of  the Islamic State. Critics were viewed with 
contempt online, and their character was undermined online as insincere believers, with Muthana 
even publicly denouncing her own father once inside Syria.232 The purpose of  rebuttal by the 
Islamic State was to appeal to its members who had a more sophisticated religious knowledge 
and might be persuaded by scholarship that countered the ideologies of  the Islamic State.  
 
In such environments, selective exposure theory also plays an important role in how information 
is received. Muthana may have been exposed to material that played out across mainstream 
media about abuses committed by the Islamic State. While members within the echo chamber 
worked to create narratives about this content that af f irmed their ideological position, these ef forts 
would have required that much of  this information was overlooked in the day-to-day lives of  
members. Irrefutable evidence, such as photos, would have been overlooked in favour of  
information that did not cause cognitive dissonance. Muthana’s decision to embark for Syria 
around November 2014, in spite of  all the information she may have seen, is indicative of  the way 
she processed information to rationalise her decisions, either based on the belief  that information 




There was a level of  segregation within the virtual community that conformed with the 
expectations for men and women within the Islamic State. For example, members of  the opposite 
sex were discouraged f rom private messaging one another.233 Muthana shared a tweet that 
included Sharia rules on the mixing of  the sexes in August 2014, furthering the reach of  these 
guidelines to include her own social media followers.234 This is a feature of  the broader Salafi 
Jihadist ideological f ramework that was prevalent within Islamic State territory.235 This indicated 
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a clear demarcation of  gender roles even before they entered Syria and Iraq. In conjunction with 
the radicalisation process, this conditioned women about the way in which they would contribute 
to the cause of  the Islamic State, which were dif ferent to western ideals around equality and the 
expectations for women. The development of  female echo chambers, even though the baqiyah 
family comprised of  both sexes, provided a support network where individuals would conform to 
expectations without the sense that these policies were oppressive while also developing a virtual 
sisterhood. 
 
This position was a step in a broader hierarchy for female Islamic State members. Supporters 
who considered themselves a part of  this virtual sisterhood and the broader baqiyah family were 
considered to be more dedicated to the Islamic State than casual observers or fans of  the 
organisation.236 They required a deeper knowledge of  Islam, which was of ten ref lected in posts 
made to their social media accounts.237 In addition to their original material, baqiyah members 
became important in the dissemination of  of ficial Islamic State material and, thus, were critical to 
the amplif ication of  these views within online echo chambers.238 Some even viewed the online 
space as a wilayat (province) in its own right.239 Their activities online were seen to support their 
counterparts in the f ield, and of ten f ramed not only as familial connections, but as brotherhoods 
and sisterhoods. Members also formed an important pool of  prospective recruits, as their self -
identif ication and conformity made them vulnerable to recruiters. 
 
Individuals who moved f rom the digital space into the physical space in Syria and Iraq were held 
in high esteem amongst online members of  the Islamic State. As such, members of  the virtual 
sisterhood had the opportunity to improve their status within the group through undertaking such 
actions. This also meant that women were able to make favourable comparisons with members 
of  the group deemed lesser in the hierarchy, subsequently bolstering their self -esteem, essentially 
acting as an ingroup within an ingroup. This, therefore, validated their sense of  self  and af f irmed 
the actions undertaken to join and maintain membership within the group, while also serving to 
inspire members of  the virtual sisterhood to make the move to Syria and Iraq. Further, members 
who were recruited f rom within this echo chamber had conformed to the norms and expectations 
of  the group, which were rewarded with the opportunity to contribute in a more tangible sense to 
the objectives of  the Islamic State.  
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Once a woman travelled to the Islamic State she would be branded a muhajirat, to acknowledge 
the completion of  the hijrah.240 This title represented an elevated status within the group, 
particularly in the online space, where they continued to interact with other members of  the 
terrorist group.241 These women were able to provide information and perspective that was 
perceived as credible as a result of  their lived experiences. Though they may have come f rom 
dif ferent countries, they were able to relate to a lot of  the concerns and issues women in western 
countries who wanted to make hijrah faced. They became a source of  expert power through these 
experiences and, as such, were able to inf luence other members online simply in sharing t hem 
and providing support and reassurance. 
 
Though not all women were raised in conservative Muslim families, with some instances where 
women would convert to Islam in the process of  their radicalisation, the gendered structure of  
these echo chambers adhered to what may have been normal behaviour for women of  
conservative backgrounds. Furthermore, as ingroups are of ten formed on shared identities, the 
duality of  a common religion and gender further strengthened the bond of  its membership. 
Muthana was not required to depart f rom what she had been raised to f ind acceptable in terms of  
gendered interactions and was also able to f ind a network that was overtly supportive of  her as 
both a woman and a Muslim. Ultimately, the family she engaged with online set expectations that 
were not unfamiliar to her day-to-day life, gradually adding expectations to modify her social 
behaviours and identity in accordance with group ideals.  
 
Muthana aspired to be like the women she encountered in her echo chamber who had departed  
for Syria. Though members of  the baqiyah family held status within the female hierarchy of  the 
Islamic State, they sat below women who had made hijrah to Syria to become jihadi brides.242 
These women would remain active online to role model for others within this echo chamber. 
Muthana noted that she felt inspired and pressured to be like other women who had made hijrah 
to join the Islamic State.243 As early as January 2014, 11 months before her departure, Muthana 
idolised the relationships jihadi brides had with the mujahideen in a post to her Twitter of  a 
screenshot f rom a video featuring a couple comparing the size of  their Kalashnikovs, with the 
caption ‘mood’.244 Even before the of ficial declaration of  the Caliphate, it is apparent that Muthana 
was exposed to and absorbed expectations about the behaviours of  women inside a Salaf ist 
Jihadi terrorist organisation. 
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Women desired a sense of  self -empowerment that seemed to arise f rom their decision to join the 
Islamic State, even though the treatment of  women o f ten suggested the opposite to be true.245 
This empowerment likely came f rom the other women they interacted with online. An ingroup 
provides positive benef its for its members that include a sense of  acceptance, support, and a 
chance for repeated interactions between members.246 Within this community, women were under 
the impression their decision to join the Islamic State – in def iance of  the west – was an 
empowered act. This plays on ingroup and outgroup dynamics, whereby there is a sense of  
antagonism toward the outgroup, known as outgroup derogation, that is referred to as intergroup 
bias.247 The outgroup, in this case, the West, are seen as threatening to the ingroup. The decision 
to act in def iance of  the outgroup in an ef fort to effectively stand up to them was a common trend 
amongst women, some of  whom, including Muthana, felt their participation in the Islamic State 
was an act of  rebellion.248 
 
This empowerment also stemmed f rom favourable comparisons with other groups, particularly 
those deemed adversarial, as self -esteem was derived f rom favourable comparisons. Coupled 
with the sense of  sisterhood and community found online, the control of  the narrative the Islamic 
State were af forded in their social media echo chambers meant these favourable comparisons 
could be engineered. Irrespective of  actual territorial and military losses inside of  Syria and Iraq, 
the Islamic State presented their members with a tightly controlled narrative that satisf ied their 
need to perceive themselves as being on the right, and victorious, side of  many adversaries, a ll 
of  whom were f ramed as inferior. This served to not only bolster the self -esteem of  members, 
subsequently af f irming their loyalty and conformity, but also to justify the brutality directed toward 
others.  
 
Muthana’s actions once she entered Islamic State territory in November 2014 were also indicative 
of  the kinds of  behaviours expected and role modelled within the familial echo chamber, she was 
a part of . She continued to participate in the same online behaviours as she had when based in 
the United States, including a positive view of  suspension from social media. In one instance, she 
posted an image of  several armed jihadis walking toward the camera with the caption, ‘coming 
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back f rom Twitter suspension like…’.249 She later claimed these posts were under the direction, 
and sometimes complete control, of  the Islamic State.250 Whether this is true or not, the content 
produced as a muhajirat is indicative of  the content she also consumed before her departure for 
the Islamic State.  
 
The use of  social media accounts operated by individuals is seen to give a more organic and 
genuine account, comparable to native marketing. This is the process whereby advertisements 
are tailored to conform with the media of  the website on which it is hosted, for example, a news 
story on news media website.251 One of  the most valuable forms of  advertisement for the Islamic 
State was its successful members, which Muthana experienced in the pressure f rom her own 
echo chamber prior to her departure and demonstrated once inside the Islamic State. Muthana 
posted several images that reiterated content found in other Islamic State propaganda material.  
For example, her Instagram account featured images of  young boys with the caption ‘ lion cubs’.252 
The ‘lion cubs’ were a branch of  child soldiers who came to feature in videos released by the 
terrorist organisation.253 Muthana also posted images of  foods, indicative that food scarcity was 
not of  concern to her, in one instance using the hashtag #5starjihad af ter telling prospective 
recruits not to worry about food.254 These posts redressed some of  the issues highlighted outside 
of  the Islamic State about security and stability, including access to basic necessities.  
 
Muthana also posted calls to violence to her social media followers. Four months af ter she entered 
Syria, she encouraged her followers to undertake drive by shootings or truck attacks directed 
toward signif icant American holidays, including Veterans Day and Memorial Day. 255 Her desire to 
live a more Americanised lifestyle as a teenager is indicative that Muthana did not have a dislike 
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of  the United States and its values until these became both acceptable and expected behaviours. 
Her use of  social media as a platform to encourage violence would not have been met with 
resistance within her social media channels, as the echo chamber ef fect amplif ied the sentiment 
that such violence was justif ied and acceptable. Though women were not necessarily the targets 
of  calls to violence, this formed a sense of  solidarity with the cause through repeated exposure to 
violent material, and further antagonised the outgroup. 
 
Overall, social media introduced Muthana to an ingroup that operated as an echo chamber and 
established a support network modelled on a family structure. Though the means by which 
Muthana became acquainted with this group online are unclear, she was able to ris e in status 
before she became a jihadi bride, having been active in the baqiyah family circles. Within this 
family, Muthana interacted almost exclusively with women as part of  a strict code of  online 
conduct built around Islamic State ideals for social behaviours. It was through the posts they 
made, and the contacts Muthana established, that she was exposed to the social identity she 
became expected to adopt to achieve greater status within the group. This family also substituted 
for real world relationships Muthana appeared to lack, in the form of  close personal f riendships.256 
 
In the case of  Muthana, it also became apparent how the ingroup she was a part of  reacted to 
existential threats originating within the outgroup. In the information space, there was a greater 
need for the ingroup to unify against the inf luence of  outgroup pressures for survival. The sense 
of  family and sisterhood experienced within echo chambers was a powerful mechanism to control 
how members interpreted information f rom the media. Members of  the baqiyah family, including 
Muthana, would also use social media to express their more advanced knowledge of  Islamic State 
doctrine, subsequently exercising power rooted in their expertise and inf luencing members of  a 
lesser status in the process. This also assisted in creating an echo chamber that appeared more 
organic and had a variety of  original content to supplement that produced and disseminated by 





One of  the themes that underpinned the shared identities of  the group was adherence to a 
common religious outlook. For many women, they had been raised in Islamic families and were 
familiar with the fundamental concepts of the religion, which formed the basis of  a shared identity 
within the sisterhood, representing values that transcended traditional geographic boundaries. 
These concepts were not inherently radical in and of  themselves and appealed to women f rom a 
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variety of  backgrounds and acted to introduce them to a radicalised sisterhood that hosted several 
recruiters for the Islamic State. It was not clear f rom social media posts how Muthana came to be 
introduced to the online community that ultimately drove her to the Islamic State; however, she 
had a conservative Muslim upbringing, that may have inf luenced her identif ication with particular 
issues raised within the echo chamber, such as experiences in western cultures and gender 
norms. This would have invariably provided her with a shared sense of  identity, at a fundamental 
level, with other women online. 
 
The link between religion and identity formed an important driver for Muthana, who said in later 
interviews that she felt she had an obligation to travel to Syria to participate in the Islamic State. 257 
Though an active member online, Muthana noted that the declaration of  a Caliphate in June 2014 
made her feel compelled to travel to Syria and join the group in person. 258 In particular, she 
described her fear of  hellf ire as a motivation for her decision, implying that anything less than 
joining the Islamic State would have qualif ied for punishment as a failure to achieve her worldly 
religious duty.259 This duty, however, was manipulated and subsequently reinforced throughout 
the radicalisation and recruitment process to af f irm her position within the group and ensure she 
complied with expectations mandated by the terrorist organisation.  
 
Muthana’s sense of  self  subsequently became linked to the expectation that her role was to 
become a wife and mother for the Islamic State. If  the Islamic State were to become an enduring 
and intergenerational terrorist organisation, they recognised a requirement to include women in 
their long-term plans.260 This ensured there was a continuous supply of  recruits already 
prescribed to the radical ideals of  the group. As such, women represented an important and 
nonviolent role in the conf lict, and as the Islamic State perceived that such a conf lict was rooted 
in their self -identif ication as ‘true’ Islamists, so too was the role women were expected to p lay. 
This sense of  duty, therefore, became intrinsically linked to a sense of  self  for women like 
Muthana.  
 
The sense of  duty or obligation that Muthana felt did not originate organically f rom her childhood 
in a conservative religious family, but rather appears to have been a product of  the interactions 
she had online with other members of  her virtual sisterhood. Material she was exposed to online 
made it apparent that there was pressure within the echo chamber to travel to Syria and become 
a wife and mother for the Islamic State. Though supporters of  the Islamic State viewed themselves 
as virtual combatants, there was consistent pressure to partake in real -world actions that 
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contributed to the terrorist organisation. Women did not appear to be exposed to t he same 
pressures as their male counterparts to undertake violent acts, though it remains to be seen to 
what extent the territorial losses of  the Islamic State inf luenced their outreach to female attackers 
in other countries. 
 
The desire to become a wife and mother of  the Islamic State was ultimately derived f rom the 
interpretation of  jihad that served as the core justif ication for the actions undertaken by the Islamic 
State. In particular, this sanctioned the use of  violence against those who did not align themselves 
to their radical interpretations of  Islam and justif ied its use to other members of  the Islamic State 
who were not necessarily party to these actions. However, the principal role of  women was not to 
undertake violence on behalf  of  the group, but as supporters of  violent activities. The journey f rom 
the west to Syria was described by many women as a hijrah, and while Muthana expressed some 
violent inclinations, in her idolisation of  a couple discussing the size of  their respective weapons, 
she also ref lected an awareness of  her status as a woman within the group with references to 
marriage and the appropriateness of  relationships with the opposite sex. 261  
 
The shif t to the position of muhajirat can be understood as being linked to the concept of  positive 
distinctiveness within social identity theory. That is to say that people are motivated to achieve a 
positive social identity.262 A positive social identity is linked to higher self -esteem, which is derived 
f rom the success of  the ingroup one is a member of .263 For Muthana, therefore, her decision to 
depart for Syria both elevated her status within the group and made a positive contribution to the 
success of  the group and, subsequently, produced elevated self -esteem and a sense of  belonging 
to the group. Positive distinctiveness is a psychological need, and therefore, sought out by 
members within a group.264 There are a number of  means by which positive distinctiveness can 
be achieved, but that which may be most relevant to the social med ia situation of  Muthana was 
social competition.  
 
Social comparison is a self -enhancing strategy identif ied in social identity theory, where positive 
distinctiveness is achieved through competition with the outgroup through ingroup favouritism. 
This is a pattern of  preference for one’s ingroup over an outgroup.265 As a sense of  self  is derived 
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f rom participation in groups, the perceived success of  the group when compared to outgroups 
correlates with higher self -esteem for its members.266 On 1 December 2014, around the time 
Muthana f irst entered Syria, she posted an image of  her passport alongside other women’s 
passports with the caption, ‘Bonfire soon, no need for these anymore.’267 In March 2015, when 
asked on Ask.FM if  she missed her f riends and family, Muthana responded, ‘I don’t miss anything 
in the west.’268 When asked about her thoughts on the United States, she replied, ‘ I think that we 
will take over soon.’269 These answers, made while in Syria, demonstrate the division she sought 
to put between herself  and her western life, while also indicating a belief  that the Islamic State 
was superior to the United States.  
 
Muthana stated that she did not hate America, nor did she hate anything else, but felt that the 
journey was obligatory for her.270 This contrasted with social media posts she would make inside 
the Islamic State, that, in addition to statements of  taking over the United States, included 
instructions on how to undertake a terrorist attack with a truck with a caption that she hoped 
attackers in the west had seen and been inf luenced by her previous post on the subject. 271 
However, it does not appear that she developed a dislike of  the United States but, rather, a 
dedication to a cause that was inherently opposed to the west. As she came to adopt the ideals 
of  the organisation as part of  her identity, their adversaries came to be her own. This was 
conveyed across her social media in the posts she made that qual if ied as anti-western, a 
ref lection of  a common outgroup antagonised by Muthana and other members of  the ingroup.  
 
The adoption of  such adversaries ref lected her belief  in the Islamic State as a militarily and 
spiritually superior force that drove Muthana to view herself , as a member, to be obliged to further 
the objectives of  the organisation. However, as social identity theory posits that participation in a 
group one favours would correspond with increased self -esteem, Muthana would have invariably 
experienced positive psychological ef fects f rom her participation and increased status within the 
group.272 Her answers to questions when inside Syria exert a casual conf idence in the Islamic 
State and their capacity for success, referring to anonymous users as ‘m8’ (mate) while discussing 
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the intention for the Islamic State to take over ‘the whole world.’273 While her online demeanour 
is not necessarily a ref lection of  all that she felt and experienced while inside Islamic State 
territory, it is an attempt to increase and maintain her status within a group she viewed as better 
than outgroup counterparts. 
 
It is not impossible that Muthana may have come to such conclusions herself  about the trajectory 
she wanted her life to take, as motherhood and successful partnerships are common desires for 
many individuals across the world. However, it is the circumstances under which she wanted to 
pursue such decisions that are particularly interesting to this case study. As a member of  the 
baqiyah family, proudly boasted across her social media, Muthana was already of  a greater social 
status than some of  her peers. Though the decision ultimately sat with Muthana, there were 
avenues for her to elevate her status within the group which were tied to a sense of  religious 
fulf ilment. This was not just a matter of  personal satisfaction or achievement, but a guarantee that 
Muthana would be rewarded for her ef forts in the af terlife.  
 
Groupthink invariably served to normalise the behaviours necessary to reach this spiritual 
objective, and ultimately transformed the way women thought about what was required of  them. 
This assured that Muthana believed that it was not only the acceptable thing to do to, but the right 
thing to do. These ideals were imposed on all other women inside the same echo chamber as 
Muthana, particularly if  they wanted to advance their own social status within the group. These 
expectations raised the consequences of  non-compliance, as members would look as though 
they did not completely support the ingroup or were not as devoted as their peers, and 
subsequently, pushed women to act on the sense of  religious obligation they felt. In this context, 
women were rewarded not only with a sense of  personal satisfaction in achieving spiritual 
objectives, but also in attaining higher status within the group. 
 
Muthana’s sense of  self  was increasingly derived f rom the group she interacted with online. Their 
ideals were derived f rom this fundamentalist interpretation which, in turn, became a common 
factor within the sisterhood that united them and set expectations members imposed on one 
another. The links to her religion manifested in real-world transformations, most notably via her 
decision to undertake a hijrah she perceived as obligatory, but also in the material she posted 
and consumed online. For example, a theme of  religiosity underpinned posts she made across 
her social media accounts, including down to seemingly trivial matters such as socialising with 
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her cousins.274 This compelled her to disregard other components of  her sense of  self  that were 
contradictory to her religious views, such as tertiary education and westernised comforts.  
 
There is some variation in the way supporters are f ramed online. For the most part, their support 
was seen as a welcome contribution. It has been demonstrated that they played an important role 
in the formation of  echo chambers that disseminated propaganda and inf luenced the recruitment 
of  terrorists, as is exemplif ied by Muthana’s own Baqiyah family.275 However, those who travelled 
to Syria were revered above all others.276 This was f ramed in religious terms, with the view that 
those who undertook such travel to live a life completely in accordance with the principles of  the 
Islamic State were in favour with Allah.277 Online supporters were never lavished with the same 
praises as those who undertook the journey itself  and, as such, the journey became aspirational 
for many who sought to achieve the same social status and validation.  
 
There were clear expectations online about what actions could be undertaken to achieve a higher 
status within the group. These acts signalled a deeper level of  devotion to the group, and of ten 
required that individual desires be forsaken in the interests of  the group. The inf luence and power 
of  members who had travelled to Syria and communicated back into the echo chamber 
outweighed that of  those who remained online in their home countries. Members with this power 
would of ten attempt to use it to advance the Islamic State’s agenda, primarily in the imposition of  
a sense of  religious duty. Interactions within online echo chambers appear to have been 
segregated on the basis of  sex, and therefore, a more concentrated appeal to a woman’s religious 
obligation could be used to motivate women to undertake travel to Syria. Naturally, the movement 
of  these women benef ited the Islamic State’s organisational structure, as they were able to fulfil 
the state building functions associated with raising the next generation of  the terrorist 
organisation.  
 
Muthana would exert pressure on her followers to join her in the Islamic State once she arrived 
in Syria. In December 2014, one month af ter she lef t the United States, she encouraged her 
followers not to wait until it was ‘safe’, with the story that she knew o f  people who had made it into 
Syria whilst remanded on bail in their home countries.278 This was likely the same pressure that 
had been applied to Muthana during the lead up to her eventual departure for Syria and emulated 
by her now that she had newfound status and responsibility within the group. This behaviour af ter 
 
274 Hoda Muthana, “Cousins are halal for us to marry,” August 4, 2014, accessed via: 
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/5988437-Twitter-Aug-4-2014-1.html. 
275 Inch, “Jihad and Hashtags,” 14-16. 
276 Inch, “Jihad and Hashtags,” 19. 
277 Inch, “Jihad and Hashtags,” 19. 




she lef t the West is demonstrative of  how she had rationalised her decision within a religious 
understanding. It also shows how this worldview was used as a tool of  coercion to create a sense 
of  obligation to become a member of  the group and conform with their behavioural expectations, 
no matter how dangerous they might be. 
 
It was not only the act of  hijrah that was sent as an obligation for women, but also to live and 
abide by a strict interpretation of  Islamic jurisprudence and governance.279 Therefore, to travel to 
the territory claimed by the Islamic State and live by their law was seen as the ultimate purpose 
for a woman.  Upon her arrival, Muthana acknowledged that there were certain acts she was 
unable to do as a woman. For example, she had wanted to yell ‘baqiyah’ but remembered she 
was unable to do so as a woman.280 However, the ultimate satisfaction came in the belief  that 
these behaviours were adherence to the truest interpretation of  Islam and conformed with the 
expectation of  the group who embodied such ideals. These gender-based expectations were 
developed online before Muthana departed for Syria, and subsequently made her a more 
compliant member of  the Islamic State, meaning they were able to exercise more inf luence on 
her behaviours and decisions once inside the Islamic State. 
 
Muthana’s stricter upbringing perhaps inf luenced who she would identify as a likeminded 
individual online. Her allegiance was foremost to her religion, and when her perception of  who 
else was in that religion changed, due to the belief  that many of  those who identif ied as Muslims 
were not true Muslims, so too did her perception of  the outgroup. Membership in the Islamic State 
was consuming and saw its members sense of  self  inf luenced in a broad fashion, as other groups 
came to be viewed as adversaries. For instance, the Islamic State claimed no state sponsorship 
or support, and therefore, identif ication with a nationality was seen as non-conformist to the group. 
Many individuals would post images of  their passports prior to destruction on social media when 
they arrived inside the Islamic State, including Muthana who intended to burn hers. 281 
 
This approach to membership also af forded the terrorist organisation more control over its 
members. As people isolated themselves f rom other groups, they became more dependent upon 
the Islamic State for a sense of  self . It is in these circumstances that individuals develop deep 
emotional ties to a group and are reluctant to engage in behaviours that have the potential to 
compromise their position.282 As such, the imposition of  a sense of  religious obligation made it 
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clear what behaviours were expected of  members. Though there were many instances where 
women never translated their support to of fline actions, it was maintained within the community 
that the most favourable members were those who had undertaken the trip to Syria to become 
wives and mothers.  
 
Baqiyah members were expected to have a more developed religious knowledge than their 
‘fangirl’ counterparts.283 This knowledge was associated to a status that could be attained by 
members, and subsequently, they were not only inf luenced by the online environment but also 
acted as inf luencers. It was through this knowledge that Muthana became impressionable to 
increasingly fundamentalist interpretations of  Islam, as it became expected that she would adhere 
to these views, not only because of  her position as a virtual member of  the Islamic State, but as 
a member of  the baqiyah family. This pressure, in turn, contributed to her views that the content 
she consumed was real and required her attention and action to mitigate the consequences. She 
felt a sense of  obligation imposed on her not only by her peers, who formed her echo chamber, 
but also driven f rom her own sense of  self -identity, derived f rom the religious outlook she 




Overall, Muthana’s introduction to the Islamic State appears to have originated as a consequence 
of  her online activities on social media. Though it is unclear precisely how Muthana came to 
encounter the baqiyah family online, her activity online, f rom social media handles to posts made 
across her social media accounts, is demonstrative of  the depth to which she engaged with this 
social network online. Its ef fect on her psychologically was to create a system of  rewards and 
consequences that correlated with actions seen to advance the group’s agenda. In particular, 
adherence to ideals dictated by the religious ideology was rewarded with higher status within the 
group, a status achieved by Muthana, f irst online as part of  the Baqiyah family and then as a jihadi 
bride in Syria.  
 
Inside the baqiyah family echo chamber online, Muthana was subjected to increased pressure to 
fulf il the religious obligations imposed on her, primarily being to undertake hijrah to Syria, where 
she would become a wife and mother for future generations of  the Islamic State. The 
consequences of  non-compliance went beyond a lesser status within the group and had a 
profound personal impact on Muthana, who believed that she would be condemned to hell if  she 
did do as was expected of  her. Her conformity to group expectations was not just, therefore, a 
matter of  status, but also of  religious obligation as def ined by the Islamic State. Fundamentally, 
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Muthana reaped psychological rewards for her conformity with group expectations and the 
favourable comparisons she made – both prompted by material she consumed in the echo 






Chapter VI: Discussion 
 
Three themes common to both cases studies were identif ied in this research: participation in an 
echo chamber; development of  a network based on the concept of  sisterhood; and a sense of  
religious duty. While Mahmood and Muthana invariably motivated by thei r individual 
circumstances, these themes were also observed to be shared by other women within their 
respective echo chambers. This echo chamber was used to control the narrative delivered to 
prospective and active members of  the Islamic State, and meant the group were able to tailor 
messaging to appeal to sisterhood and compel women to act in accordance with a strict def inition 
of  religious obligation. This also enabled them to control how their adversaries were perceived, 
leading to the unchallenged view that the Islamic State would be the victors in conf lict with all 
adversaries.  
 
Social identity theory was used to establish the relationship between these themes and the 
eventual decision to make hijrah to the Islamic State. The processes of  social identif ication, 
categorisation, and comparison, as proposed by Tajfel, were evident in interactions observed 
across the social media accounts of  Mahmood and Muthana. These processes underpinned the 
thematic commonalities of  both case studies, with sisterhood and religion being intrinsic parts of  
the women’s social identities that were inf luenced via echo chambers to convince them to become 
active participants of  an extremist ingroup. Mahmood and Muthana were rewarded with 
psychological benef its, namely in the form of  a positive social identity, that compelled them to 
further their participation in order to elevate their status as members, eventually culminating in 
the decision to make hijrah to the Islamic State. 
 
Positive social identity is a principal psychological benef it of ingroup participation, experienced by 
both Mahmood and Muthana and evidenced in posts made across social media. This occurs 
where one makes favourable intergroup comparisons. However, where social comparisons lead 
to a negative social identity, an individual will be motivated to engage in strategies to attain a 
positive one, including leaving a group or making changes to the ingroup so they compare more 
favourably.284 The echo chamber structure meant Mahmood and Muthana only made favourable 
comparisons. Disrupting and proliferating echo chambers would have introduced new information 
that undermined such comparisons, while also potentially mitigating the identif ication and 
categorisation processes caused by the participation in a virtual sisterhood and imposition of  
religious duty.  
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The relationships that created the virtual sisterhood served as the basis for the echo chamber 
and the source of  guidance on religious matters and the imposition of  obligation. Disruption of  
such relationships would interrupt the sense of  belonging, and perhaps open opportunities for 
intervention to disrupt the radicalisation and recruitment process. These relationships satisf ied 
social needs that made it easier for the women to disengage f rom their real-world social circles 
and develop a sense of  duty in accordance with Islamic State expectations. With networks 
modelled on familial structures, namely sisterhood, Mahmood and Muthana found support where 
their real families would have disapproved. This virtual family and echo chamber acted as an 
example of  the social behaviours Muthana and Mahmood should undertake in order to retain their 
position and develop status within the hierarchy, while also satisfying social needs they may 
otherwise have felt disconnected f rom when they chose to leave their real families for Syria.  
 
This chapter will examine policy, technical and goodwill approaches to online counter-recruitment 
to examine how these mechanisms work when understood through the lens of  social identity 
theory. This chapter will also incorporate other psychological theories that have been explored  
throughout the case studies within this thesis and which are linked to social identity theory. The 
approaches to countering terrorist recruitment outlined in this chapter are general approaches, 
and as such, will be applied to the specif ic case studies of  this research to identify how they may 
have impacted on the outcome. As this thesis only covered two case studies, the overall ef f icacy 
of  such approaches may dif fer when applied to dif ferent circumstances, though some of  the 




Policy solutions provide a broad approach to counter-recruitment and can be categorised into 
positive and negative approaches. Positive measures refer to content created to counter extremist 
narratives, while negative measures are the removal of  extremist content.285 These approaches 
can be combined to increase their overall ef fectiveness, with their respective impact dependent 
on several variables, such as the audience, messenger, and means of  contact. Mahmood and 
Muthana were in a space dominated by an extremist narrative delivered via content created and 
shared within an echo chamber. In terms of  these drivers, both positive and negative policy 
measures could have disrupted the radicalisation and recruitment o f  Mahmood and Muthana.  
However, previous implementations of  positive and negative measures have seldom accounted 
for the psychological component of  these drivers used by recruiters to connect the social identities 
of  prospective recruits to the wider group to motivate them toward more extreme actions.  
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The positive measures this chapter will focus on are counternarratives and education, which are 
intended to limit the impact terrorist recruitment material has.286 These initiatives can be delivered  
in online and of f line formats.287 The online environment has increased the access recruiters have 
to vulnerable individuals, and as such, positive measures need to adapt to the breadth of  this 
environment. However, positive measures remain limited in their need to identify both persons 
and narratives and present counternarratives in new media formats that are not immediately 
rejected by those embroiled in extremist and exclusive echo chambers. Both case studies were 
noted for their increased religious practice, but o therwise there were few indicators observed by 
their families and communities that pointed to their radicalisation. This meant that they were not 
exposed to counternarratives and educational opportunities that may have interrupted their 
experience. When combined with the inf luences of  sisterhood, religious obligation, and echo 
chambers online, the lack of  ef fective positive measures meant that Mahmood and Muthana were 
enveloped in the narratives of  the Islamic State. 
 
Counternarratives provide alternative perspectives to those propagated by a terrorist organisation 
and can be directed by governmental, non-governmental, and community groups. One of  the 
most important factors for a successful counternarrative is in the delivery and ability to appeal to 
its intended audience.288 Unless counternarratives are able to reach those at greatest risk of  
radicalisation, they essentially become redundant. This is not just a question of  actual exposure 
but also absorption of  the narrative. Mahmood and Muthana were exposed to immense volumes 
of  information, and as such, were selective in what was retained, with that being the narrative that 
was most dominant across their respective echo chambers. The content of  the message itself  
needs to appeal to its recipients and cannot follow a scripted and impersonal format that may 
dissuade f rom the sincerity of  the message.  
 
While these narratives focused on sisterhood and religious obligation, counternarratives did not, 
and instead looked to prof ile the violent tendencies of  the Islamic State.  This approach could 
have been better tailored, and subsequently better received by its audience in the content it 
covered and the tone of  the message. As such, the lack of  material that aligned with the core 
themes attracting women to the Islamic State meant there were few opportunities for exposure to 
counternarratives, as they seldom interacted with content outside of  an echo chamber 
preoccupied with sisterhood and duty. Instead, counternarratives that aligned to the trends and 
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core issues seen in these spaces may have provided greater opportunities for intervention and 
disruption.  
 
Counternarratives must be delivered via a credible messenger. This is someone who possess 
qualities that make them believable to those vulnerable to terrorist recruitment.289 Examples of  
credible messengers include former extremists, survivors of  terrorism, and religious scholars. 290 
Their credibility is derived f rom the authenticity of  their experience and the expert power they are 
able to use to inf luence vulnerable individuals.291 They can also act as a bridge to reconnect  
radicalised individuals to the outgroup, which is of ten so deeply antagonised in terrorist material 
that positive engagement with an outgroup member may be met with punishment. 292 Mahmood 
and Muthana were encouraged to isolate themselves f rom support networks that were 
subsequently replaced with a loyal sisterhood bound by a common sense of  religious obligation. 
The proliferation of  a credible message in this context could have occurred  where they were able 
to appeal to these core drivers and introduce a counternarrative that did not create psychological 
resistance by causing cognitive dissonance or amplifying ingroup and outgroup tensions.   
 
Finally, counternarratives must engender an individual to appropriately respond to its content. 
The f inal stages of  Lasswell’s model of  communication consider the recipient and the ef fect of an 
act of  communication.293 It is an important factor to consider in the development of  
countermeasures as the recipient represents a potential future threat. Even if  the counternarrative 
is presented in a palatable fashion by a credible messenger, if  the emotional state of  the recipient 
is not receptive and open, then it is likely such counternarratives will be rebuf fed in favour of  the 
radical content that they are accustomed to consuming. Counternarratives introduced to 
Mahmood and Muthana were interpreted by themselves and the Islamic State as an existential 
threat, which caused members to double down in defence of  their shared ideologies. Therefore, 
for an individual to be receptive to counternarratives, they must be presented in such a way that 
is not perceived as an attack while simultaneously providing material that contributes to a negative 
social identity so that members turn away f rom their ingroup. Just as radicalisation is a process, 
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so too must the introduction of  counternarratives to ensure the intended recipient is receptive of  
the messages. 
 
Just as credible messengers can be ef fective in their abili ty to reach vulnerable individuals, the 
wrong messenger can undermine the ef f icacy of the narrative they convey, particularly when 
combined with the wrong message. For example, the US Government were heavily criticised for 
their attempt to produce satirical counternarratives to dissuade participation in the Islamic State, 
particularly in the video ‘Welcome to ISIS Land’.294 While the US Government were a poorly 
received messenger by Islamic State recruits, the message itself  was seen as poorly constructed, 
emphasising the need for both a credible messenger and message. Counternarratives are also 
subject to engagement f rom the terrorist organisation, who can use them to reinforce the 
perceived divisions between the ingroup and the outgroup when the messenger seems insincere.  
Credible messengers, therefore, reduce the ability for such reinforcement to occur f rom the 
terrorist organisation and have the capacity to disrupt ingroup formation which, in turn, can disrupt 
radicalisation. 
 
Muthana would have likely been exposed to counternarratives delivered by western news media 
and governments. However, within the echo chamber, these narratives were dissected and 
refuted by the Islamic State, subsequently diminishing the ef fectiveness of  the message. This 
content was interpreted in such a way that reinforced Islamic State narratives, including that the 
West—the outgroup—were manipulative adversaries who had undertaken a campaign to 
undermine and disrupt the Islamic State—the ingroup. For some members of  the ingroup, this 
was the sole exposure they had to counternarratives. Instead, it may have been more ef fective to 
integrate messages that were able to circulate within these restrictive environments but 
contributed to the development of  a negative social identity that forced members to reconsider 
their membership.  
 
Ef fective counternarratives can be used to disrupt the power and inf luence recruiters have online 
as they reduce the appeal and status of  an ingroup. As a group becomes less attractive to its  
prospective members, they are less inclined to seek out or be interested in participating in the 
group. This can also undermine the sense of  social competition fostered within the group, 
whereby individuals feel a need to both be accepted and develop status within a particular 
ingroup, subsequently diminishing the establishment of  a positive social identity associated with 
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that group.295 Instead, counternarratives can be used to deliver ideas vulnerable or radical 
individuals may not have been exposed to, and which may resonate with them on the basis of  
other interests or grievances that attracted them to the organisation in the f irst instance.  
 
Mahmood and Muthana both identif ied with the grievances shared across social media by the 
Islamic State and their supporters. In particular, these grievances identif ied the outgroup, being 
the West, as the primary perpetrators. This further solidif ied the sense of  outgroup antagonism, 
while also attracting individuals who faced similar experiences, or at least identi f ied with their 
message. When f ramed in religious terms, as was the case for both Mahmood and Muthana, the 
ingroup were also able to appeal to and inf luence an element of  their identity that linked their 
actions with severe consequences in the af terlife and imposed a sense of  urgency and duty. While 
modern western governments traditionally are areligious, targeted counternarratives they produce 
can take a religious tone to appeal to the religious identities of  prospective terrorist recruits, 
undermining the divide between “us” and “them” reinforced by the ingroup, as well as providing 
an alternative perspective that still satisf ies the spiritual needs and obligations of  prospective 
members. For instance, collaboration with community groups can help government departments 
understand core issues and themes that could appeal to the target audience.  
 
Education is similar to counternarratives in that it presents a moderate perspective to terrorist 
narratives. However, unlike counternarratives, education is intended as a preventative measure,  
as opposed to a reactionary one. The intention of  educational programmes is to raise awareness 
of  the risks of  radicalisation among those who may be sought out for recruitment, by enabling 
individuals and communities to identify and counter the process as it occurs.296 For example, 
recruitment that targeted disaf fected Muslim youths in the west would of ten need to take place 
inside Islamic sites, such as mosques and schools, to easily identify and provide resources for 
individuals most susceptible to the recruiter’s message. However, in the case of  Mahmood and 
Muthana, they were not the traditional targets for recruitment. Therefore, there would have been 
a benef it to providing them with the tools to identify and critically analy se the material they 
consumed as originating f rom a terrorist organisation with a very particularly worldview. The 
identif ication of  persons who may be at risk also have the potential to exacerbate tensions 
between ingroups and outgroups, and as such, it must be carefully managed and introduced to 
ensure education does not cause harm.  
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In the internet era, the need for such community participation is substantially altered, as recruiters  
may engage remotely, or be sought out by interested parties. Online interactions can of ten be 
distinct f rom of f line ones, and allow individuals to better conceal their activities, subsequently 
reducing the ef f icacy of  community education. The families of  Mahmood and Muthana both 
acknowledged they appeared to have increased their religious practice in the period before they 
travelled to Syria, but this did not concern them as they considered this an organic development 
as part of  their faith.297 Both women may have received instruction on what was acceptable to 
share with their community, to ensure they maintained a low prof ile and were not detected as 
potential radicals. However, it was through their sisterhood that they were able to disengage f rom 
their actual communities, as their psychological and social needs were met within their 
sisterhoods. This meant that even with community education on the identif ication of  radicalised 
behaviour, social media has meant that much of  this takes place privately, and without the 
opportunity for community intervention.  
 
Mahmood and Muthana both demonstrated that a shif t in loyalty would drive them to leave their 
most substantial real-world support networks—their families—in favour of  a life inside the Islamic 
State. This means that even if  individuals continue to engage with their respectiv e communities, 
they may have started to consider their online networks as their primary support network and be 
less likely to conf ide in trusted members within their community of  their radicalisation and 
recruitment. Once again, without the physical interaction with others who may contribute to 
radicalisation, it can be dif f icult for those around an individual being radicalised to recognise the 
extent of  their newfound social network, particularly when social media platforms encourage users 
to develop a following for themselves and to follow many others more than they may typically 
interact with of f line. However, had they been equipped with the knowledge on seeking out 
alternative sources and recognising the radical nature of  content they consumed, they may have 
not become so embroiled in the echo chambers that developed around them. Likewise, they may 
have recognised the shortcomings of  the ingroup and been unable to develop a positive social 
identity, subsequently seeking out other groups to meet this need.  
 
The traditional focus of  education, at both an individual and community level, has been less 
focused on how radicalisation takes place online. The education required is not as simple as the 
identif ication of  those who may present as recruiters within the community, but to educate 
individuals on how to critically examine and challenge the material they consume. 298 The critical 
analysis of  content requires a reasonable level of  ef fort, that may sit outside the realistic 
expectations one has for standard social media use. However, it remains one of  the most 
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important educational tools to equip users to think about the source, content, and intention of  the 
material they consume online. As the radicalisation and recruitment process becomes more self -
driven, so too must the tools provided to vulnerable social media users via the education process. 
 
For Mahmood, her interest in current events in the Middle East led her to f ind likeminded 
individuals who appeared to engage in self -radicalisation together online as a consequence of  
the material they were exposed to. This eventually led her to develop radical beliefs that would 
be used to encourage her to participate in a terrorist organisation. Even if  Mahmood had never 
interacted with another individual online, her exposure to extremist content invariably contributed 
to her radicalisation, and the self -awareness and self -ref lection necessary to identify that one has 
become radicalised is of ten beyond reach when embedded within an echo chamber that 
contributes to the perception that one’s beliefs are widespread and popular. In the instance had 
Mahmood received a more tailored education to discern fact f rom f iction in the online space, as 
well as critical analysis skills to identify the origin of  her sources as terroristic, it may have 
prevented the attachment she developed to such perspectives and information.  
 
Education can, at an even broader level, consider the role of  critical thinking as part of  the national 
school curriculum as a means to disrupt radicalisation and misinformation across a broad range 
of  ideologies. Both Muthana and Mahmood, alongside many of  their peers, were interested in 
world events, such as the Syrian Civil War. However, the f rameworks by which they came to 
interpret these events were a combination of  their own personal experiences as Muslim women 
in the West and radical interpretations sanctioned by the Islamic State and its supporters. Both 
women encountered these views prior to or early on in their tertiary education, indicative of  the 
need for an earlier critical thinking curriculum as a preventative measure to radicalisation on the 
internet. This could also assist in the social categorisation and identif ication stages of  social 
identity theory, as it leads to a more balanced interpretation of  information to reduce the risk of  
identif ication with a radical group. This may be an area for further research to further the 
relationship between social identity theory and terrorist recruitment.  
 
The online space fundamentally reduces the visibility of the recruiters and allows them to operate 
with a greater degree of  secrecy and geographic reach. This means that educational approaches 
need to consider training individuals to recognise the behaviours of  recruits and the radical nature 
of  content they may consume. The behaviours of  Mahmood and Muthana during their recruitment  
period, in terms of  their interactions with their families and communities, are indicative not only of  
the instructions they were likely to receive on the management of  their of f line interactions, but 
also of  the primacy their new social network had. Without a suf f icient education programme that 
provided individuals with the capacity to understand and interpret the content and interactions 
they had in such a radical space; they would have been insuf f iciently equipped to recognise the 
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depth of  inf luence being exercised. Instead, it is important to consider the social dynamics and 
nature of  internet-based relationships and networks in the development of  educational material 
to counter terrorist recruitment, and how individuals can recognise these situations online.  
 
Both educational programmes and counternarrative campaigns represent opportunities to engage 
with prospective recruits and disrupt their radicalisation. However, current programmes of ten fail 
to consider the relationship between the social interactions one has with a terrorist group and its 
impact on their sense of  self . The familial style relationships Mahmood and Muthana formed 
online made them resistant to external messaging and relationships while also reinforcing the 
need to be in near constant communication with members of  their ingroup. Even when barriers  
were enacted to limit the contact these members had with one another online, they would use 
other social media platforms to seek one another out. These families or sisterhoods occupied the 
entirety of  the echo chambers Mahmood and Muthana were in and appealed to their identity as 
both women and Muslims. Where positive and negative measures did not match this appeal and 
challenged the inf luence it had on the social identities of  Mahmood and Muthana, their reactions 
were deeply personal and negative, as they perceived this not only as an attack on the group but 
also their sense of  self .  
 
Current programmes fail to account for, and pre-empt, the psychological element of  recruitment, 
and the impact social psychology, as identif ied in social identity theory, can have on one’s 
willingness to participate in a group, in spite of  whatever ideology they may perpetrate. The 
relationship between group participation and one’s identity  fosters loyalty that also makes it harder 
for counter recruitment measures, both negative and positive, to disrupt this dynamic. The Islamic 
State used social media to form an ingroup that was resistant to these measures as a result of  its 
inf luence and control over members. Mahmood and Muthana exemplif ied how this extended 
beyond Islam and into their position as women, and how counter-recruitment measures failed to 
appeal to these facets of  their identities, instead making them feel as though the outgroup  
represent an existential threat. However, positive measures do not exist in isolation and the 
recruitment of  Mahmood and Muthana cannot be blamed on the absence of  such measures. 
Rather, negative policy measures should be considered in addition to these positive approaches 
to create a rounded approach to countering terrorist recruitment.  
 
Negative measures disable access to radical content in the f irst instance. This can be achieved 
via a number of  means, including removing online material or denying an identif ied individual 
internet access. Theoretically, this would mean internet users are unable to f ind radical material,  
either on purpose or by accident. Realistically, negative measures encounter several issues in 
their implementation, which mean terrorist material of ten remains online and accessible. These 
include tensions between f reedom of  speech and the removal of  content, material produced by a 
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terrorist organisation that is not illegal or objectionable, and that few skills are required to 
circumvent technical barriers to access. This meant that Mahmood and Muthana were able to 
access and eventually create extremist content, even as the Islamic State became the focus of  
government and non-government counterterrorism ef forts.  
 
The emphasis on sisterhood and religious obligation within the echo chambers Mahmood and 
Muthana were part of  meant that the material produced and shared was mostly protected, as it 
was not, in and of  itself , extremist material. The protection of  f reedom of  speech is perhaps best  
exemplif ied in the United States, where it is a constitutional right, and judicial tests have almost 
always favoured this amendment over challengers.299 Therefore, the limitation of  such seemingly 
innocuous material would appear to be an overreaction by any institution, government or 
otherwise, with a commitment to f reedom of  speech. This interpretation of  events contributed to 
the narratives of  existential threat for supporters of  the Islamic State online, which further united 
them in their view of  a common adversary, motivating them to deepen their relationship with other 
members of  the echo chamber and f ind alternative social media platforms where there was less 
of  an existential threat, such as Telegram.300 
 
Mahmood and Muthana developed real relationships with other women online, some of  whom 
made hijrah alongside them. This sisterhood replaced real-world familial networks that may have 
implemented negative measures at an individual level if  they became aware of  the radicalisation 
and recruitment process online. This network also created expectations and rules for social 
behaviours in accordance with Islamic State ideals, and rewarded compliance with a positive 
social identity. This sisterhood also provided a f ramework whereby Mahmood and Muthana 
identif ied, categorised, and compared social groups and consistently found the Islamic State 
favourable. Had Mahmood and Muthana become disconnected f rom these communities, the 
absence of  a positive social identity and a sense of  belonging may have motivated them t o satisfy 
this psychological need elsewhere. While there is no guarantee this would have not been with 
another extremist ingroup, it provides a greater opportunity for intervention and disruption of  
terrorist recruitment than where an individual is otherwise embroiled in an echo chamber.  
 
In the case of  both Mahmood and Muthana, their status in the digital space, both before and af ter 
they made hijrah to Syria, saw them contribute and engage with a volume of  religious material 
that could be considered scholarship or discussion. The censorship of  such content is problematic 
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in that it contravenes western democratic values and laws and can also lead to accusations that 
the social media platforms who enforce such bans are radical in and of  themselves. The ban of  
all content which discuss Islam, for example, would be seen as Islamophobic. The removal of  
such content can, therefore, embolden the narrative that the outgroup poses an existential threat 
to the ingroup, in that they seek to remove the ingroup f rom spaces they use to connect with one 
another and disseminate their content. Such broad policies have the potential to undermine the 
intended ef fect of  deterring recruitment, and instead isolate individuals who were not previously 
susceptible to recruitment or force them to areas of  the internet which are considerably more 
dif f icult to monitor and disrupt. 
 
While the potential psychological impact of  denying prospective recruits to extremist online 
spaces, the practicalities of  negative measures are much more d if f icult to implement. Social media 
platforms used their terms of  service to suspend extremist accounts and remove radical content 
f rom their sites. This proved inef fective, as account suspension became aspirational for women 
who had not yet proliferated the inner circles of  the virtual sisterhood as a means to prove their 
loyalty.301 This strengthened the view of  the outgroup as adversarial and threatening and united  
the sisterhood in their shared experiences of  negative interactions with the outgroup. Actions that 
def ied outgroup behavioural expectations were encouraged—irrespective of  how small those 
actions might be—and this was no dif ferent in the behaviours exhibited and encouraged online to 
condition individuals to conform with group ideals. This demonstrated how negative measures 
could be manipulated in such a way that reinforced ingroup narratives.  
 
These actions were rewarded in the same manner as all others that adhered to behavioural and 
social expectations, with an elevated sense of  self -esteem and increased status f rom within the 
group. In order to disrupt this social process, therefore, these actions must be met with negative 
consequences that outweigh the benef its of  group participation, while also limiting access to the 
group to receive the validation and support that ultimately contributes to this sense of  improved 
self -esteem. A negative reaction f rom the outgroup is not necessarily enough to provoke a 
negative social identity for an individual, as their self -esteem is derived f rom favourable 
comparisons between this group and their ingroup. Instead, the value of  the ingroup could be 
undermined by denying access to material that reinforced favourable comparisons to the outgroup 
and proliferating an echo chamber with counternarratives. For instance, more moderate material 
on the Syrian Civil War could have been made available to Mahmood on Tumblr, while 
simultaneously denying her access to radical material.  This subsequently drives an individual to 
look for a means to develop a more positive social identity where this need is no longer met by 
their ingroup.  
 




The technical capabilities required to circumvent state restrictions on terrorist material are 
relatively low, even when the most extreme censorship capabilities are employed. For example, 
users constrained by geographical restrictions are able to use virtual private networks (VPNs) to 
access material they may otherwise be unable to. Terrorist organisations are able to adapt their 
digital presence to ensure members continue to be able to access radical content despite negative 
measures designed to counter this, like any other organisation with an online presence. Terrorist  
organisations are also versatile and adapt to ef forts to counter their presence online, as the 
Islamic State were known to adapt their online present to limit counter-recruitment ef forts. As it 
became more dif f icult to maintain a consistent presence on mainstream social media applications 
like Facebook and Twitter, the Islamic State moved to the secure messaging application 
Telegram.302 Both women faced repeated suspensions f rom social media platforms where they 
were identif ied as Islamic State supporters and were able to continue to create accounts and 
access the social networks they had developed online.  
 
An unanticipated ef fect of  denying the Islamic State access to social media platforms was that 
they were able to better control the material their followers were exposed to through directions to 
limit their interactions with ‘untrusted’ individuals and use more discrete social media p latforms 
and messaging applications to consume radical material and interact with other members of  the 
group. This, in turn, deepened the echo chamber many members were already embroiled in and 
further distorted their perception of  how popular the beliefs propagated were and made the 
establishment of  the ingroup and outgroup much easier. This environment was conducive to 
groupthink, with members under the impression more radical actions in the name of  the Islamic 
State were appropriate, and seldom encountered contrary opinions. This manifested in online 
behaviours like creating accounts af ter being suspended or banned f rom the social media 
platforms but, in some instances, would lead to radical of f line behaviours deemed acceptable by 
the group, such as travelling to Syria or facilitating a violent attack. 
 
However, negative measures are of ten interpreted as a form of  harassment by the outgroup 
directed toward the ingroup, and further entrench the view that they are diametrically opposed. 
To adequately incorporate the psychological experiences these women faced throughout the 
radicalisation and recruitment period, it is important to recognise the signif icance of  relationships. 
To simply deprive them of  the support networks they developed in this time does not m itigate the 
inf luence they have had and, rather, has the potential to entrench the beliefs espoused in online 
ideologies. This is not to say that negative measures do not have the capacity to disrupt terrorist 
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recruitment but, rather, that they have limited impact when considered within the f ramework of  
social identity theory. Both Muthana and Mahmood were embroiled in echo chambers that could 
have perhaps been disrupted in their earliest phases if  radical material had been unavailable or 
limited, before they developed connections with other group members that resembled familial 
style relationships. Once these relationships were formed, both women continued to f ind ways to 
re-engage with their sisterhoods online, while also feeling their ties to the group —and by 
extension, their identity—were under threat by the outgroup.  
 
Policy measures provide a standardised and methodical approach to terrorist recruitment, which 
aims to broadly disrupt and undermine the radicalisation and recruitment of  individuals using  
positive and negative measures. These measures of ten fall short where they fail to consider the 
individual drivers of  terrorist recruitment, including the social interactions and identities that come 
f rom an individual’s participation in a terrorist organisation. Social identity theory posits that 
participation in an ingroup, and adherence to its behaviours and expectations is rewarded with 
high self -esteem where the group compares favourably with outgroups. Current approaches do 
not cater to these needs, and as such, fail to provide an alternative ingroup that compares 
favourably and contributes to improved self -esteem. However, the shortcomings of  policy 
measures can be mitigated through a multipronged approach that combines positive and negative 




The relationship between social media echo chambers and radicalisation has become more 
apparent in recent times as several terrorist attacks have been the supposed product of , and of ten 
reference back to, exclusive echo chambers online.303 In both the case studies explored in this 
thesis, it emerged that their engagement on social media took place within an echo chamber 
where they were exposed to increasingly radical material critical to their radicalisation and 
recruitment. In such an environment, ingroups become prominent, creating an environment where 
groupthink thrived, which, in turn, justif ied violence against the outgroup in the name of  the group’s 
ideology shared within an exclusive online echo chamber. Echo chambers also served to protect 
those contained within them from external perspectives that may have disrupted the radicalisation 
process and control the narratives individuals were exposed to.  
 
One proposed countermeasure to social media recruitment is for technical adjustments to the 
sites themselves to reduce the exposure to and availability of  radical material. This is a negative 
measure in itself , but far more targeted than broader policy takedo wn ef forts. This means that 
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social media platforms must consider how to disrupt the echo chambers that form around this 
type of  content, as it is of ten their own algorithms that create such environments. These echo 
chambers foster the development and maintenance of  ingroups. Algorithms are used to improve 
the experience of  users on social media platforms by tailoring which content a user sees to the 
likelihood that they will actually want to see it, and information on how they can be used more 
ef fectively is of ten readily available.304 As such, the Islamic State were able to exploit the inbuilt 
mechanics of  social media sites to create carefully controlled echo chambers modelled on familial 
networks that cultivated a ready supply of  recruits. Even though their material was disseminated 
widely across the internet to attract as many prospective recruits as possible, those who engaged 
with it were actively and positively drawn into the echo chamber to connect with one another and 
reinforce the messaging being delivered within the social media space.  
 
This research will explore two core mechanisms to prevent the formation of  echo chambers on 
social media sites: the modif ication of  algorithms to limit the emergence of  echo chambers and 
the insertion of  targeted alternative material that acts as a counternarrative to radical content. By 
the nature of  their design, modif ications to algorithms could see the introduction of  other content 
outside of  the narrow perspectives imposed by other members of  the echo chambers, whereas 
the inf iltration of  echo chambers via the insertion of  alternative content would see more targeted 
material, including counternarratives and connecting vulnerable individuals with appropriate 
resources. Both approaches are intended to disrupt the ef fects of recruitment online, particularly 
to provide new perspectives that disrupt the perception that terrorist narratives are more widely 
accepted than they truly are in reality. In other words, they are designed to counter the 
establishment of  radicalised ingroups promoted within the echo chambers of  such digital 
environments.  
 
The modif ication of  the algorithms that permit the emergence of  echo chambers is a 
countermeasure that has of ten been suggested as a means to counter terrorist recruitment on 
social media. For instance, sites that do not ‘recommend’ content based on a user’s activities limit 
the capacity to develop a network or community online.305 This means that their virtual 
connections are more likely to mirror their real world communities and may limit the prospect for 
individuals to develop an echo chamber that consists almost entirely of  extremist material. A 
greater balance of  ideas means that it is possible for the radicalisation process to be disrupted by 
individuals interacting with and being exposed to others. The behavioural expectations for 
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Mahmood and Muthana within their virtual sisterhoods restricted them from their real -world  
communities and saw them disengaging in favour of  Islamic State members and supporters. This,  
in turn, restricted their access to alternative perspectives. This approach does not necessarily  
introduce specif ic perspectives, but rather prevents the encapsulation in material that solely refers 
to and reinforces one perspective, and in doing so disrupts the develop ment of  ingroups and 
outgroups and the consequent groupthink, which can lead to radicalisation.  
 
In terms of  the ingroup dynamic, exposure to alternative narratives through changes to technical 
protocols may disrupt the narratives created to entrench the sense of  ‘us’ and ‘them’. This 
undermines the control terrorist recruiters have on the narrative regarding outgroup members and 
provides greater opportunity for the responses and counternarratives to be distributed and 
encountered online organically through exposure. Though there are instances where other 
perspectives were acknowledged within Islamic State circles on social media, this was only 
presented with the criticism to undermine any validity and credibility f rom the outgroup. This also 
has the capacity to limit the ef f icacy of role models, where other viable alternatives are presented 
under modif ied algorithms. For instance, Mahmood became a role model and Muthana was 
inf luenced by the other women who had gone before her. These role models acted as ‘success 
stories’ and were elevated to a higher social status within the group. This was inspirational for 
those within the ingroup, as it represented an opportunity to elevate their status and cement their 
position within the ingroup, thus, af f irming their positive social identity. The introduction of  more 
positive role models on social media may have, for example, ref ramed the aspirations of  these 
women and provided other avenues to attain self -esteem. 
 
While a modif ication to the algorithms would alter the types of  content supporters are exposed to, 
the greatest ef fect would be on those interested in topics that were exploited by the terrorist 
organisation as a gateway to their material. This seemed to be the case with Mahmood, who was 
interested in the Syrian Civil War and driven toward the social connections she established with 
other women who shared her sense of  outrage and disappointment. If  her exposure had not 
become limited by the accounts she selected based on the feeds that the algorithms presented 
to her—which ultimately formed the sisterhood she joined—then it may have reduced the ef f icacy 
of  those messages. As with all counter-recruitment measures, it is dif ficult to measure a non-
outcome; however, f rom a social psychology perspective, this would have undermined the 
capacity for phenomenon such as groupthink to take hold and make violence an acceptable and 
justif ied behaviour.  
 
Much of  the religious content Mahmood and Muthana came into contact with was seemingly 
benign and did not carry overtly radical tones in its messaging. This content did not appear to 
violate the terms and conditions of  the sites that hosted it; however, it appeared to be critical in 
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the imposition of  a sense of  religious duty on both women that was a contributing factor in t heir 
eventual decision to depart for Syria. However, it was during this period that both women began 
to identify and categorise social groups on the basis of  the material they encountered. In this time 
before they were entrenched in, and their social identities were intrinsically linked to, their ingroup 
membership. This material originated f rom likeminded accounts, some of  which may have been 
operated by the Islamic State themselves, who posted religious texts and interpretations that 
aligned to the group’s ideology and their view on women. In this instance, had there been an 
adjustment to the algorithm that saw content on the same subject matter but f rom dif ferent 
perspectives, it may have had the ef fect of  disrupting the sense of  religious obligation both women 
felt, while still of fering the opportunity to engage with their religion online.  
 
Both women were able to maintain a social media presence for an extended period of  time af ter 
their travel to Syria. In the case of  Muthana, this meant she had to create new accounts 
periodically as she was of ten banned by the social media platform. This is indicative that denial 
of  access to a social media service is of ten not a viable way to remove those who do not comply 
with the terms and conditions of  a site and, thus, largely inef fective in reducing online 
radicalisation. Likewise, removal of  certain content f rom the platform is seldom the last time that 
content is posted to the site. Instead, it is reiterated across multiple accounts managed by a single 
individual, once again contributing to the impression that a view is more popular or widely held 
than it truly is and distorting the perception of  others within the echo chamber who believe it to be 
an accepted fact. Alterations to the types of  content displayed and to the suggestions of  similar 
accounts worth following can assist in the prevention of  the development of  such a perspective.  
 
It is dif f icult to disrupt the content that is fed into an echo chamber without the aforementioned 
redesign of  the algorithms used on social media sites. However, while social media companies 
have an obligation to police the content that is hosted on their site in accordance with their local 
legislature, they are not necessarily under the same obligation to fundamentally alter their 
operating model so as not to inadvertently enabled terrorist recruitment. The adverse ef fects of  
echo chambers have been clearly demonstrated in the cases of  Mahmood and Muthana, who 
became deeply entrenched in sisterhoods that shaped them into jihadi brides. That being said, 
social media companies have become increasingly aware of  the detrimental ef fect association 
with such terrorist organisations, deliberate or otherwise, can have on their business, and have 
subsequently made ef forts to limit such activities on their platforms. 306 
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Modif ications to the algorithms employed by social media s ites are not beyond the reach of  social 
media companies, but they may be hesitant to adopt such an approach. Algorithms serve to make 
the user experience on social media more relevant which, in turn, makes it more popular and 
more prof itable. Even if  the association to a terrorist organisation is harmful to their brand, they 
may see other, less ef fective but more public, mechanisms as better countermeasures to mitigate 
any reputational damage without impacting on the service they provide. 307 Confusion and  
dissatisfaction f rom contributors to Twitter with modif ications to the site’s algorithms is the kind of  
commercial disruption social media sites may seek to avoid.308 Instead of  technical modif ications 
that undermine the performance and relevance of  a social media site, and potentially make users 
more inclined toward other platforms, social media companies may look to options , such as 
modif ications to their community standards, that are less disruptive (and overall less ef fective), 
but make them appear involved in combating extremism.   
 
The fundamental objective, however, ought to be on the disruption of  echo chambers that have 
the potential to form radical ingroups. The policies and technical changes implemented by the 
platforms they host need to consider both the formation and maintenance of  the echo chambers 
that emerge on their sites. Mahmood and Muthana used the platform to connect with other 
Muslims on topics of  common concern; however, the narratives and users they found online did 
not appear to represent a diverse array of  perspectives, but rather, a radical and ultimately 
terroristic one. The modif ication of  algorithms has the potential to have a similar impact on 
countering terrorist recruitment as the introduction of  counternarratives, in that it reduces the 
appeal and status associated with the ingroup by allowing its prospective members to not be 
embroiled in an echo chamber controlled by recruiters and propagandists.  
 
Countering echo chambers online is not simply a matter of  reworked algorithms, however. It has 
been demonstrated that even with access to a variety of  information, there is a tendency for an 
individual to select only information that conforms with their expectations and beliefs. 309 Though 
the introduction of  more balanced material may minimise the opportunities for individuals to be 
exposed to radical content, it is unlikely to completely eradicate the risk of  radicalisation. 
Alternatively, radical groups may look for other channels where they can share their material 
exclusively. As social media sites cracked down on Islamic State linked accounts – with Twitter 
closing 125,000 sympathetic accounts between mid -2015 and early 2016 – the group found 
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alternative distribution networks to continue to share material with followers. 310 The messaging 
application Telegram became an important dissemination platform for the group due to its heavy 
encryption as they found it increasingly dif f icult to maintain a consistent social media presence. 311 
Such an application represented an even more exclusive echo chamber which continued to 
propagate the group’s ideologies.  
 
The inf iltration of  echo chambers with alternative perspectives, so as to disrupt the recruitment 
process, could be a more ef fective solution to the issue of  radicalisation and recruitment across 
social media, given the impact these environments had on shaping the ideological drivers of  
Mahmood and Muthana. This is not an idea that is entirely distinct f rom the modif ication of  
algorithms, as this process is also intended to introduce alternative content to users who may be 
prone to radicalisation. However, the inf iltration of  echo chambers can also take place without 
changes to the fundamental design of  the social media networks themselves. This model seeks 
to disrupt the monopoly ingroups have over the members within their echo chamber, to undermine 
their power and inf luence to determine the narratives presented to members online. More 
specif ically, the material that is presented to those within these echo chambers is targeted to 
counteract the exposure they have had to radical content.  
 
The technical capability to insert alternative material exists, being used for advertisements that 
are of ten targeted to their audience. The same model could be applied based on the content a 
user becomes subscribed to, to provide them with alternative perspectives f rom credible sources. 
This is naturally constrained by the same restrictions as any other means of  introducing 
counternarratives and may be rejected or ignored by users in favour of  more palatab le ideas. 
However, just as advertisers develop more subtle ways to market their products to social media 
consumers, counternarratives could be inserted in non-confrontational formats that do not create 
cognitive dissonance for the recipients. This can dif fuse outgroup antagonism, as this content can 
be perceived as less confrontational. Naturally, there is no guarantee it will be accepted by its 
recipients, as per cognitive dissonance theory, but it has a greater capacity to disrupt the status 
and reputation of  the ingroup and elevate positive views of  the outgroup.  
 
As with counternarratives, the introduction of  alternative viewpoints and critical analysis must be 
done in a format that is appealing and easily digestible by the consumer, even if  its integration is 
more subtle. A change to the site’s algorithms may provide an avenue for this content to be 
introduced to vulnerable persons, but this does not mean it will be readily considered by its 
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audience.  This means that the approaches used in counternarratives must be applied with a 
consideration for the psychological state an echo chamber member experiences, a state where 
hostility toward outside views is engrained in participants, who view the outgroup as antagonistic 
and threatening.312 The inf iltration of  echo chambers may also be extended to more personable 
experiences, with direct engagement with vulnerable persons to attempt to counteract the social 
inf luences of  other members within an echo  
 
The issue with targeted proliferation is that outsiders were of ten treated with mistrust, with 
members of  echo chambers of ten making their accounts—or at the very least, their identities—
private for self -protection.313 The Islamic State did cast a wide net in their recruitment campaigns, 
but it remains unclear to the researcher how they determined who was authentic in their intentions 
and was subsequently permitted to operate within the echo chamber and interact with other 
members f reely. It is apparent across both case studies that, at the very least, engagement was 
separated on the basis of  gender. Therefore, the disruption of  female recruits needed female 
counter-recruiters to drive this inf iltration. This also meant men could pose as women online but 
needed to provide the sense of  credibility to develop the trus t and conf idence women within the 
Islamic State sisterhood shared with one another.   
 
Exposure to alternative materials in and of  itself  is not necessarily enough to disrupt the 
psychological process of recruitment, in that it does not guarantee a negative social identity that 
would drive someone to seek to leave a group.314 Instead it is important to consider all the 
avenues through which the terrorist organisation engaged with a prospective recruit to af firm their 
sense of  positive social identity. The Islamic State jihadi brides came to represent a complex 
social community, complete with a social hierarchy, inf luencers, and social expectations for 
members.315 This reinforced the collective ingroup identity that was so protective of  its core value 
and violently hostile toward outsiders, consequently creating an environment increasingly dif ficult 
for inf iltration. However, as the technical capabilities already exist and counternarratives can be 
marketed in a more subtle fashion, namely microtargeting, this countermeasure represents a 
possible response that engages with the nature of  social media sites themselves while also not 
posing an existential threat to the ingroup, and by extension, the identities of  its members.  
 
Overall, technical countermeasures have the capacity to limit the ef f icacy of echo chambers. This 
subsequently diminishes the power and inf luence of  relationships within this space, which disrupts 
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the formation of  radical ingroups. In the online space, Muthana became entrenched in a social 
hierarchy rooted in support for the Islamic State through the Baqiyah family.316 This social 
structure af f irmed and reinforced the development of  radical beliefs in the hope that members 
would feel inspired to undertake further actions in support of  the Islamic State: namely, a 
relocation to Syria to become a bride.317 It is impossible to say that alternative perspectives may 
have countered the recruitment of  Muthana, but it would have invariably widened the opportunity 
that she may not have been inf luenced to undertake the actions she did had they seemed more 
unacceptable within her online community. The proliferation of  Muthana’s echo chamber would 
have been dif f icult to achieve without technical measures, due to the guidance her peers of fered 
her to protect her identity and their own. It needed to be done in conjunction with a range of  
counternarratives that were underpinned by messages that mitigated the ef fect recruiters had on 
her sense of  identity as a result of  the ingroup she became a member of .  
 
Likewise, Mahmood became embroiled in an echo chamber that formed as a consequence of  her 
legitimate interest in the Syrian Civil War. The capacity for terrorist organisations to capitalise on 
the interests of  vulnerable individuals is diminished when they are unable to latch on to the content 
that acts as a gateway to their own radical material. While the modif ication of algorithms to reduce 
the emergence of  echo chambers will not necessarily stop terrorist recruiters identifying and 
engaging with vulnerable individuals, it does limit the capacity for groups to emerge and 
participate in behaviours like groupthink and outgroup antagonism. This, in turn, reduces the 
community of  online supporters who are readily available for recruitment and continue to 




The f inal countermeasure examined in this thesis is goodwill gestures, which are the collaborative 
initiatives that emerge in response to terrorism to collectively condemn and seek solutions to their 
actions, including recruitment. These movements have most recently extended to the online 
space and sought to include technical experts and leaders f rom the private and public sectors. 318 
Of ten the actions expected to arise f rom such initiatives qualif ies as a policy or technical measure. 
However, the collection of  resources, power and inf luence behind such initiatives af fords them 
greater legitimacy and to ensure responses are better coordinated between corporations, experts, 
and governments. What has been demonstrated across policy and technical measures is t hat a 
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single approach is seldom suf f icient to disrupt the radicalisation and recruitment process. Instead, 
a coordinated, multidimensional approach is more likely to succeed.  
 
It has been demonstrated throughout this thesis that the drivers behind terrorist recruitment online 
are rooted in the social relationships and groups that form on social media. This interaction, built 
into the sites themselves by their very name, is designed to foster social interactions on a digital 
platform irrespective of  the physical distance that may exist between people. The use of  these 
technologies has become a concern for the social media platforms themselves, who recognise 
the harm that can be caused where a terrorist group entrenches themselves on the platform. 319 
However, the case studies within this thesis used multiple social media platforms to engage with 
their peers, recruiters, and eventually, with prospective recruits. Where a social media platform 
becomes inhospitable to a terrorist organisation, they move to another.320 As such, the denial of  
access needed to counter recruitment on social media must come f rom a collaborative approach 
incorporating governments, communities, experts, and social media platforms.  
 
Goodwill gestures enable a collaborative approach to counterterrorism issues. The intention 
behind this approach is to foster greater cohesion and coordination in the implementation of  
countermeasures across a spectrum of  actors, including counterterrorism practitioners, experts, 
community leaders and governments, such as the Christchurch Call.321 One of  the issues with 
countermeasures is their application tends to be broad. While individual-level responses are 
resource-intensive, broad approaches can have an impact on the recruitment that is dif f icult to 
measure, but the social dimension of  recruitment demonstrated in the case studies of  this thesis 
indicates that it may be dif ficult for a broader approach to have an ef fective impact. Goodwill 
gestures can provide a space whereby the appropriate actors are brought  together to f ind how 
they can best utilise resources to mitigate terrorist recruitment online. This also amplif ies the 
perception of  a united outgroup, which can undermine ingroup narratives of  disharmony, disunity, 
and weakness.  
 
In addition to collaboration and coordination, goodwill initiatives also provide a basis upon which 
independent contributions to counterterrorism are encouraged and supported. The Global Internet  
Forum to Counter Terrorism (GIFCT), for instance, sees members commit to improving their own 
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platforms in addition to collaborative ef forts.322 The imposition of  expectations across a wide 
variety of  actors can also work to reduce discrepancies that are exploited by terrorist organisations 
on social media sites. Members of  the GIFCT include Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, Pinterest, and 
LinkedIn.323  Though competitors, these social media platforms all host dif ferent types of  content 
and can be used in dif ferent ways. As such, each respective platform must implement its own 
measures to counteract the ways terrorist organisations may seek to use their platform.  
 
The consequence of  a unif ied approach to counterterrorism online—exemplif ied in the denial of  
access to the Islamic State and its members—has been to limit their opportunities to establish 
and entrench social communities online. The inhospitable state of  mainstream social media 
networks has pushed the Islamic State to prioritise platforms where they can operate with less 
restriction. In 2015, the Islamic State circulated a list of  ‘safe’ mobile communication applications 
and encouraged that sensitive conversations with recruiters take place on Telegram, as opposed 
to across social media sites.324 The Islamic State would use channels on this platform to 
communicate to followers, disseminate radical content and plan attacks. 325 However, by 
December 2019, the Islamic State had reportedly been removed f rom the platform following an 
account deletion campaign by Telegram.326 
 
Even when the Islamic State were able to maintain a presence on Telegram, their reach was 
reduced. The steps required for interested individuals to access radical content are greater than 
on mainstream social media platforms with more accessible search functions. One element of  
attraction for members of  the Islamic State was the outward projection of  power, inf luence and 
status members presented online. Mahmood and Muthana posted content that indicated they 
believed the Islamic State to be superior, and by extension, they developed a positive social 
identity linked to their membership. Muthana, for instance, posted material that correlated with 
her position as a member of  the baqiyah family, representative of  her elevated status within the 
group.327As the Islamic State lost its capacity to operate online, its members were limited in their 
ability to project the core values of  the group and attract new members to its ranks.  
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The impact of  this was to create the perception that the Islamic  State were losing in the social 
media space. Most permanent suspensions f rom mainstream platforms limited the capacity for 
members to remain connected with one another, and subsequently diminished the size of  their 
social media presence. For individuals who had to continually seek out new platforms and 
accounts, it would have been increasingly dif f icult to ensure their own security online and to 
maintain the impression that they were part of  a group that sat in a position of  power. Without 
access to the narratives created and controlled by the Islamic State, it became increasingly 
possible for the proliferation of  alternative information sources into their echo chamber, which 
would have undermined these narratives. This meant that favourable comparisons to outgroups 
became less compelling with reduced access to this information, leading to a negative social 
identity and driving individuals to f ind new social groups.  
 
Goodwill initiatives in the form of  the GIFCT, and others like it, such as the Christchurch Call of  
2019, can act to coordinate individual measures to achieve better collective results. This also 
provides opportunities to limit the reach future terrorist organisations may have on social media 
platforms. This means that when a terrorist organisation next seeks to establish a presence 
across social media as a means of  recruitment, there is already a f ramework in place to deny 
them access to multiple social media sites in a decreased timeframe. The use of  social media 
networks for recruitment leads to the emergence of  social groups by its own design. In future, 
goodwill initiatives have the capacity to prevent and restrict the access and reach of  such groups 
on social media platforms, as well as reduce the timeframe it takes them to exhaust all other 
mainstream social media options. 
 
It ought to be acknowledged that the denial of  access to a space where terrorist organisations 
congregate online does not remove the threat posed by radicalised individuals, who may be driven 
to violence without routine engagements that take place on social media, but rather, through the 
consumption of  material independent of  social media. However, it severely limits the reach of  
terrorist organisations, like the Islamic State, to foster social groups. Likewise, where social media 
companies have improved channels to communicate with counterterrorism practitioners, experts, 
and community leaders (and vice versa), there are improved opportunities for a multidimensional 
approach that combines online and of fline measures to reduce the risk posed by radicalised 
persons. 
 
The themes identif ied across both case studies had strong ties to their sense of  self -identity, 
which appeared to be derived f rom the relationships they formed with likeminded individuals 
online. The concept of  sisterhood or a familial connection appeared to form a large portion of  their 
interactions with others and represented an ingroup within an ingroup. Likewise, the sense of  
religious obligation both women experienced was a consequence of  the adoption of  Salafist Jihadi 
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Islam as a fundamental component of  their identity. While it is not uncommon for individuals to 
form their identities around a religious outlook, the consequences, in the case of  the Islamic State, 
were to move to an increasingly radical position and view the outgroup as an enemy. With respect 
to both themes, a unif ied response f rom outgroup members with similar experiences and 
identities, namely Muslim women, may have had the capacity to undermine the status of  the 
ingroup and to make promotion within its ranks a less compelling prospect.  
 
The ef fect of  goodwill initiatives is contingent on the willingness of  all necessary parties —
governments, their respective institutions, and technical corporations—to participate and use the 
initiative as a starting place for further action. Such action f requently is expected to incorporate 
policy and technical measures outlined above, as well as others not explored in this thesis. The 
intention behind such initiatives is to create a collective statement that terrorism is  not tolerated 
in the online sphere, and then to undertake actions that reinforce these views. 328 Such actions 
include the measures detailed throughout this chapter, as well as other initiatives on a case-by-
case basis.  
 
There are issues within the initiatives themselves, as a consequence of  the matter they seek to 
combat. These goodwill gestures can be seen as the unif ication of  the outgroup, for whom terrorist 
organisations view themselves as distinct f rom. In the case of  the Islamic State, the outgroup 
represented an extremely broad collection of  individuals and groups, notwithstanding likeminded 
organisations and terror groups who did not absolutely conform to their ideology. This unif ication 
can further entrench a sense of  ‘otherness’ and be perceived as hostility by members of  the 
ingroup, which deepens the divide between those at risk of  radicalisation and those interested in 
intervention. These initiatives also raise the prof ile of  counter-recruitment campaigns, which 
subsequently increases the caution and suspicion within online communities that they may be 
targeted.  
 
Mahmood was active amongst members who perceived the online environment to be a distinct 
province of  the Islamic State. As this environment became more dif ficult for members to operate 
in, it could be perceived as an existential threat to the group itself , even though it poses no 
physical risks. This was demonstrated when members faced account deletion on the platform 
Riot, where the Islamic State had relocated af ter being ousted f rom Telegram.329 Members were 
seen to react with confusion and f rustration to the site’s actions, as they lost contact with one 
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another and found few opportunities on other social media sites.330 Though such statements are 
seemingly trivial, where this environment is perceived as a f rontier, the constant removal f rom 
social media platforms feels deeply personal to those who have made it their home.  
 
In circumstances of  existential threat, ingroup bias has been shown to increase. 331 This means 
that as members on social media sites are denied access to such platforms, there may be an 
increased tendency to favour the Islamic State more than before, which may culminate in more 
extreme behaviours than before under the belief  the outgroup pose an existential threat. This  
poses its own dangers, as members will have invariably been exposed to the violent expectations 
of  the organisation and may seek to act on it. Even in instances where they do not resort to 
violence, increased ingroup favouritism will make these individuals  more resistant to other 
countermeasures that may be enabled as a consequence of  goodwill initiatives. This would be 
especially true if  further countermeasures originated f rom members of  the outgroup, who are 
already treated with suspicion, and would likely be antagonised further under conditions of  
increased ingroup favouritism. 
 
A message of  condemnation can have the ef fect of  delegitimising the recruitment campaigns of  
terrorist organisations. This is particularly ef fective when it comes f rom multiple do mains and 
seeks to remove the platform of  any terrorist organisation. GIFTC represents how several social 
media networks have put aside commercial rivalries to present a unif ied f ront and deny terrorist 
organisations access to their services. The success o f  such denial is of ten mixed, based on the 
benef its and risks of  such action, but in making their platforms more dif ficult to use, they are able 
to limit the opportunities for terrorist organisations to embed themselves on the sites and conduct 
recruitment campaigns. Where social media companies have clear policies and f rameworks in 
place to limit the presence of  a terrorist group on their platform, the less able these groups are to 
maintain an enduring presence and reach a wider audience.  
 
Muthana, in particular, operated in a digital environment where she was aware of  the criticisms 
that had mounted against the Islamic State. Before her departure, she was likely exposed to the 
media coverage of  their atrocities and the unif ied responses that came f rom governmental and 
expert voices alike. It cannot be stated that these acts did not contribute to a sense of  confusion 
within Muthana, but her subsequent decision to travel to Syria and join the Islamic State is 
indicative that these measures were not enough. To Muthana, the Islamic State were not the 
illegitimate organisation global actors had united to characterise it as. Instead, the unif ication of  
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the ‘other’ was perceived as an existential threat to the Islamic State in their targeting of  any  
individual or group who joined in these ef forts and sought to turn their own members against them.  
 
When it comes to countering terrorist recruitment in this environment, it is, therefore, important to 
consider the way it will be received. While there are certain limitations to the advances that can 
be made while considered a part of  the outgroup, the content and perception of  restrictive actions 
pushed in the online space in a coordinated and cohesive approach can be disruptive to the 
formation and maintenance of  a strong ingroup. Where members start to doubt, even slightly, the 
ef fectiveness, morals, and objectives of  the group they belong to, their own self -esteem and 
identity can be adversely af fected. As such, they may be receptive to new relationships  and 
groups where they can develop status and boost their self -esteem. The incorporation of  broader 
identity-based groups to whom the prospective recruits can relate, such as the Islamic community 
in this instance, has the potential to make counter-recruitment activities feel less adversarial and 
antagonistic, as there are common identity-based themes and experiences that can be used to 
bridge the divide.  
 
This response is to be expected when terrorist organisations need to defend themselves against 
their adversaries in narratives. However, these goodwill gestures can be ef fective when they are 
comprised of  individuals or groups who are prepared to use the tools at their disposal to limit the 
reach and capability of  the organisations they seek to counter. As with all countermeasures, there 
are restrictions of  the ef f icacy of  such an approach that are rooted in the psychological reaction 
of  radicalised individuals engaged in terrorist organisations. The principal benef it of  goodwill 
initiatives is in the collaborative approach it af fords counter-recruitment writ large, whereby 
resources can be pooled, and a multidimensional approach can limit the shortcomings of  each 
individual countermeasure. 
 
The resistance to such initiatives by terrorist organisations, reinforced by the reaction members 
have to existential threats and challenges to their sense of  social identity, mean it is inevitable 
that there will be strong resistance amongst terrorist organisations to the implementation and 
action of  such initiatives. However, in order to disestablish a group and make it unviable for them 
to continue to operate on social media sites, it is important to consider the role social identity 
theory may have in the reception to countermeasures, particularly with respect to the unintended 
consequences that may arise where individuals feel their identity is threatened. The strength of  
these group dynamics was enough to drive Muthana and Mahmood to relocate to a warzone f rom 
their western lifestyles and presents immense challenges that are likely to endure and be 






Individual responses to countermeasures are of ten hard to predict, but when these responses are 
examined with respect to the relationships an individual has with a radical ingroup, it becomes 
more apparent how certain countermeasures will be received and perceived. First and foremost, 
the collective identity of  the ingroup entrenches a sense of  loyalty and trust that dissuades 
members f rom betraying the group. Outgroup antagonism also builds a sense of  superiority and 
fear of  ‘otherness’ as members aim to distinguish themselves f rom the outgroup. Muthana noted 
her fear of  hellf ire if  she did not conform to the expectations of  the Islamic State, and subsequently 
rejected the values she had been raised with in the west.332 When placed in context with the 
material she was exposed to and the relationships she formed, social identity theory provides 
insight into why Muthana developed such fears, and also  why she would have been so resistant 
to any ef forts to intervene in her radicalisation and recruitment.  
 
The division of  countermeasures into policy, technical solutions and goodwill initiatives does not 
ref lect an exhaustive approach of  all the measures available to counterterrorism practitioners, but 
rather, is an attempt to broadly categorise some of  the main approaches to the issue of  terrorist 
recruitment. The utility of  such approaches is impossible to quantify, as it is incredibly dif ficult to 
measure a non-outcome, but there are certain advantages af forded by each approach in terms 
of  the ways it can limit the radicalisation and recruitment of  further vulnerable individuals. Goodwill 
initiatives, in particular, highlight the potential where these countermeasures are used 
collaboratively to create multidimensional approaches to countering terrorist recruitment. While 
each of  these approaches have shortcomings that can hinder their ef f icacy and exacerbate 
ingroup and outgroup tensions, when used in conjunction with one another, the overall impact 
could better undermine the positive social identity individuals associate with their ingroup 
membership. 
 
One of  the core issues of  these countermeasures is their versatility and application in the social 
media space. The Islamic State quickly proved they were adaptable to social media and exploited 
its very design to indiscriminately disseminate radical content and recruit f rom pools of vulnerable 
people identif ied online. In contrast, countermeasures were slow and reactionary. By the time the 
Islamic State found themselves homeless across social media platforms, with their eviction f rom 
Telegram in December 2019, it had been f ive years since the terrorist organisation f irst 
emerged.333 In that timespan, countless individuals were recruited into its ranks, some travelling  
to Iraq and Syria, and others joining a digital jihad f rom their homelands. 
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Terrorist recruitment is a social experience, which centres around shared grievances and 
develops into a common ident ity. Muthana and Mahmood’s experiences were rooted in their 
social interactions with other women and def ined how they viewed themselves and their identities 
in accordance with shared beliefs. It is these relationships that appear to be one of  the main 
drivers for female recruits within the Islamic State. The sense of  sisterhood that emerged as a 
product of  echo chambers developed on social media provided both Mahmood and Muthana with 
a support network that transcended physical boundaries and imposed behavio ural expectations 
and codes of  conduct that translated into real-world action. The issues that motivated Mahmood 
and Muthana to investigate the Islamic State may have varied, but the factors that seemingly 
drove them to actually join were rooted in the social networks they constructed for themselves 
online.  
 
The psychological ef fect these relationships have on the individual is also of ten overlooked in the 
development of  countermeasures.334 The social identity that is derived f rom these interactions is 
an important component in the loyalty and trust that reinforces group cohesion and ingroup 
favouritism. In future, consideration of  the nature of  social relationships, as well as an 
understanding of  the factors that enable such relationships to thrive, is a factor that will improve 
the responses to radicalisation and recruitment across social media platforms. This is particularly 
true as terrorist organisations develop broader recruitment strategies that call for broad 
responses. Overall, where social identity theory, and the relationships that drive this, is taken into 
consideration, it can improve the opportunities for countermeasures to succeed just as it improves 
the chances for terrorists to recruit. 
  
 




Chapter VII: Conclusion 
 
While the successful recruitment of  western women by the Islamic State seems counterintuitive 
upon f irst consideration, particularly given the extensive use of  violence against women, social 
media posts made by Aqsa Mahmood and Hoda Muthana reveal themes which, when analysed 
through the lens of  social identity theory, of fer possible explanations for their motivations to 
undertake hijrah to Syria. Both born and raised in western nations, Mahmood and Muthana 
appeared to have no predisposition to radical ideologies on the basis of  their upbringing. However, 
encounters on social media with the Islamic State, in the form of  its content, supporters, and 
recruiters, ultimately persuaded them to adopt an extremist position and relocate to Syria for the 
purpose of  supporting the intergenerational aspirations of  the Islamic State as wives and mothers.  
 
Social media sites are designed to optimise user experiences by allowing people to select the 
content they want to follow and share. This means users can surround themselves with 
likeminded opinions in such a way that distorts the perception of  their real-world popularity. Social 
media was an enabler for both women, creating an echo chamber that contributed to their 
radicalisation and facilitated interactions with likeminded and more extreme individuals. This was 
the f irst theme identif ied across both case studies, and which would have likely been experienced 
by many other women who joined the Islamic State af ter engagement on social media. These 
echo chambers allowed Mahmood and Muthana to embroil themselves in extremist environments  
that refused outsider contributions and perspectives, which may have otherwise acted as 
moderators on their thoughts and subsequent behaviours. 
 
In both cases, their echo chambers involved members with whom Mahmood and Muthana formed 
bonds modelled on familial structures: the second theme identif ied in this study. For Mahmood, 
there was a particular emphasis on the concept of  sisterhood, which is important within Islam 
more broadly, but was manipulated as a means to understand the role of  women within a 
radicalised context. This sisterhood acted as a support network and formed the basis of  the 
ingroup to which Mahmood belonged. It was this sisterhood that appeared to guide Mahmood in 
understanding how to categorise and identify her social world, as well as setting the extremist 
belief  system she adopted in her internalisation of  the group as her own. While Muthana engaged 
with the baqiyah family, who were connected directly with the Islamic State, her interactions were 
primarily with other women. This family created a clear path by which status could be earned and 
female members could express their devotion to the group, with the top position being that of  a 
martyr’s widow. Once again, this group guided Muthana in her action of  travelling to Syria as a 





The third theme to emerge was that of  a sense of  religious obligation. The imposition of  t his 
obligation took place over social media via exposure to extremist content that f it the Islamic State 
narrative. However, not all of  this content was necessarily original to the terrorist organisation, 
with both women posting references to religious scholarship and their personal takes on a number 
of  issues f rom a religious perspective. The Islamic State used fundamental religious concepts, 
particularly in terms of  Jannah and the af terlife, to inf luence the decisions of  its followers. For both 
women, hijrah to Syria would be met with not only increased social status, but benef its in the 
af terlife, while inaction would lead to severe spiritual consequences. These women were raised 
as moderate Muslims; however, fundamental understandings of  Islamic concepts were 
misrepresented by the Islamic State in their own interpretation so as to motivate its supporters to 
undertake acts in support of  the group. Coupled with the echo chamber ef fect and inf luential 
sisterhoods both women became embroiled in, they came to view hijrah as a means by which 
they could satisfy religious duties, while attaining and maintaining ingroup membership.  
 
These motivations can be understood within the f ramework of  social identity, whereby their 
association with and participation in the Islamic State af forded them a positive social identity. This 
was the result of  favourable comparisons with outgroup counterparts , as well as identif ication with 
the ingroup and internalisation of  their values and ideals. The distortion of  information both women 
received via their echo chambers and social connections formed the basis of  this interpretation 
that the Islamic State were militarily and spiritually superior to adversaries  – such as western 
nations and Muslims who did not agree with their radical interpretation of  Islam – and allowed 
both women to view their own communities negatively while they still resided within them.  While 
their participation could have remained digital, as was the case with many supporters who never 
undertook hijrah, the desire to elevate their social status within the group, meet group behavioural 
expectations and avoid the social and spiritual consequences of  non-participation pushed both 
women to Syria, while also creating and bolstering a positive social identity.  
 
The rise of  social media, and of  terrorist recruitment on social media, has meant that any person 
with internet access has the capacity to access radical content. For counterterrorism practitioners, 
this has meant that recruitment is no longer relegated to a select group of  vulnerable persons  
identif iable by the locations they f requent and people they interact with. On paper, neither 
Mahmood nor Muthana appeared to have the hallmarks of  prospective terrorists and may have 
not registered as such with counter-recruiters until they were inside the territory held by the Islamic 
State. As such, social identify theory was used in this thesis to  not only understand the motivations 
of  female Islamic State recruits but also to evaluate the ef f icacy of  counter-recruitment 
mechanisms, many of  which have been adapted for the recent uptake of  social media use, with 
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particular consideration of  the themes identif ied as the primary driver for Muthana and Mahmood 
online.  
 
In order to counter the psychological benef its of  the Islamic State recruitment model,  
counterterrorism practitioners would have needed to associate a negative social identity to the 
Islamic State to push the women to f ind another source f rom which they could derive a positive 
social identity. This notion was considered in terms of  three approaches to countering terrorist 
recruitment: policy, technical and goodwill measures. All of  these initiatives had both advantages 
and disadvantages, but when considered in terms of  social identity theory, it was noted that there 
was the potential to exacerbate intergroup conf lict by presenting the outgroup as an existential 
and united threat to the ingroup in attempts to limit terrorist presences on social media. This was 
true for Mahmood and Muthana who were deeply attached to  ingroup relationships and reaped 
psychological rewards for their ongoing and escalating involvement with the group, rewards which 
were unmatched elsewhere, and would have reacted negatively to the prospect of  losing these 
relationships and rewards.  
 
Across all three counter-recruitment mechanisms examined, the signif icance of  intergroup conf lict 
became a particularly apparent basis upon which the responsiveness of  prospective recruits could 
be understood as it af f irmed the positive social identity af forded to them by the Islamic State. 
Behaviours observed in this study where counter-recruitment material was encountered,  
particularly in the case of  Muthana, who was active on social media af ter the of ficial emergence 
of  the Islamic State in mid-2014, were generally a result of  outgroup antagonism promoted by the 
ingroup. The Islamic State (the ingroup) pushed the narrative that the West (the outgroup) were 
an existential threat, thereby undermining any of  the counter-recruitment material encountered. It 
was found that this solidif ied the resolve of  the ingroup, making clear the expectations and 
requirements of  members, even in the face of  counter-recruitment material. It was also identif ied 
that certain approaches to counter-recruitment within this environment had the capacity to further 
entrench the view of  the outgroup as an existential threat, such as suspending accounts f rom 
social media sites, which essentially rendered such ef forts counterproductive.   
 
The existence of  echo chambers also hampered ef forts to deliver counternarratives, meaning  
they would not have reached their intended audience even if  these had been constructed in such 
a way that did not inf lame intergroup conf lict. The Islamic State exercised a level of  control over 
the material circulated amongst its online supporters and would pre-empt counter-recruitment 
material so as to undermine its ef f icacy if  it was encountered elsewhere online or of f line. While 
there are mechanisms to disrupt echo chambers, and the presence of  extremist material online 
has become a focus of  several social media companies, it was identif ied  in this study that the 
most successful counter-recruitment mechanism was a combined and collaborative approach, 
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such as goodwill gestures aimed at unifying social media companies with governments. As with 
other approaches, this could inf lame tensions; however, with pooled resources, access to a 
broader range of  credible messengers, and technical countermeasures, collaborative initiatives 
have the potential to compensate for the shortcomings of  using a single approach to counter 
terrorist recruitment and provide a multifaceted approach to deradicalise and disrupt recruitment.  
 
While this thesis identif ied three themes across two case studies, broader observations have 
been made about the social and psychological nature of  the radicalisation and recruitment  
process on the basis of  interactions not only between recruiters and recruits, but also amongst 
recruits themselves. Social media has enabled these interactions to take place transnat ionally  
with an ease that has never before been possible. These social media sites also make possible 
a digital space where ingroups can conform and convene. Mahmood and Muthana were sheltered  
f rom alternative perspectives in this space, and subsequently, developed an unchallenged view 
of  the Islamic State. For both, the social and psychological benef its of  their participation 
outweighed those found in their western lifestyle, and on this basis, they undertook hijrah to Syria, 
alongside countless other women f rom across the globe.  
 
The Islamic State may have been notable f or their early widespread use of  social media in 2014, 
but they are far f rom the only terrorist organisation to recruit online.  Extremist organisations f rom 
across the ideological spectrum have found homes on social media to radicalise and recruit 
individuals. While the drivers of  these recruits require further research, social identity will 
invariably have a role to play as it did in the cases of  Mahmood and Muthana. Likewise, social 
identity theory could be considered in tailoring collaborative approaches to disrupt further terrorist 
recruitment f rom other organisations online. What is apparent, irrespective of  how the problem is 
approached, is that terrorist groups have established itself  on social media and will present an 
enduring challenge for some time to come. Mahmood and Muthana may have been amongst the 
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